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The Agricultural Act of 2014, signed February 7, 2014, introduces a new era of federal support 
in the production of major agricultural commodities in the United States for the 2014 through 
2018 crop years. The ultimate result of the Act was a 954-page piece of legislation that 
represented market-oriented policies such as the creation of an area-wide shallow loss revenue 
support program for covered commodities and a greater reliance on crop insurance products 
offered as a suite of risk management tools available to producers.  
The impact that this law has on agricultural producers in the Mississippi River delta region of the 
Mid-south is not yet fully known. Moving forward, the elimination of the direct payment 
program is likely to have an impact on farm income, as these payments were made annually and 
were decoupled from actual market prices. Various combinations of federal farm programs, 
chosen irrevocable, paired with multiple crop insurance products, that are purchased annually, 
will act to mitigate the risks of production. 
Simulation analysis provides a basis for evaluating the variability associated with production 
systems in the Mississippi River delta region. Three representative rice and soybean farms and 
six corn, cotton, and soybean farms were modeled as to determine the five year net returns 
resulting from price and yield risk as well as to evaluate alternative farm program and crop 
insurance selection. Financial performance of these farms is measured for varying levels of risk 
using a stochastic efficiency criteria. Results are presented for multiple combinations of the 
agriculture risk coverage and price loss coverage programs of the commodity title and revenue 
protection, supplemental coverage option endorsement, and the stacked income protection plan 
for producers of upland cotton contained in crop insurance title of the current farm law. For each 
farm at each location, an estimate to the net present value of the cumulative net returns above 
variable costs to the producer for the five year life of the farm bill is provided. Results from 
xi 
 
different farming operations suggest the preferred pairing of farm programs and crop insurance 


















CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
Agricultural production in the southern United States is centered on the major row crops of the 
Mississippi River delta region which include but are not limited to corn, cotton, rice, and 
soybeans. According to economic production summaries released in 2013, Louisiana agricultural 
enterprises contributed over $6.9 billion to the state’s economy. Of that total, corn contributed 
$735,472,192 (10.6%); cotton $147,816,799 (2.1%); rice $494,415,302 (7.1%); and soybeans 
$773,443,391 (11.1%). Collectively, these four crops accounted for nearly 31% of the value of 
agricultural production in Louisiana (Louisiana State University Agricultural Center, 2013). In 
Arkansas, the total direct value of agricultural production and processing in 2013 was slightly 
over $9.0 billion. Of that total, corn contributed $859,785,000 (9.5%); cotton $420,710,000 
(4.6%); rice $1,363,086,000 (15.1%); and soybeans $1,956,672,000 (21.7%). Collectively these 
four crops accounted for nearly 51% of the value of agricultural production in Arkansas in 2013 
(University of Arkansas, 2013). Mississippi agricultural enterprises contributed $7.4 billion to 
the state’s economy in 2013. Of that total, corn contributed $631,000,000 (8.5%); cotton 
$331,000,000 (4.5%); rice $141,000,000 (1.9%); and soybeans $993,000,000 (13.4%). These 
four crops accounted for approximately 28% of the value of agricultural production in 
Mississippi in 2013 (Mississippi State University, 2013).  
 
1.1 Major Agricultural Production Systems of the Mississippi River Delta Region  
 
Crop rotation has been a long-standing agronomic practice and can be defined as a more or less 
regular recurrent succession of producing different crops on the same land (Kipps, 1970). Some 
examples of typical crop rotation system include two-year rotations (e.g. corn/soybeans, 
rice/soybeans, and corn/cotton) and three-year rotations (e.g. corn/soybeans/wheat and 
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rice/cotton/soybeans). Corn, cotton, rice and soybean crops are typically produced in a 
rotational-based production system in the Mid-south region of the U.S. Soybeans are also rotated 
with rice, although this rotation is limited to rice fields that are considered fallow- remaining idle 
after two or more consecutive years of rice. The introduction of soybeans and rice to the 
Mississippi River delta region of the Mid-south, however, took some of the heavier clay soils of 
the Delta out of cotton production and converted them to growing these two crops, usually in a 
rotational sequence (Burns, et al., 2007). Cotton, produced in a continuous production system, 
remained the primary crop on the loam soils and sandy-loam soils of the Delta region. Since the 
majority of crawfish in the U.S. are produced on over 100,000 farmed acres annually in 
Louisiana, rice and crawfish are commonly produced together in alternative crop rotation 
systems. Most of its production occurs in the southwestern part of the state (Salassi, et al., 2009).  
For crops being rotated, producers must determine what crop mix they wish to produce on their 
farming operation as to minimize production risk while maximizing economic returns. Multiple 
studies have been conducted in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi that denote the benefits to 
crop rotation resulting in yield increases, increased soil organic matter, avoidance of soil fertility 
depletion, reduced disease, insect and weed pressure, and farm profitability (Guidry, et al., 2001; 
Martin, et al., 2002; Bruns, et al., 2007; Salassi, et al., 2009;  Hristovska, et al., 2011). One of the 
primary factors impacting crop production choices by agricultural producers is the expected 
market price of each commodity and the resulting expected net economic returns from the 
production of selected commodities, as well as the relative economic risk associated with 
production of potential commodities (Anderson and Griffiths, 1982; Huirne, et al., 2000). Crop 
rotation risk involves yield variability and net return benefits resulting from higher yields and 
reduced production costs (Helmers, et al., 2001). 
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The major components that characterize production systems in the Mississippi River delta region 
include proper selection of crop cultivar, pest control, cropping system, tillage method, nutrient 
management, and water management. Each component must be selected according to the 
individual farm and/or crop situation (Snipes, et al., 2005). Supplemental to the agronomic 
benefits, crop rotations are often considered for the economic benefits. The relative economic 
return risk from crop production varies across commodities due to differences in the historical 
variability of market prices and crop yields and production cost difference per locale. Market 
instability of commodities has precipitated the need for diversification of income, which can be 
considered an additional benefit to crop rotation. Rotations are generally thought to reduce yield 
variability and may result in higher yields as well as reduced production costs (Helmers, et al., 
2001). By increasing the number of commodities produced per farm unit, producers can offset 
some of the risk associated with producing one particular commodity. Also, different cultural 
practices needed at different times for various crops provide for a more even distribution of labor 
(Kurtz, et al., 1990). The economic evaluation of the relative profitability of a particular crop 
rotation system generally includes the economic benefit of the production of one crop on the 
other crop or crops, in an indirect manner (Salassi, et al., 2009). In addition, crop rotation choices 
made by producers would be expected to vary based primarily upon their risk preferences 
(Salassi, et al., 2013).  
Since the mid-2000s, shifts away from cotton and into corn and soybean crops can be observed 
in the Mississippi River delta region of the Mid-south that include the states of Arkansas, 





Table 1.1 Arkansas production history of corn, cotton, rice, and soybeans, 1996-2013.  

















































































































 Source: USDA NASS, 2014.  Where: (LG) represents long grain rice varieties and (MG) 
represents medium grain rice varieties.  
 
Part of this acreage shift can be attributed to the increased demand for corn-based ethanol from 
production facilities located in the Midwestern United States coupled by a rise in price of foreign 
petroleum. Increased levels of corn-based ethanol resulted from a combination of not only rising 
gasoline prices but also a suite of Federal bioenergy policies that provides evidence that 
producers have altered their land-use decisions in response to increased demand for corn 
(Wallander, et al., 2011). An increasingly common crop rotation in the Mid-south is cotton 
rotated with corn and corn rotated with soybeans (Martin and Hanks, 2009; Reddy, et al., 2013). 
Rice is typically rotated with soybeans. Although rice is the more profitable crop than soybeans, 
the latter crop is generally rotated with rice as a means of controlling red rice, a close weed 
relative to rice (Hristovska, et al., 2011). Many producers in the Mid-south initially  
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Table 1.2. Louisiana production history of corn, cotton, rice, and soybeans, 1996-2013. 

















































































































Source: USDA NASS, 2014. Where: (LG) represents long grain rice varieties and (MG) 
represents medium grain rice verities. 
 
viewed corn as an alternative crop to cotton, and considering the fact that the market price for 
corn nearly doubled over the latter part of the decade, corn was solidified as a cornerstone of 
most farming operations in the region opposed to being an alternative crop choice.  
Changes in government commodity support programs and increases to the price of feed grains in 
recent years has encouraged producers in the Delta region to shift cotton acreage to other crops, 
such as corn, to remain profitable. In recent years, soybean and corn acreage has increased with a 
continual decreases in cotton acreage (Reddy, et al., 2013). The increase in price for grain crops 
have acted as a stimulus for farm operators inside the region as well as across the country as 
producers respond to increased market demand for corn and soybean crops. The appeal of the 
corn market, increased global demand for oilseeds (e.g. soybeans), and the flat market price for 
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cotton collectively lead to a reduction of cotton acres in favor of corn and soybeans- which could 
be produced with a lower management intensity- made these grain crops commercially attractive. 
 
Table 1.3. Mississippi production history of corn, cotton, rice, and soybeans, 1996-2013.  






























































































Source: USDA NASS, 2014. Where: (LG) represents long grain rice varieties.  
 
 
National marketing year average (MYA) prices for these major row crops were obtained from 
USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) and presented in Table 1.4. The trend in 
corn, cotton, and soybean acres that emerged in early 2000, suggests that producers are receptive 
to crop rotation systems (Guidry, et al., 2001). In the Mid-south region, planted acreage moving 
into the 2007/08 crop year witnessed corn prices near record levels for the decade ($4.20 per 





Table 1.4. National marketing year average prices per unit for major row crops produced in the 
Mississippi River delta region, 1996-2013. 

















































































































Source: USDA NASS, 2014. Where: (LG) represents long grain rice varieties and (MG) 
represents medium grain rice verities. 
 
Given the price relationship between cotton and corn, producers elected to plant corn instead of 
cotton (Fannin, et al., 2008). Further highlighting this trend, national acreage shifted out of 
soybeans and into corn between 2006 and 2007, but soybean acreage rebounded between 2007 
and 2008. Corn and soybean acres expanded over the short and long run, whereas most other 
crop acreage decreased over the long run (Wallander, et al., 2011). For example, Arkansas and 
Mississippi underwent large increases in corn acreage with Louisiana showing a significant 
increase in both corn and soybean acreage in this period.  In the lower Mississippi River Valley 
states of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi, corn production has increased from nearly 
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600,000 acres in 1995 to about 1,000,000 acres in 2005 with a large portion of this corn 
production occurring in a rotation with cotton (Bruns, et al., 2007). 
Reasons that can be attributed to this acreage decline in cotton are the yield and price of 
competing crops– most noticeably corn and soybeans. Corn and soybean crops have lower 
management intensity when compared to cotton. A noticeable production cost difference exists 
in fertilizer, seed, insect control programs, as well as with harvesting costs when cotton is 
compared to corn and soybeans in the Mississippi delta region. In the latter part of the past 
decade, cotton acreage in Louisiana has shifted into more profitable alternatives – namely 
acreage expansion in corn, soybeans, and wheat. According to USDA NASS data from 2006, 
cotton acreage in Arkansas and Mississippi exceeded 1,100,000 acres in each state and 635,000 
acres in Louisiana. By 2009, cotton acreage had declined to 520,000 (56%) and 305,000 (75%) 
in Arkansas and Mississippi and 230,000 (64%) acres in Louisiana- all record lows, respectively 
for each state. Over this same three-year period, corn acreage in each state nearly doubled. 
Arkansas corn acres increased from 190,000 acres in 2006 to 430,000 in 2009 (126%). 
Mississippi corn acreage increased from 340,000 to 730,000 acres (115%). Corn acres in 
Louisiana increased from 300,000 acres to 630,000 in 2009 (110%). Soybean acreage in the 
region also increased. From 2006 to 2009, soybean plantings increased by 310,000 (10%); 
490,000 (29%); and 150,000 (17%) acres in Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana respectively. 
This data support claims made by Wallander, et al., (2011) that referenced national average 
trends in short run expansion of corn and soybean acreage. 
 A suppressed cotton market price and rising input costs coupled with increased grain prices have 
caused cotton acres to reach historic lows. Ebelhar, et al., (2011) states that higher grain prices 
are lower cotton prices have eroded the cotton base while corn production has greatly increased 
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in the last few years. Corn and soybean production are increasing while cotton acres are in 
decline in the Mississippi delta (Deliberto, et al., 2013). Paxton, et al., (2003) identifies a 
management strategy such that producers in northeast Louisiana are rotating crops in response to 
changing market signals and the ability of producers to practice crop rotation without 
jeopardizing benefits under federal farm programs. Guidry, et al., (2001) states that with the 
removal of acreage restrictions and government payments no longer tied to production, 
producers have the flexibility to select cropping systems based on market signals rather than 
policy provisions.  
In response to increases in the market prices for corn and soybeans, producers in the Mississippi 
River delta region have expanded production of these grain crops on their farms. However, input 
price volatility, as witnessed throughout the second half of the past decade, has had a significant 
impact on agricultural producers in the Mid-south as well as across the country in terms of 
profitability. Aside from the economic benefit of crop rotation systems, production costs per acre 
and management intensity of one or more crop alternatives must be considered. Input price 
volatility has had a substantial impact on crop returns for operations in the Mid-south (Martin, et 
al., 2002; Hristovska, et al., 2011; Deliberto, et al., 2013; Salassi, et al., 2013). Energy-related 
farm inputs have increased significantly in recent years, driven primarily from large increases in 
costs associated with fertilizers, chemicals, and seed. Deliberto, et al., (2013) examines the ten 
year observation period from 2002-2011, in which fertilizer, chemical, seed, and fuel inputs 
composed two-thirds of total variable costs per acre for corn and soybeans and half of the 
variable costs per acre for cotton produced in the of northeastern Louisiana. For example, diesel 
fuel price per gallon has undergone nearly a three-fold increase, from $0.94 per gallon in 2002 to 
$2.75 per gallon in 2011, reaching its highest unit price in 2008 at $2.90 per gallon. Unit costs 
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for phosphate and potash fertilizer have tripled, while nitrogen costs have increased to 2.5 times 
their unit cost level since 2002.  
The yield per planted acre for corn, cotton, rice, and soybeans are presented for Arkansas, 
Louisiana, and Mississippi from 1996 to 2013 as obtained from USDA NASS and presented in 
Tables 1.5 to 1.8.  
Table 1.5. Corn yield per planted acre (bushels) for selected states.  
Year Arkansas  Louisiana Mississippi 









































































1.2 Commodity Production Costs within the Region  
 
Farm management decisions are on-going and range from deciding on the appropriate crop mix 
model, variety selection, input application timing, harvest optimization, marketing, and 
reinvestment in farm capital. Each decision requires an understanding in crop physiology, 
management science, economics, and, in particularly, risk management. Producers are able to  
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Table 1.6. Cotton yield per planted acre (pounds) for selected states.  
Year Arkansas  Louisiana Mississippi 





































































Source: USDA NASS, 2014. 
 
participate in on-farm variety trials conducted by universities, structured bank loans based on 
historical land production, off-set yield risk with the purchase of crop insurances policies, and 
manage income risk by participation in commodity-based revenue programs established through 
federal agricultural legislation. However, forecasting the input markets (e.g. fertilizer, fuel, seed, 
chemicals, etc.) from one crop year to the next can become complex when trying to predict the 
relationship of multiple variables into an economic model to forecast farm profitability. 
Variables are often dependent and correlated in price movements over a particular time period.   
Enterprise budgeting and whole farm budgeting are tools used by farm managers to aid in 
decision making. The information derived from budgeting includes estimates of income, 
expenses, and net returns for a specific enterprise or a whole farm management plan. Budgeting 




Table 1.7. Long and medium-grain rice yield per planted acre (hundredweight) for selected 
states.  























































































































which maximizes profits (Mississippi State University, 2014). Production cost data per acre for 
corn, cotton, rice, and soybeans were obtained for Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi relative 
to common production systems across each crop in each state. In order to obtain cost estimates 
over an entire crop, input cost data were recorded for the selected production systems employed 
for the 2014 crop year: Roundup Ready® (RR) corn, Bollgard II® Roundup Ready® Flex 
(B2RF) cotton, conventional variety rice, CLEARFIELD® (CL) variety rice, CLEARFIELD® 
hybrid variety rice, Roundup Ready® (RR) soybeans, and Liberty Link® (LL) soybeans. In 




Table 1.8. Soybean yield per planted acre (bushels) for selected states.  
Year Arkansas  Louisiana Mississippi 





































































Source: USDA NASS, 2014. 
 
Ready® refers to corn and soybean seeds that possess genetic traits that convey resistance to  
glyphosate, an active ingredient in Roundup® herbicide (Pioneer, 2015).  The Bollgard II® with 
Roundup Ready® Flex trait in cotton offers the combination of broad-spectrum weed control that 
targets grass and broadleaf weeds, while offering protection against worm damage (Monsanto, 
2015.)  CLEARFIELD® rice seed is a nongenetically modified technology developed to provide 
broad-spectrum weed control while being tolerant to Newpath®, Clearpath®, and Beyond® 
herbicides (BASF, 2015). The Liberty Link® gene provides resistant to Liberty® herbicide 
(Pioneer, 2015). Appendix A contains a complete list of enterprise budgets per crop that were 
released per state for the 2014 crop year. Irrigation delivery system is also listed, based on the 
enterprise description provided by each state for corn, cotton, rice, and soybean crops.  
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Variable production costs per acre included the categories of: custom field operations (e.g. aerial 
application, fertilizer application, planting, spraying, harvesting, hauling, and drying), fertilizers, 
herbicides, insecticides, fungicides, growth regulators, defoliants, seed (and associated 
technology fees), irrigation supplies, labor, diesel fuel, repair and maintenance, and interest on 
operating capital. Tables 1.9 denote the total variable costs per acre to produce corn, cotton, rice, 
and soybeans relative to typical production systems in Arkansas for the 2014 crop year.  
 
Table 1.9. Variable production costs per acre for selected crops and production systems in  
       Arkansas, 2014. 
Enterprise Seed Technology  Production System Variable Cost 
per acre 







































Center Pivot Irrigation 
No Irrigation 
Furrow Irrigation 
Center Pivot Irrigation 
No Irrigation 
Furrow Irrigation 
Center Pivot Irrigation 
No Irrigation 
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Flood Irrigation  
Furrow Irrigation 
Center Pivot Irrigation 
No Irrigation 





























According to the University of Arkansas’ Division of Agriculture, current input unit prices for 
nitrogen (N), phosphate (P), potash (K), and sulfur fertilizer for 2014 were: $0.45 to $0.55; 
$0.52; $0.39; and $0.29 per pound of active ingredient, respectively. Boron fertilizer was applied 
at a rate of $4.00 per acre. The price of farm-grade diesel fuel was $3.17 per gallon. Furrow and 
flood irrigation costs, contained in irrigated enterprise budgets, were estimated at $3.74 per acre-
inch of applied water while center pivot irrigation costs were $5.69 per acre-inch applied.  
Variable production costs for stacked gene corn produced in Arkansas in 2014, ranged from 
$430.44 to $597.49 per acre, depending on whether or not the crop received irrigation. Energy 
related inputs, e.g. fertilizer and diesel fuel, compose nearly 52% of the total variable cost per 
acre for corn produced in Arkansas. Across three production systems in corn, the total acre 
expenditure for nitrogen, phosphate, potash, sulfur, and boron fertilizers ranged from $198.65 for 
dryland production to $226.58 for irrigated systems. Diesel fuel charges for tractors, harvesters, 
and irrigation delivery systems varied from $21.58 (dryland production) to $69.07 and $89.83 
(furrow and pivot irrigated systems, respectively). Due to the fact that over half of the variable 
costs per acre for Arkansas corn is attributed to energy-related inputs, substantial increases in the 
unit price for one or both of these units will have a significant impact on production costs and 
ultimately net returns.  
For cotton produced in Arkansas, variable production costs ranged from $390.15 to $540.53 per 
acre, depending on irrigation practice. Fertilizer averaged $71.06 on dryland production to 
$97.60 per acre for irrigated systems. Diesel fuel for tractors, harvesters, and irrigation delivery 
systems averaged $36.97 to $84.88 and $105.63 for furrow and pivot irrigation fields. On 
average, the energy-related expenditures represented 26% to 41% of variable production 
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expenses per acre for the Bollgard® Roundup Ready® Flex (B2RF) and Bollgard® Liberty 
Link® (B2LL) seed varieties.  
A significant portion of rice in Arkansas is planted using a grain drill; however, some of the 
acreage is water-seeded. Total variable costs ranged from $515.30 to $668.65 per acre depending 
on the rice variety planted. Differences in production costs arise from the planting method and 
variety (conventional or CLEARFIELD® seed) since all rice in the state receives irrigation. 
Fertilizer cost ranges from $68.40 to $112.60 per acre. Irrigation costs compose a majority of 
production costs per acre at $108.32 for a water-seeded system to $145.30 per acre for a drill 
seed planting method. Together, energy-related inputs compose between 34% and 42% of 
current total variable production costs per acre.  
Roundup Ready® (RR) and Liberty Link® (LL) production systems are typical in the Arkansas 
soybean sector. Phosphate and potash fertilizer components of both production systems are 
consistent at $44.20 per acre. Diesel fuel for ranges from $18.83 per acre for dryland production 
to $58.84 and $75.70 for furrow and pivot irrigation systems. Fertilizer and fuel expenditures 
represent 24% and 38% of variable production expenses per acre.  
For Louisiana, production practices for major row crops such as corn, cotton, rice, and soybeans 
are presented by geographic region- northeast and southwest. Input unit prices, published by the 
Louisiana State University Agricultural Center, for nitrogen, phosphate, and potash fertilizer in 
2014 were $0.50; $0.50; and $0.37 per pound, respectively. The price of farm-grade diesel fuel 
for tractors, harvesters, and irrigation pumps (poly-pipe and center pivot systems) was $3.30 per 
gallon. Across a representative sample of northeastern Louisiana feed grain farms, the irrigation 
budgets for grain crops produced employ a poly-pipe irrigation delivery system.  
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The two types of corn seed planted in northeastern Louisiana are of Roundup Ready® (RR) and 
Bt-stacked gene (BtRR) technologies. Corn is typically produced using eight-row farm 
equipment in a dryland and irrigation production system. Variable production costs for corn 
ranged from $438.07 (dryland) to $535.12 and $536.41 for RR and BtRR irrigated systems, 
respectively. Fertilizer composed the largest budget share at $127.20 (dryland) and $142.50 
(irrigated) per acre, respectively. Tables 1.10 denote the total variable costs per acre to produce 
corn, cotton, rice, and soybeans relative to typical production systems in Louisiana for the 2014 
crop year. 
 
Table 1.10. Variable production costs per acre for selected crops and production systems in  
       Louisiana, 2014. 
Enterprise Seed Technology  Production System Variable Cost 
per acre 



































Roundup Ready ® 
Poly-pipe Irrigation (8 row) 
No Irrigation (8 row) 
Poly-pipe Irrigation (8 row) 
No Irrigation (8 row) 
Poly-pipe Irrigation (8 row) 
Poly-pipe Irrigation (12 row) 
Water Planted (C. Tillage) 
Water Planted (Stale seedbed) 
Water Planted (C. Tillage) 
Water Planted (Stale seedbed) 
Drill Planted (C. Tillage) 
Drill Planted (Stale seedbed) 
Drill Planted (C. Tillage) 
Drill Planted (Stale seedbed) 
Drill Planted 
No Irrigation (8 row) 
Poly-pipe Irrigation (8 row) 
No Irrigation (12 row) 




















Source: Louisiana State University Agricultural Center, 2014. Where: 8 or 12 represent the row 
capabilities of the implements used and C.Tillage represents conventional tillage was employed 




Diesel fuel costs were $23.08 to $60.84 per production system. On average, the fertilizer and fuel 
expenditure ranged from 33% to 38% of total variable production costs per acre for the 2014 
crop year.  
The predominant enterprise budget for cotton production in Louisiana was of Bollgard II® 
Roundup Ready® Flex (B2RF) technology. Budget data is presented for eight and twelve-row 
farm equipment. Total variable production costs for cotton ranged from $519.99 on dryland 
fields to $582.89 for irrigated fields. Fertilizer costs per acre were consistent at $97.20 per acre. 
Diesel fuel cost per acre was $46.26 and $78.76 to $83.32 (dryland and irrigated eight and 12-
row equipment). The energy-related budget share for Louisiana cotton was 28% to 31% of total 
variable cost per acre.  
Rice is produced predominately in the southwestern region of Louisiana. However, production 
acreage fluctuates in the northeastern portion of the state. Production of rice in the northeast 
region can represent as much as 30% of the state’s acreage. Given the fact that rice is an irrigated 
crop, it is expected that fertilizer and fuel will comprise a large share of total variable production 
expenditures. Variable production expenses per acre for rice ranged from $634.78 for 
conventional varieties to $790.93 for CLEARFIELD® hybrid varieties. In the southwestern 
region, fertilizer expenditures for rice were consistent across conventional and CLEARFIELD® 
varieties at $107.20 per acre. Fuel costs were also comparable across varieties and planting 
methods between $206.81 and $225.84 per acre. The energy-related input budget share for the 
region was between 43% and 53% of total variable costs per acre. Rice produced in northeastern 
Louisiana received less fertilizer, a reduction in chemicals (and subsequent application costs) 
resulting from reduced weed and disease pressure, as well as reduced pumping costs. 
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Conventional variety rice had a variable cost of $485.42 and CLEARFIELD® variety had a cost 
of $536.38 per acre, respectively. Fertilizer costs were $85.00 per acre and fuel was also similar 
at $96.56 to $100.34 per acre, accounting for an energy-related budget share of 33% to 38% for 
northeastern Louisiana rice production in 2014.  
Roundup Ready® soybean enterprise budgets indicate that variable costs equate to $304.00 
(dryland) to $350.87 (irrigated) per acre for 2014. Fertilizer cost per acre is consistent for each of 
the production systems at $43.50 per acre. Diesel fuel ranges from $15.33 on dryland production 
to $40.80 to $42.85 on irrigated eight-row and twelve-row operations. The energy-related 
expenditure for soybeans produced in northeastern Louisiana is 20% to 25% of total variable 
production costs per acre. Soybeans are also produced in southwestern Louisiana, primarily as a 
rotational crop with rice. Production costs for this region were estimated at $278.35 per acre. In 
the southwestern region of the state, fertilizer accounts for $43.50 (16%) of the $278.35 total 
variable production expenses. Soybeans enterprise budgets do not consider irrigation, so the fuel 
expenditure of $16.01 (6%) includes tractor and harvester usage. The total energy-related 
component to this production system in southwest Louisiana, is $59.51 per acre (21% of total 
variable costs per acre) in 2014. 
Enterprise commodity budgets for corn, cotton, rice, and soybeans crops produced in Mississippi 
contain nine fertilizer chemicals. Tables 1.11 denote the total variable costs per acre to produce 
corn, cotton, rice, and soybeans relative to typical production systems in Mississippi for the 2014 
crop year. The prices for ammonium sulfate, di-ammonium phosphate, phosphorous, potash, 10-
34-0 fertilizer N-P-K mix, urea, urea plus sulfur, UAN, and ammonium nitrate were estimated at 
$17.75; $25.75; $23.75; $28.25; $22.60; $19.50; $19.50; and $22.50 per hundredweight (cwt) 
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unit, respectively. Farm grade diesel fuel was estimated at $3.30 per gallon for the 2014 crop 
year.  
Table 1.11. Variable production costs per acre for selected crops and production systems in  
       Mississippi, 2014. 
Enterprise Seed Technology  Production System Variable Cost 
per acre 



















































C. Tillage (8 row) 
No Tillage (8 Row) 
C. Tillage Skip Row 
C. Tillage (8 row) 
C. Tillage (12 row) 
Furrow Irrigation, CT (12 row) 
Center Pivot Irrigation CT (12 row) 
No Tillage (12 row) 
C. Tillage (12 row) 
Contour Levee 
Straight Levee 
Multi-inlet Straight Levee 
Straight Levee, Precision Grade 
Contour Levee 
Straight Levee 
Multi-inlet Straight Levee 
Straight Levee, Precision Grade 
Straight Levee 
No Irrigation (12 row) 
Furrow Irrigation (12 row) 
Flood Irrigation (12 row) 


























Source: Mississippi State University. Where: 8 or 12 represent the row capabilities of the 
implements used and C.Tillage represents conventional tillage was employed in the field and CT 
represent conservation tillage.  
 
Mississippi corn is produced in both a dryland and furrow irrigated system using BtRR and RR 
seed technologies. Total variable cost per acre in 2014 ranged from $418.22 to $588.00. 
Fertilizer expenses ranged from $153.48 for dryland RR corn to $167.61 per acre for dryland  
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BtRR corn. Furrow irrigation fuel expenses ranged $55.88 to $64.53 for BtRR and RR corn 
varieties, while fuel expenditures for dryland production was $17.77 to $25.07 per acre. On 
average, the fertilizer and fuel budget share for dryland corn in Mississippi was 43% to 44%; 
while irrigated corn commanded a slightly higher budget share at 51% of total variable costs per 
acre.  
Cotton is produced in a variety of production systems in the state using eight and twelve-row 
equipment. B2RF and B2LL cotton is produced in dryland systems using no tillage, conservation 
tillage, or conservation tillage-skip row. Irrigation production systems are estimated for furrow 
and center pivot water delivery systems with twelve-row farm equipment. Fertilizer costs per 
acre ranged from $102.26 to $119.63 for dryland production. The cost of the recommended 
fertilizer requirement for irrigated cotton is $125.33 per acre. Diesel fuel expenditures for 
dryland production systems ranged from $36.88 to $54.13 per acre, and $74.76 to $80.43 per 
acre for irrigated cotton. The energy-related inputs for dryland cotton accounted for a 23% to 
25% budget share. Fertilizer and fuel comprised approximately 27% of the budget share for 
irrigated cotton.  
Rice is produced in Mississippi using either a contour or straight levee control structure. 
Conventional, CLEARFIELD® and CLEARFIELD® hybrid rice varieties were produced in the 
state in 2014. Total variable costs per acre will vary depending upon the irrigation practice and 
most importantly, seed technology selected. Variable production costs were $572.08 to $651.76 
for conventional varieties, $634.57 to $699.04 for CLEARFIELD® varieties, and $741.61 for 
CLEARFIELD® hybrid varieties. However, fertilizer expense per acre for all seed-types 
produced in 2014 equated to $106.72 per acre, with the CLEARFIELD® hybrid variety 
receiving $99.26 per acre. Diesel fuel also varied by irrigation system. Contour levee systems 
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had a fuel expense of $117.78; straight levee systems $98.88; multi-inlet straight levee systems 
$88.75; and straight levee that received a zero-grade field slope $75.35 per acre. The energy-
related budget share for conventional rice was 32% to 34% compared to 27% to 32% for 
CLEARFIELD® rice varieties.  
Roundup Ready® soybeans are produced in a dryland, furrow, flood, or center pivot irrigation 
system. Total variable costs per acre were estimated at $269.70 for dryland soybeans and 
$323.36 to $346.03 for irrigated soybeans. Fertilizer costs per acre were consistent at $52.50 per 
acre across production systems. The cost of diesel fuel was $16.62 for dryland and $44.94 to 
$64.34 per acre for irrigated systems. The energy-related budget share was 26% for dryland 
soybeans and 30% to 36% for irrigated soybeans.  
Traditionally, fuel and fertilizer expenditures per acre have accounted for a significant portion of 
the production costs associated with rice, soybean, corn, and cotton production in the Mississippi 
River delta region.  On average, production costs from 2014 indicated that rice has a fuel budget 
share of 24%, 36%, and 18% for Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. This can be attributed to 
the fact that rice is an irrigated crop, although water delivery systems do vary across farms and 
topology in the region. Corn fertilization expenses comprise 47%, 29%, and 42% of total 
variable production per acre for Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. Cotton and soybeans 
produced in irrigated production systems exhibited an equitable split in the fertilizer and fuel-
related budget share relative to total variable costs between 15% and 20% in Arkansas, 
Louisiana, and Mississippi.  
Economic returns from corn, cotton, rice, and soybean crops produced in the Mid-south region 
are obtained by using state average yield per planted acre and average prices received in each 
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state, respectively. Using these yields and market prices, Tables 1.12 to 1.14 represent the gross 
returns from crops captured while considering no production expenses.  
 
Table 1.12. Historic gross economic returns (per acre) for selected crops produced in Arkansas.  
Year Corn  Cotton Rice (LG) Rice (MG) Soybeans 







































































































Source: USDA NASS, 2014. Where (LG) represents long grain rice varieties and (MG) 




Risk in cropping systems can result from variability in returns across time and from year-to-year 
changes in yields, crop prices, and input costs (Helmers, et al., 2001). The degree of variability in 
production costs (per acre) for major row crops in the Mississippi River delta region impacts net 
returns, and ultimately profitability to the producer. Relative to the energy-related inputs such as 
fuel and/or fertilizer, volatility in the input market significantly affects crop rotation choices 
especially when combined with market expectations. In efforts to illustrate the effect that 
production cost volatility has on net returns, a comparison of the production costs per acre were 
extracted from enterprise budgets in Louisiana over the past ten years (2004-2013). Louisiana 
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production cost data is presented in Table 1.15 to serve as an illustration. Information for 
Arkansas and Mississippi is also complied but are not included in tabular format. Due to the  
 
Table 1.13. Historic gross economic returns (per acre) for selected crops produced in Louisiana.  
Year Corn  Cotton Rice (LG) Rice (MG) Soybeans 







































































































Source: USDA NASS, 2014. Where (LG) represents long grain rice varieties and (MG) 
represents medium grain rice varieties. Note that return levels are rounded to the nearest whole 
dollar.  
 
fact that many different production systems are employed in the production of a single crop, 
assumptions were made to identify a representative production system for each major row crop. 
Conventional corn enterprise budgets were compiled prior to the widespread adoption of 
Roundup Ready® corn seed in 2009 to present. Bollgard® Roundup Ready® cotton seed 
systems are presented from 2004 to 2009. To date, Bollgard II® Roundup Ready® Flex cotton 
seed is the assumed predominant cotton seed technology employed in the state. CLEARFIELD® 
long-grain rice was assumed to be produced in Louisiana under a drill planting method for 
southwest region production. Roundup Ready® soybeans are modeled for production in the 




Table 1.14. Historic gross economic returns (per acre) for selected crops produced in Mississippi.  
Year Corn  Cotton Rice (LG) Soybeans 






















































































Source: USDA NASS, 2014. Where (LG) represents long grain rice varieties. Note that return 
levels are rounded to the nearest whole dollar.  
 
 
Table 1.15. Variable production costs per acre for selected crops in Louisiana, a ten-year  
       historical data set. 


























































1.3 Federal Farm Program Policy  
 
Since the implementation of the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 
(1996 FAIR Act), producers have had flexibility in planting decisions because program 
payments have been decoupled from planting decisions (Fannin, et al., 2008). Prior to the 1996 
farm bill, farm program provisions encouraged year-after-year planting of a single commodity, 
which prevailed as a primary cropping system used by producers. Price support systems in the 
legislation allowed producers to establish continuous or monoculture cropping systems with less 
concern for market signals (Guidry, et al., 2001). A number of significant changes in commodity 
programs resulted from provisions contained in the 1996 FAIR Act, including a complete 
revision and simplification of a direct payment program and the elimination of most supply 
control programs. During the mid-1990s, the setting for agricultural commodity policy changed 
since many producers and policymakers felt planting restrictions during the 1980s were limiting 
in regards to the ability of a producer to plant crops of his choosing. The 1995/96 marketing year 
also contributed to the reform effort. High commodity prices weakened the case for continued 
price and income support programs. Program bases and deficiency payments were based on 
historical plantings, which created an incentive for farms to maintain historical production 
systems. This was in contrast to the viewpoint of some producers who wanted to change their 
cropping mix in order to respond to changing market conditions (Young and Westcott, 1996). 
The 1996 FAIR Act replaced price-sensitive deficiency payments, based on the difference 
between congressionally-set target prices and the final reported marketing year price, with a 
system of fixed production flexibility contract (PFC) payments built as predetermined seven-year 
payments to producers (Young and Westcott, 1996; Nelson and Schertz, 1996). PFC payments 
are decoupled, meaning there is no link between payments and current plantings. A series of 
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predetermined annual contract payments were made to producers who participated in any of the 
1991 to 1995 programs afforded to wheat, feed grains, cotton, or rice under the previous law, and 
who agree to implement a PFC for the 1996 through 2002 crop years. The share of total 
payments for each commodity is stated in the FAIR Act. Each participant’s share of total annual 
commodity payment is equal to the product of their given contract acreage, individual farm 
program yield, and the national payment rate. This payment rate is represented by the total 
amount made available for a commodity in a given fiscal year, divided by the sum of all payment 
production in the country. Payments did not depend on the level of current production or market 
prices (Nelson and Westcott, 1996).  The FAIR Act eliminated target prices, deficiency 
payments, and production adjustment programs (Nelson and Schertz, 1996). The 1996 Act did 
continue the nonrecourse marketing assistance loan (MAL) program. Minimum loan rates for all 
eligible commodities, except rice, were initially calculated as 85% of the preceding five-year 
Olympic average. These loan rates were then subject to established minimums, maximums, and 
conditional adjustments. It is noted that the loan rate for rice was fixed (Nelson and Westcott, 
1996).  
In summary, the 1996 FAIR Act fundamentally changed U.S. agriculture support programs by 
eliminating supply management, increasing planting flexibility, and changed income support for 
contract crops. Planting flexibility increased to a 15% limit without affecting deficiency 
payments. Authority for the acreage reduction program expired. The 1996 Act accelerated the 
market orientation of the previous two major farm Acts, which gradually reduced the 
government’s influence in the agriculture sector through commodity programs (Young and 
Westcott, 1996).  
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Under the 2002 and 2008 farm bills, commodity support was tied to farm production history, 
allowing producers enrolled in the direct payment program to have complete planting flexibility 
in the production of desired crops that fit their management plan. Direct payments were made to 
the historical yield per base acre of eligible enrolled commodities that were dispersed by USDA 
Farm Service Agency (FSA) regardless of market prices and planting frequency. These payments 
were often shared between the landowner and grower in exchange for rental privileges or other 
production costs sharing arrangements.  
The 2002 farm bill included income support for wheat, feed grains, cotton, rice, and oilseeds 
provided through three main programs: direct payments, countercyclical (CC) payments, and 
marketing loans (Young, 2002). This bill also made direct payments available for soybeans. 
Highlights of the bill included the introduction countercyclical farm income support. Under the 
1996 FAIR Act, producers could enroll into seven-year contracts. To receive a direct payment, 
producers must enroll into an annual agreement. The direct payment (DP) rates is specified by 
language of the farm law. The 2002 bill make countercyclical (CC) program payments to 
covered commodities whenever the effective price is less than the target price. The target prices 
for each covered commodity are specified in the 2002 bill-a similarity to the 1996 bill.  Under 
the 1996 Act, market loss assistance payments were authorized through supplemental legislation. 
These payments were proportional to PFC payments (Young, 2008).  
Acreage bases and payment acres for calculating direct and countercyclical payments (DCP) 
were adjusted/updated. Under the 1996 Act, land eligible for contract acreage was equal to a 
farm’s base acreage for 1996, as calculated under the previous farm program, plus expired 
conservation reserve program (CRP) base. In the 2002 bill, producers have the option to select 
one of two methods for base acres for all covered commodities for the farm: (1) update base to 
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reflect four-year average of planted acres during the 1998 to 2001 crop years or (2) use 2002 
PFC contract acres as new base and oilseed base as the default option. Payment acres that were 
made on 85% of contract acres are now equal to 85% of base acres. Under the 1996 Act, 
program yields were frozen at 1995 levels. With the 2002 bill, payment yields for direct 
payments remained unchanged. Payment yields for CC program could be the same as those for 
the DP or may be updated using either: (a) adding 70% of the difference between program yields 
for 2002 crops and the farm’s average for 1998 to 2001 yields; or (b) use 93.5% of the 1998 to 
2001 average yields.  
Planting flexibility was the same for 2002 as contained in the 1996 Act- meaning that producers 
could plant 100% of contract acreage to any crop. Marketing assistance loans are extended in the 
2002 bill, with loan rates fixed by the legislation. The requirement that producers enter into an 
agreement for DP to be eligible for loan program benefits was eliminated.  
The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-246) contains three primary types of 
payments: (1) direct payments that are unrelated to production or process; (2) countercyclical 
payments for a commodity that are triggered when (a) prices are blow statutorily-determined 
target prices, or (b) revenue falls below a historical guaranteed level; and (3) marketing 
assistance loans that offer interim financing and, if price fall below loan prices set in statute, 
additional income support (Monke, 2008). The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, 
also referred to as the 2008 farm bill, continued the price and income support provisions 
framework established under the 2002 farm bill, with some modifications. One such 
modification is the creation of the average crop revenue election (ACRE) program.  Under the 




Direct payments are available to producers with eligible historical production of wheat, corn, 
grain sorghum, barley, oats, upland cotton, rice, soybeans, other oilseeds, and peanuts (USDA 
ERS, 2011).  Direct payments are one of many farm income support payments. They are 
considered decoupled farm assistance, as they are not tied directly to current production or 
market prices. For the past 10 years, direct payments have been paid to producers who operate 
land that historically has been used to produce major agricultural commodities on base acres. 
Unlike most other farm program payments, direct payments transfer income to eligible producers 
and largely are paid without regard to the producer’s current production decisions or commodity 
market conditions. Direct payments, administered by USDA FSA are calculated as the payment 
rate multiplied by the payment yield and the payment acres. Payment acres are equal to 85% of 
the base acres enrolled in each of the eligible program crop. Due to Federal budget issues, the 
payment acre percentage was reduced to 83.3% of base for crop years 2009 to 2011.   
The major economic implication of the direct payment program is such that the payments are 
fixed and not tied to current production or market prices but are based on historical cropping 
patterns of major commodities, or base acres, with per-acre rates fixed in legislation. Specific 
commodity production is not required on the land. Planting flexibility allows producers to not be 
restricted to growing the historically produced crops for which they are receiving direct 
payments (USDA ERS, 2011). On a per acre basis, the value of the direct payment varies by the 
commodity associated with the historic base and by payment yields, which vary by geographic 
location. For example, Table 1.16 contains direct payment amounts for producers of corn, cotton, 
rice, and soybeans in Louisiana. Average payment yields per program crop were obtained from 




Table 1.16. Estimated direct payment rates per acre for selected crops produced in Louisiana,  
       2008-2012. 
Program  
Crop 

























Source: USDA FSA and the Louisiana Farm Bureau Federation, 2013.  
 
From a national perspective, rice and peanuts received the largest direct payment per acre at  
$96.25 and $45.85, respectively, but combined they only account for about 2% of total base 
acres (Ifft, et al., 2012). Corn, wheat, and soybeans accounted for more than 80% of total base 
acres in 2008, but received lower direct payments per acre ($24.39, $15.21, and $11.54 per acre 
respectively). The direct payment program makes fixed annual payments to producers which are 
tied to base acreage and program yields determined by production on a farm in the distant past, 
and are generally unaffected by current planting decisions or production levels (FAPRI, 2012).  
Countercyclical program (CCP) payments provide support counter to the cycle of market prices 
as part of a ‘safety net’ in the event of low crop prices (USDA FSA, 2008). Countercyclical 
payments are issued if the effective price for a program commodity is below the target price for 
the commodity. The target price for each program commodity is set legislatively by the 2008 
bill.  The CCP rate is the amount by which the target price of each commodity exceeds its 
effective price. Target prices are set at: $10.50 per hundredweight for long and medium-grain 
rice; $0.7125 per pound for cotton; $2.63 per bushel for corn, and $5.80 per bushel for soybeans 
for the 2008 and 2009 crop years and then increased to $6.00 per bushel through the 2012 crop 
year. The effective price for a covered commodity equals the direct payment rate for the program 
crop plus the higher of the national MYA price for the commodity or the loan rate for the 
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commodity. Total CCP payment is determined by multiplying the base acre by the CCP rate and 
the CCP payment yield. The payment amount for covered commodities equals the product of the 
payment rate, a producer’s historical payment acres (85% of base acres), and a producer’s 
historical countercyclical payment yield, which may differ from the direct payment yield. If the 
loan rate plus the direct payment rate for the period (which equals the effective price) is equal to 
or exceeds the target price for that particular commodity, the payment rate will equate to zero. 
In recent years, market prices for most grains and oilseeds have been above levels that would 
result in countercyclical payments, although large payments can occur when prices are low 
(FAPRI, 2012). The economic implications of the CCP are such that these payments are 
designed to support and stabilize farm income in years when current prices for historically 
produced commodities are less than target prices (USDA ERS, 2009). Thus, when market prices 
deteriorate, the payment level is increased. CCP payments constitute a risk management 
instrument for producers to guard against price-related revenue risks. Because program payments 
vary based on the relationship between the target price and current commodity price, payments 
will vary across commodity base acres from year-to-year. The distribution of program payments 
across crop base acres will continue to be dependent upon the relationship between the CCP 
target price and current market price (USDA ERS, 2009).  
Marketing assistance loans (MAL) and loan deficiency payments (LDP) were reauthorized under 
the 2008 bill and are made available to eligible producers for the 2008 through 2012 crop years. 
MALs and LDPs are marketing tools available to producers beginning upon harvest of the 
crop(s) (USDA FSA, 2011).  The MAL program is designed to provide short-term financing in 
all price environments, as well as to assist producers when market prices are low. MALs provide 
payment to producers when market prices are typically at their lowest during the harvest season. 
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This allows the producer to delay the sale of the commodity until more favorable market 
conditions emerge. Allowing producers to store their commodity at harvest provides for a more 
orderly marketing of commodities throughout the year (USDA FSA, 2011). These types of loans 
are considered nonrecourse when the loan can either be redeemed by repayment or by delivering 
the pledged collateral (the crop) to the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) as full payment for 
the marketing assistance loan at maturity (USDA FSA, 2011).  To avoid forfeitures, the 
marketing loan provision allows producers to repay loans at a rate less than the original loan rate 
plus accrued interest and storage when the adjusted world price (AWP) is below the loan rate 
plus accrued interest and storage (USDA ERS, 2011).  For example, producers that hold a 
marketing loan provision may repay a MAL at the lower of the loan rate plus accrued interest or 
the AWP. (It is noted that marketing loan repayment for rice and upland cotton are based on 
prevailing world prices. The world market price for rice is determined by a formula adjusted for 
U.S. quality and location. A quality adjustment for upland cotton is made based on cotton of 
comparable quality delivered to a definable and significant international market).  If the AWP is 
lower that the loan rate, the amount by which the loan rate exceeds the AWP is the marketing 
loan gain (MLG) rate resulting from producers repaying their nonrecourse loans to the CCC. 
MLG represents a program benefit to producers.  Producers also are eligible for a LDP in lieu of 
obtaining a marketing assistance loan. The LDP is the amount by which the loan rate exceeds the 
adjusted world price (AWP) which is the same as the MLG rate. 
Nonrecourse marketing assistance loans carry a rate that is established statutorily within the 2008 
farm bill. The national average loan rates for 2008 through 2012 crop years are: $6.50 per 
hundredweight for medium and long-grain rice, $5.00 per bushel for soybeans, $0.52 per pound 
for upland cotton, and $1.95 per bushel for corn. The economic implication of MALs and LDPs 
33 
 
are such that when commodity prices are below commodity loan rates, loan benefits augment 
market receipts. The impact of marketing loans vary year-to-year, depending on the absolute and 
relative magnitudes of expected crop-specific marketing loan benefits (USDA ERS, 2009).  
One distinct difference in the 2008 farm bill, compared to the 2002 bill, is the creation of the 
average crop revenue election program (ACRE). Farm commodity programs over the past 
decade have focused on protecting producers against declines in farm prices and not declines in 
revenue, calculated by obtaining the product of price and production (Shields, 2010). Traditional 
programs for field crops provide benefits to producers when farm prices drop below specified 
levels. To help producers manage revenue risk, Congress included ACRE as a revenue-based 
program option for producers who enroll in traditional farm commodity programs (Shields, 
2010). Under the ACRE program, producers may receive revenue-based payments as an 
alternative to receiving price-based countercyclical payments (USDA FSA, 2009).  
The ACRE program provides participating producers a revenue guarantee each year based on 
market prices and average yields for the respective commodities. The program guarantee is based 
on state-level planted yields and national market prices, but payments are dependent upon state- 
and farm-level planted yields and national market prices (USDA ERS, 2009).  Producers that 
elect to participate in ACRE must agree to receive a 20% reduction in the direct payment rate for 
all commodities produced on the farm and cannot receive counter-cyclical payments.  ACRE 
payments are revenue-based and are not tied to crop production and the national average market 
price for planted covered commodity crops on the farm. ACRE payment acreage is limited to the 
total amount of base acres on the farm, and can only be issued for a crop if two triggers are met 
for the covered commodity (USDA FSA, 2009). In order for the ACRE state trigger to be met, 
the state ACRE guarantee must exceed the actual state revenue. The state ACRE guarantee 
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cannot change by more than 10% from the previous year’s guarantee. In order for the ACRE 
farm trigger to be met, the farm ACRE benchmark must exceed the actual farm revenue. If both 
triggers are met for a planted or considered planted commodity crop, then an ACRE payment is 
calculated for the eligible crop through the planted acres multiplied by 83.3% multiplied by the 
benchmark farm yield. This figure is then multiplied by the lesser of the state ACRE guarantee 
minus the actual state revenue for the commodity or 25% of the ACRE guarantee.  
The economic implications of the ACRE program are that producers have a one-time opportunity 
to enroll all of their covered commodities in the ACRE program any year during the 2008 
through 2012 crop years. When electing to participate in ACRE, producers will trade-off the loss 
of CCP payments and the reductions in DP and marketing loan benefits for ACRE revenue 
protection. Producers will base their participation decisions in-part on the historic variability in 
state-level yields and the expected variability of national prices (USDA ERS, 2009). A 
producer’s gross revenue is a function of the market price times output for each crop that is 
produced on the farm. Gross revenue will vary with changes in prices and yield. Traditional 
commodity support, in the form of the CCP and marketing loan benefits (MLB), pays producers 
when prices fall below specified levels, but does not compensate for yield losses (Cooper, 2009). 
Traditional USDA disaster assistance programs do assist producers, but in ad hoc fashion, and 
does not necessarily compensate for low market prices. Marketing loss assistance payments 
addressed market losses associated with low prices, also in ad-hoc fashion. Congress provides 
disaster assistance constituent only by request for aid and is contingent on the Federal budget. In 
contrast, CCP and MLB apply whenever market prices fall enough to trigger payments, as 
determined by the operational parameters of the programs (Cooper, 2009). 
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Participating producers get an ACRE payment when state and farm-level revenues for a 
particular crop fall below triggers determined by past prices and yields (FAPRI, 2012). A 
comparison of current to previous DP and CCP farm programs to that of the ACRE program are 
contained in Zulauf and Orden, 2010. Income support via fixed direct payments, countercyclical 
payments, and marketing loan payments are provided to eligible producers under current farm 
programs. Direct payments are a specific dollar amount per historical base acre and the amount 
does not change with prices or with the level of production. The policy objectives of the 
countercyclical and marketing loan programs is to assist farmers with managing the systemic 
(i.e. market) risk of low prices that can last from one year to an extended period of years. 
Payments occur if market price drops below the support rate, which becomes a floor on the per 
unit value of a crop. Marketing loan payments are based on current production and prices, and 
thus are coupled under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. Countercyclical payments are 
based on current prices but historical production. Zulauf and Orden, 2010, state that the policy 
objective of the ACRE revenue program is to assist farmers with managing the systemic risk of a 
decline in crop revenue that can extend from one to a short period of years, but to avoid creating 
a floor. Risk assistance level of the ACRE program is calculated using moving averages of 
lagged national prices and state yields, where its risk assistance level increases (decreases) over 
consecutive year as market revenue increases (decreases). Thus, no floor exists on revenue. 
However, ACRE can provide assistance when revenue declines but prices remain above the fixed 
marketing loan and countercyclical support prices.  
Since DCP payments are tied to base acreage, many producers are currently receiving DCP 
payments tied to a historical mix of crops on a farm that no longer matches current production 
patterns. Alternatively stated, soybean producers may receive DCP payments associated with 
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other corps that may or may not be in production in a given year. Likewise, many producers 
receiving cotton and rice DCP payments are actually planting other crops or devoting their land 
to other uses (FARPI, 2012; USDA FSA, 2012).  
To extrapolate commodity program selection to a regional view, USDA FSA data from 2009 
through 2013 indicates that a large portion of base acreage overwhelmingly favors the direct and 
countercyclical (DCP) style of farm program protection compared to the ACRE program in the 
Mississippi River delta region. The data, obtained from USDA FSA, and presented in Table 
1.17, indicates that corn, cotton, rice, and soybean base enrolled in the DCP programs 
represented shares of 1.6%; 16.7%; 26.8%; and 33.6% of total base in Arkansas. In Louisiana, 
DCP base represented a 9.1%; 34.6%; 30%; and 17.1% of total base acreage for corn, cotton, 
rice, and soybeans. DCP base in Mississippi for corn, cotton, rice, and soybean crops comprised 
a 6.5%; 44.2%; 10.5%; and 24.9% of total base acres, respectively. Overwhelmingly, the direct 
and countercyclical programs were favored in all states compared to less than one percent of 
base enrolled in the ACRE program. 
The 2002 and 2008 farm bills are responsible for the support programs are designed to assist 
producers manage risk by using price-triggered subsidy programs to buffer the price risk faced 
by farmers. These programs include countercyclical payments, direct payments, and loan 
deficiency payments. Additionally, crop insurance programs provide another layer of protection 
that has traditionally mitigated yield risk (Thomas, et al., 2007). Prior to the 2008 bill, revenue-
based subsidy programs did not exist in federal farm legislation and supporters claimed that a 






Table 1.17. DCP/ACRE enrolled base acreage for selected crops in the Mississippi River delta  
       portal of the Mid-south region, 2009-2013. 





























































































  Source: USDA FSA, 2014. 
 
Advocates of revenue-based programs are generally located in the Corn Belt region. Producers of 
traditional crops in the South such as rice and cotton tend to prefer price-based programs, much 
like the current programs. This dichotomy occurs because areas where prices and yields are not 
negatively correlated respond better to programs that separate price risk from yield risk (Thomas, 
et al., 2007).  
Farm management decisions coupled with the political climate of agricultural policy adds a 
tremendous degree of uncertainty as to the future role of governmental support to the U.S. 
agricultural sector. The safety net provisions contained in Title I of the 2008 farm bill (direct 
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payments, countercyclical payments, and marketing assistance loans) underwent major changes 
in both language and substance as well as the level of federal funding available as the 2008 bill 
expired. The impending changes combined with market driven revenue-based program options, 
varying degrees of crop insurance coverage, disaster assistance programs, and adjusted gross 
income limitations have given way to a complex array of legal guidelines and questions 
regarding the overall efficiency of programs that are administered.  
The Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-79) represents a landmark rewrite to the farm safety net 
in American agriculture for major row crops such as corn, cotton, rice, and soybeans. Significant 
revisions were included in this legislation which alters the current structure of government 
support for production agriculture, notably the aforementioned row crops. The three major issues 
that are embedded in the farm safety net proposals that were considered for the new farm bill, as 
identified by Shields and Schnepf, 2012, are: (1) how price (or revenue) protection is established 
(i.e. within-year versus averaging across multiple years or fixed in statute); (2) at what 
geographic level-the farm level or a more aggregated regional level-program benefits are 
triggered; and (3) whether the proposal addresses ‘shallow losses’ in revenues, or those not 
covered by federally subsidized crop insurance but paid by the producer via the policy 
deductible. Program type, commodity coverage, type of losses covered, program mechanics, 
payment limits, conservation compliance, cost to producers and taxpayers, and political strategy 
of the proposal as well as the sponsoring lawmaker’s political rationale are examined by Shields 
and Schnepf, 2012.  
Stepping back from the program specifics, the general policy and political context for the 2014 
farm bill’s safety net may provide additional perspective. This farm bill was written in an era of 
heightened scrutiny over federal debt and deficits; it was considered politically necessary to 
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reduce the bill’s spending for passage in a budget-obsessed Congress. Fairly relentless criticism 
of commodity programs, particularly direct payments, in an era of high commodity prices and 
strong farm incomes also complicated matters. These forces combined to bring about the end of 
direct payments and altered the existing structure of commodity policy. An underlying principle 
to the changes in this farm bill was a focus on helping farmers manage the considerable risks 
they face in crop production in a move away from existing income support. In a politically-
challenging environment, the debate centered on how to make the farm safety net more 
defensible to the general public, as well as being effective and relevant to the farm sector. Real 
challenges emerged, however, and significant concerns were raised with the two main policy 
proposals of the House and Senate. Crop insurance already provides valuable risk management 
tools that many were reluctant to interfere with, while federal subsidies tied too close to actual 
production risk raised concerns about distorting production decisions creating market and trade 
problems. Therefore, the final agreement decoupled both Title I programs and ended up being 
more of an approximation of risk-based assistance than actual risk management- supplement to 
what is provided through crop insurance. While this is familiar territory for price-based 
programs, decoupling revenue policy from production is a new direction that has yet to be tested. 
It remains to be seen how well revenue payments on base acres will function on the farm.  
The Agricultural Act of 2014 (i.e. the 2014 Farm Bill) repeals DP, CCP, and ACRE programs. 
Producers will no longer receive direct farm payments that are made at a fixed rate that are 
dispersed regardless of current market conditions. Instead, new commodity support programs for 
the 2014 through 2018 crop years will consider rolling averages of farm conditions (e.g. yield 
levels calculated at the county-level and marketing year average prices) that will calculate a 
benchmark revenue threshold per acre per crop per farm. During the farm bill debate period, 
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Southern agricultural interests succeeded in retaining a countercyclical-style price support 
program that uses a price floor for each commodity, with their reference prices protected by 
legislative authority. The farm bill debate pitted Midwestern corn and soybean interests against 
Southern crops such as cotton, peanuts, and rice. Soybean and corn growers of the Midwest 
wanted a revenue protection plan to replace the traditional supports. Rice and peanut growers 
preferred traditional supports. Each faction said the other tried to skew the farm bill towards its 
region. Much of this regional divide centered on the design of commodity support programs 
which ultimately gave way to the notion that a single style of support (revenue versus price) 
could not applied uniformly to the entire subset of American agriculture- or that the ‘umbrella’ 
approach would not be entirely effective in mitigating risk.  
The difficult negotiations between competing approaches to the farm safety net resulted in the 
compromise approach in the farm bill, which identifies four main points of consideration 
discussed in Coppess, 2014. The House farm bill required the owners of a farm to choose 
between a county revenue program and a fixed-price program. The Senate version of the bill 
provided both a price and revenue program for all farms and covered commodities but within the 
revenue program it required a choice between county-level or individual farm-level revenue. The 
final bill requires a choice among a price program, a county revenue program, or an individual 
farm revenue program. Title I of the 2014 farm bill includes a price-based assistance program 
and a revenue-based assistance program. Reflecting significant concerns about market and 
planting distortions, the compromise utilizes base acres for program payments (i.e. payments are 
made on a percentage of the farm’s base acres); neither program makes payments on the acres 
actually planted to covered commodities with the exception of cotton base acres (now termed 
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generic base acres) that are planted to covered commodities. Cotton is no longer a covered 
commodity due to the WTO trade-dispute claim originated by Brazil.  
Although the new design of commodity program support alone is not expected to result in any 
major acreage shifts in southern agriculture, it will force landowners and tenant producers to 
renegotiate their crop land rental arrangements. This will affect the return levels for all parties 
with a shared interest in the crop(s), as some commodity programs remain tied to the USDA FSA 
farm number (under control of the landowner) regardless if the producer has land privileges for 
the duration of the farm bill. Therefore, the combination of price and/or revenue support coupled 
with crop insurance policies for farms located in the Mid-south region will significantly impact 
the risk level of the producer. The crop selection decision as well as the combination of these 
support mechanisms will determine the profitability of the operation(s) under the control of the 
producer.  
Marketing loan provisions are largely maintained in the 2014 farm bill, with a slight alteration to 
the cotton loan rate. The marketing loan rate is established for wheat at $2.94; corn at $1.95; rice 
at $6.50; and soybeans at $5.00. For cotton, the loan rate is set equal to the simple average of the 
adjusted prevailing world price for the two immediately preceding marketing years but not less 
than $0.45 and no more than $0.52 per pound.  
From a policy standpoint, the single biggest decision in the bill is to end direct cash payments to 
farmers, which cost more than $4.5 billion annually (CBO, 2014). Instead, producers will have to 
make a decision between two options linked to real market losses. In lieu of direct cash 
payments, which are tied to the land, producers will have to make a choice between two options 
linked to real market losses- the agriculture risk coverage (ARC) or the price loss coverage 
(PLC) programs. Producers will face an irrevocable decision choice in program selection that 
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persists for the five-year duration of the 2014 farm law. Simultaneously, producers and 
landowners must also decide if they wish to reallocate their base acres between covered 
commodities going forward. Southern crops like rice, peanuts, and sorghum are expected to sign 
up for the PLC option. And as an added inducement, the bill allows these growers access to a 
new supplemental crop insurance option (SCO) that will become available in 2015, providing 
lower cost coverage based on county-wide revenues.  
Producers will have the choice of traditional price supports or insurance-like protection against a 
drop in crop revenue under the 2014 farm bill. Under the bill, producers will make a one-time 
choice for their covered commodities on whether to enroll for revenue protection, based on 
yields and national MYA prices or a program similar to the target price design that sets a 
minimum price. Reference prices used in the bill to trigger payments are up sharply from current 
law. Reference prices are set at $14.00 per hundredweight for long and medium grain rice, $5.50 
per bushel for wheat, $8.40 per bushel for soybeans, and $3.70 per bushel for corn. This is in 
comparison to the 2008 farm bill’s target prices of $4.17 wheat, $2.63 corn, and $6.00 soybean 
price levels. For farmers who choose revenue protection (ARC program), payments would 
become available when crop revenue is less than 86% of the rolling five year average. Protection 
would end when revenue falls below 76% of the average. Crop insurance would then act to cover 
deep revenue losses. The PLC program would operate similar to 2008 farm law, with payments 
triggered when MYA prices are below the guaranteed price. For the purpose of making PLC 
payments, a single opportunity is afforded to producers to update yields equal to 90% of the 
average yield per planted acre for the crop for the 2008 through 2012 crop years. Pertaining to 
base acres, there is a provision for the retention of one-time reallocation of base acres on a farm. 
The reallocation of base acres may not result in a total number of base acres in excess for the 
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farm on September 30, 2013. The premise of this option is to allow the farm owner to update 
their production history that may better reflect their farm composition, if desired.  
The ARC program, favored by the Senate, promises early but temporary assistance to producers 
faced with a downward cycle of prices. Payments would be triggered once prices fall 14 
percentage points below the prior five year average. But the subsidy covers only a narrow 10-
point band- from 86% to 76% of revenues- and will fade after several years if prices do not 
improve. The second choice, PLC, fits the more classic countercyclical model of fixed, 
government-set target prices- not a rolling 5-year average. The PLC program uses target prices, 
or reference prices. PLC payments would typically be triggered later in a market downturn but 
then promise a more permanent floor to cover a producer’s production costs- a major priority for 
House Agriculture Committee.  
PLC payments are made for the 2014-2018 crop years if the effective price for the covered 
commodity for each crop year is less than the reference price for the commodity. The effective 
price is equal to the higher of the national average market price or the national loan rate. The 
payment rate is the difference between the reference price and the effective price. The payment 
amount is equal to the payment rate multiplied by the payment yield multiplied by the payment 
acres. For ARC, payments is the actual crop revenue for the crop year is less than ARC 
guarantee for the crop year. Actual crop revenue, for the county coverage option, is equal to the 
actual county yield per planted acre multiplied by the higher of the national average market price 
or the loan rate. For the individual coverage option, total production is multiplied by the higher 
of the national average market price or the loan rate. The ARC guarantee is equal to 86% of the 
benchmark revenue. Benchmark revenue for county-level coverage is equal to the average 
historical county yield for the most recent five crop years, excluding the highest and the lowest 
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and the national average market price for the most recent five years, excluding the highest and 
the lowest. If the national market price during any of the five years is lower than the reference 
price, the reference price is used in the calculation. The payment rate is equal to the lesser of the 
amount that the guarantee exceeds actual crop revenue or 10% of the benchmark revenue. 
Appendix B provides the U.S. Code for agricultural commodity program specifications.  
 
1.4 Legislative Markup of Title I Programs  
Both the Senate and House Agriculture committee-reported bills borrow conceptually from 
current farm programs, revising and renaming them to enhance either price or revenue protection 
for producers. In contrast to earlier farm bill proposals, both the House and Senate Agriculture 
Committees’ versions included a price support program. The key differences in the proposals 
was the varying levels of support across covered commodities with the inclusion of new revenue-
based commodity programs. The Senate Agriculture Committee proposed a target price program 
called the adverse market program (AMP) in addition to a new revenue program called ARC. 
The AMP would provide payment if price falls below a specified reference price. AMP reference 
prices are defined as 55% of the previous five year Olympic average of national market price for 
each covered commodity. This is vastly different from House-proposed price support programs. 
Rice and peanuts, however, have reference prices that are set legislatively. An AMP payment 
acre is defined as 85% of base acres with updates allowed for rice and peanut crops. The House 
Agriculture Committee proposal advocated the PLC program with an optional election of a 
county-level revenue loss coverage program (RLC). The implications were such that the Senate 
version of the bill would favor Midwest and northern Corn Belt interests as ARC spending 
accounts for almost 90% of the Senate-proposed commodity title spending (S.954). The House-
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proposed bill (H.R.1947) was viewed as ‘balanced ‘pertaining to the choice between RLC and 
PLC. The Senate ARC program offers the choice of coverage between farm and county- level 
coverage, with the major difference being the yields used to determine the benchmark and actual 
revenues, and the percent of payment acres upon which the ARC payment would be received if 
actually triggered.  
Concerns to the Federal budget deficit have led to various proposals to reduce farm program 
spending (FAPRI, 2011). Key results from the FAPRI study indicate that the reduction in farm 
program payments results in lower farm income and agricultural land values (FAPRI, 2011). 
Also, effects of eliminating direct payments will differ across crops because of differences in 
direct payment rates, projected market prices, and expected revenue volatility (FAPRI, 2011). 
The FAPRI report stated that setting direct payment rates to zero would increase potential 
countercyclical payments, since payments are made when the season-average farm price falls 
below a trigger level set equal to the target price minus the DP rate. Increases in target prices and 
reductions in loan rates, DP rates, or market prices can collectively increase the CCP rates 
(FAPRI, 2007). If direct payments were eliminated by setting direct payment rates per unit to 
zero, the result would be an increase in the price that triggers CCPs. This effect could be avoided 
if DPs were eliminated in a different way, such as by specifying that no acreage is eligible for the 
payments. Eliminating direct payment program reduces government payments to producers, with 
negative effects on farm income.  The elimination of DP has a significant effect on production 
expenses than on market sales. The single largest impact is on rental payments made to non-
operator landowners (FAPRI, 2011). DPs are a much larger share of income for some producers 
than for others. Results differ across commodities. DPs are lower on a per acre basis for 
soybeans than for other crops. For cotton and especially rice, DPs per base acre are much greater 
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than for corn, wheat, and soybeans. Thus the reductions in producer income are greater for 
producers of cotton and rice than for producers of other crops (FAPRI, 2011). Eliminating DCP 
and ACRE payments, therefore, has a larger proportional impact on producers of some crops 
than on others.  
In a 2012 FAPRI report that analyzed commodity title provisions, the effect on crop returns, 
soybean producers (at one extreme) would lose $11.00 per base acre in DCP payments while rice 
producers (at the other extreme) would lose approximately $96.00 per base acre in DCP 
payments. Tables 1.17 and 1.18 provide a regional view on this aspect. When there is a large 
enough decline in revenues relative to a benchmark, payments can be quite large. The 
combination of lost DCP and ACRE payments and lower prices more than offset the new ARC 
and the stacked income protection plan (STAX) benefits for producers that have one base acre 
for each acre planted. Base acreage was determined by cropping patterns many years ago, and 
planted acreage can prove to be difficult to administrate, both on a particular farm and for the 
country as a whole. Producers with a lot of base acreage relative to planted acreage will be the 
most affected by the loss of DCP payments. Production and price impacts can be explained by 
the proposed shift from payments tied to base acreage to payments tied to planted acreage. 
Because DCP are tied to base acreage and do not require producers to grow any particular crop, 
payments have a smaller impact on planted acreage, dollar-for-dollar, than ARC or STAX 
benefits that do require current production (FAPRI, 2012).  
In the House PLC program, reference prices are set by Congress and, in general, are set above 
current CCP target prices. Payment acres are 85% of planted acres up to base acres with payment 
yields allowed to be updated from current levels to 90% of average yields from 2009 to 2012. 
The ARC program promises early- but temporary- assistance to growers faced with a downward 
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cycle of prices. ARC payments are expected to be triggered once prices fall at least 14 
percentage points below their prior five-year average. This program will likely be favored by 
producers in the Midwest, given the price declines in the corn markets. The subsidies provide 
assistance to help growers compensate for low returns, but will fade after several years if prices 
do not improve. The PLC program fits the more classic countercyclical model of fixed, target 
prices- not a rolling five year average.  PLC payments will typically trigger later in a market 
downturn but then promise the farmer a more permanent floor to cover production losses. But for 
both programs, the subsidies are designed to be greater in periods of stress. The choice of ARC 
or PLC hinges on price expectations. For example, if multi-year average prices for corn are 
expected to persist above $3.70 (corn reference price of $3.70 per bushel) over the life of the 
farm bill, ARC will provide better protection since PLC will never trigger payment. If prices are 
expected to be low, for instance averaging less than $3.00, PLC will provide better coverage. 
With lower market prices, PLC has become more relevant for corn and soybeans at a particular 
moment in time, although ARC still starts with a higher effective guarantee and could protect 
more revenue for the life of the farm bill. Individual farm-level ARC coverage could 
accommodate those with yields outside the county average. Producers should also consider how 
to best cover the gap between their personal crop insurance level and their farm program 
coverage level.  
Wailes, et al. 2012, states that the ARC program is in stark contrast to Title I of the 2008 farm 
law. This is in part due to the relatively high market process for the period 2008 through 2012 
that provided income transfers primarily through the DP program that has been of considerable 
importance for southern agriculture and rice producers in particular. ARC provides assistance in 
the deductible range of crop insurance utilizing indications of actual losses (county-wide or 
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multiple-commodity revenue movements from a recent average) and an emphasis on multi-year 
price risk. PLC is traditional income support policy utilizing price floors for commodities to help 
with market uncertainties such as sustained low prices. 
Concerns were expressed that the market-oriented nature of the assistance could become 
ineffective if prices are depressed for a sustained period of time. Concerns about the distortive 
potential of this policy were strongly voiced in the wake of Brazil’s successful challenge of 
cotton supports at the WTO. Concerns were also raised that policies using reference prices fixed 
for the life of the farm bill may not reflect actual market conditions. In this view, if the prices are 
fixed too low that the program may not help mitigate actual price risk, missing the impact on 
tight farm margins from volatile markets and input costs. If reference prices were set too high 
and run the risk of being viewed like direct payments, the program could be criticized for 
providing assistance in times when farm incomes are strong.  
Brazil and the United States reached an agreement in October of 2014 that resolves a long-
standing cotton dispute in the World Trade Organization that was originated by Brazil in 2002. 
The WTO case (# DS267) was initiated by Brazil- a major cotton export competitor. Schnepf, 
2014, provides a summary of the case by which Brazil charged that U.S. cotton programs were 
depressing international cotton prices and thus artificially (and unfairly) reducing the quantity 
and value of Brazil’s cotton exports, causing adverse harm to Brazil’s domestic cotton sector. In 
the wake of these challenges, a new cotton support policy was developed and included in both 
the Senate and House farm bill proposals. The resulting cotton policy for the 2014 through 2018 
removed cotton from price and income support program eligibility. Instead, cotton will rely upon 
a within-year, market-based insurance guarantee as its primary support measure. Under the new 
cotton program, producers have to pay into the program in order to gain benefit, a loss (albeit at 
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the county level) has to occur before a payment is made, and the sum of the program payments is 
prohibited from exceeding the value of the crop insured in order to minimize any potential 
incentive. (Schnepf, 2014). The major cotton-related provisions enacted in the 2014 farm bill 
include: (1) current cotton support program such as DP, CCP, and ACRE are repealed; (2) cotton 
is ineligible for new price (PLC) and income support (ARC) programs; (3) a reduced marketing 
loan program benefit, (4) an opportunity to purchase a cotton-only insurance plan,  (5) 
opportunity to receive a cotton transition assistance payment (CTAP) for the 2014/15 crop years, 
(6) concessions to the Brazil Cotton Institute, and (7) additional changes made to the GSM-102 
export credit guarantee program (Schnepf, 2014).  
 
1.5 Crop Insurance in the Region  
Crop insurance has been used as a risk management tool in the Mid-south region. As modern 
agricultural policy migrates towards a market-oriented approach, crop insurance products have 
the potential to become more widely adopted by producers of corn, cotton, rice, and soybeans in 
this region. Traditionally, crop insurance products have been a key fixture among Midwestern 
producers in lieu of the reliance of DCP payment to offset income risk. Information is presented 
in Tables 1.19 to 1.21 on the number of insured acres per crop per policy type as well as the 
percentage of insured acres to total acres in the state pertaining to the most recent crop year, 
2014. 
Crop insurance profiles for Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi were obtained from the USDA 
RMA for the 2004 to 2013 observational period. Common insurance policy products that are 
available in each state include: revenue protection (RP), revenue protection with harvest price 
exclusion (RPHPE), yield protection (YP), group risk income protection with harvest price 
exclusion (GRIPH), and a group risk plan (GRP). Revenue protection policies guard against a 
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loss of revenue caused by a price increase or decrease, low yields, or a combination of both. RP 
policies guarantee an amount based on the individual farm’s actual production history (APH) and 
the greater of the projected insurance price or the harvest time price. These aforementioned price 
parameters are established through the USDA RMA price discovery period for the applicable 
crop. The projected insurance price is used to calculate the premium. An indemnity is due when 
the calculated revenue is less than the revenue protection guarantee for the crop acreage 
(National Crop Insurance Service, 2014). RPHPE policies are similar to RP, however RPHPE 
provides protection against loss of revenue caused by a price decline, low yields, or a 
combination of both. Unlike RP policies, the revenue protection guarantee for RPHPE is based 
on the projected insurance price only and does not increase based on the harvest time price 
(National Crop Insurance Service, 2014). YP policies provide protection against a loss in yield 
due to unavoidable, naturally occurring events. Like the APH plan of insurance, YP guarantees a 
production yield based on the individual producer’s APH. The projected insurance price is used 
to determine the yield protection guarantee, premium, and to value the production. An indemnity 
is due when the value of the production is less than the yield production guarantee (National 
Crop Insurance Service, 2014).  GRIP and GRP are alternatives to traditional APH and other 
various revenue insurance products, and are based on county average yields rather than the actual 
yield of the farm or the insured unit (Edwards, 2011). Under GRP, a producer would receive 
payment (indemnity) when the actual county yield falls below the triggered yield that the 
producer chooses. Under GRIP, a producer would receive an indemnity when the actual county 
revenue falls below the triggered revenue that the producer chooses (Edwards, 2011). GRIP can 
be purchased with a harvest time price option, which means the harvest time price is used to 
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calculate the triggered revenue if it is greater than the projected insurance price during the USDA 
RMA price discover period for the applicable crop.  
In a historical context, the previous three years have brought three predominate types of crop 
insurance policies to the insurance-based safety net for the Mississippi River delta region: RP, 
RPHPE, and YP. These three products represent the predominate types of crop insurance policies 
purchased for corn grown in Arkansas. From 2011 to 2013, the percent of insured acres for corn 
under RP coverage increased from 39 to 48%, while the amount of insured acres for YP policies 
decreased from 59% to 51%. RPHPE policies accounted for approximately 1% of insured corn 
acres in Arkansas. The total amount of insured corn acreage in Arkansas ranged from 484,120 to 
749,985 acres over the 2011 to 2013 crop years (producing an annual average of 588,086 acres). 
Cotton insured in Arkansas since 2011 favors an increasing preference for YP policies. The share 
of insured cotton acres in the state over the three years has increased from 80 to 83%, while the 
share of RP acres has undergone a cyclical pattern of between 18 and 22%. The total number of 
insured cotton acres in the state over the three-year period ranged from 278,413 to 587,607 acre 
(annual average of 448,408 acres). Rice insured in Arkansas has shifted from YP policies to RP 
policies. RP policies have increased from 40 to 49% of insured acres while YP policies 
decreased from 61% to 50%. From 2011 to 2013, rice insured acreage ranged from 891,936 to 
1,190,608 acres (annual average of 1,027,844 acres). Finally soybean policies follow the trend 
associated with rice insurance policy preference. RP policies command 48% of the insured acres 
while YP command 51%. The total amount of insured soybean acres in Arkansas exhibited the 
least degree of variability, ranging from 2,447,892 to 2,563,156 acres over the 2011 to 2013 crop 
year period annual (average of 2,502,393 acres). Table 1.18 provides a description of insurance 
policies in Arkansas for selected crops purchased for the 2014 crop year.  
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Source: USDA RMA, 2015.  
 
In Louisiana, the amount of insured corn acres under RP policies has increased from 49% to 71% 
from 2011 to 2013. The other common policy purchased for corn is YP, with those policies 
decreasing in terms of the percentage of insured acres from 49% to 29%. The total amount of 
insured corn acreage in the state ranged from 514,784 to 650,723 acres from 2011 to 2013 
(annual average of 572,438 acres). A similar pattern of policy purchase can be observed for the 
RP polices for insured cotton acres in the state. RP policies increased from 45% to 66%, while 
the concentration of YP policies decreased from 53% to 31%. The total amount of insured acres 
for cotton has drastically been reduced since 2011- associated with the decrease in the number of 
planted acres in the state. Insured acres for the crop have ranged from 277,865 in 2011 to just 
123,339 acres in 2013. RP policies for rice have increased from 25% to 40% while YP policies 
of the crop have decreased from 75 to 60%. The number of insured acres for rice has been 
consistent over the 2011 to 2013 period, with acreage ranging from 330,403 to 374,288 acres 
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(annual average of 351,516 acres). RP is the dominant policy for soybeans produced in 
Louisiana, witnessing a 41 to 61% increase in insured acres. YP policies for soybean acres 
decreased from 57% to 38%. Pertaining to the amount of insured soybean acres in Louisiana, the 
same observation that is observed for Arkansas insured soybean acres proves true. The amount 
of Louisiana soybean insured acres has shown little variability. Acreage ranged from 945,069 to 
1,045,140 acres from 2011 to 2013 (annual average of 1,010,158 acres). Table 1.19 provides a 
description of insurance policies in Louisiana for selected crops purchased for 2014.  
 









































































Source: USDA RMA, 2015. Where * denotes prevented planted acreage caused insured acre to 
exceed planted acres. 
 
In Mississippi, the total amount of insured corn acres ranged from 748,016 to 997,387 acres 
during the 2011 to 2013 period (annual average of 841,140 acres). RP for insured corn acres has 
increased from 70% to 78%, while YP policies have decreased by a proportional amount (30% to 
22%). RP is also the favored insurance product for cotton acres in the state, undergoing an 
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increase of 52% to 64%. YP policies for cotton in Mississippi have decreased from 47% to 36%. 
Total amount of insured cotton acres decreased from 575,061 to 303,587 acres over the three-
year period (average of 439,550 acres). The decrease in cotton acres throughout the region 
supports this trend. For rice planted in Mississippi, the amount of insured acres has been cyclical 
over the 2011 to 2013 period- with a low of 118,800 acres to a high of 196,510 acres. The 
average amount of insured acres over the period is 156,678 acres annually. RP policies for rice 
has significantly increased from 46% to 72% of insured acres. YP policies decreased from 54% 
to 28%. For soybeans that are insured in Mississippi, RP policies represent 64% to 73% of the 
insured acres, while YP has decreased from 36% to 27%.  The amount of insured soybean acres 
has been consistent over the 2011 to 2013 period, ranging from 1,688,727 to 1,906,074 acres 
(annual average of 1,811,722 acres).  
In an historic change, driven by years of international trade disputes, approximately 10 million 
acres of cotton will transition out of the commodity title support and into a new revenue-based 
insurance program called STAX (the stacked income protection plan) to begin operating for the 
2015 crop year. The premium costs for cotton are even more heavily subsidized than regular crop 
insurance and is estimated cost the Federal government $3.8 billion over nine years, including 
$556 million in cotton transition payments designed to assist growers through the 2014 crop year 
(CBO, 2014). On balance, this is still less than cotton’s share of Federal direct payments, as the 
cotton industry hopes the new approach will settle claims made by Brazil in the WTO court.   
Table 1.20 provides a description of insurance policies in Mississippi for selected crops 



































































Source: USDA RMA, 2015. Where * denotes prevented planted acreage caused insured acre to 
exceed planted acres. 
 
The farm bill established transition assistance for producers of cotton for the 2014 and 2015 crop 
year (in a county where STAX is not available). The transition assistance rate is equal to the June 
12, 2013 midpoint estimate for market price for the marketing year minus the December 10, 
2013 estimated for market price as contained in the USDA’s World Agriculture Supply and 
Demand Estimate (WASDE) multiplied national program yield for upland cotton of 597 pounds 
per acre. Payment is made on 60% of base in 2014 and 36.5% of base acres if offered in 2015. 
STAX will provide coverage for revenue losses of not less than 10% and not more than 30%. 
Coverage is established based on an expected price established under existing GRIP or area-wide 
policies that are offered with an expected county yield that is the higher of the expected county 
yield in existing area-wide plans or averaged applicable yield data for the county for the most 
recent five years, excluding the highest and the lowest, from USDA RMA or NASS. There is an 
option to for producers to select a multiplier factor to establish a maximum protection level per 
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acre at 120% of yield. Indemnity is paid based on the amount that expected county revenue 
exceeds actual county revenue, as applied to individual coverage. The Federal Crop Insurance 
Corporation (FCIC) will subsidize 80% of the premium cost.  
As the name ‘stacked’ implies, the program will be available in addition to a producer’s crop 
insurance policy while a producer would not necessarily have to purchase a crop insurance 
policy in order to be STAX-eligible. STAX is subsidized at an 80% level and like the current 
GRIP policy, the maximum protection per acre is calculated by multiplying the expected county 
yield by the price and by a 120 percent multiplier. The multiplier is useful to producers with 
above average yields to purchase a higher level of liability (American Farm Bureau Federation, 
2012). It involves using an area-wide revenue product such as a modified group risk income 
protection program where losses are determined at the county-level rather than the farm-level. 
STAX would be delivered through crop insurance, providing protection against shallow losses 
by adding a layer of additional protection to existing crop insurance policies. GRIP is an 
insurance product designed to protect farms against revenue losses that occur at the county-level 
rather than at the individual farm-level. Area-wide policies such as GRIP are generally cheaper 
than farm-level policies since the risk of loss is pooled at a more aggregate level (Shields and 
Schnepf, 2012).  STAX coverage is between 70 and 90% of county target revenue with a 
maximum payment not to exceed 20% of the county target revenue. STAX may not overlap an 
individual crop insurance policy. For example, if a producer has a 75% crop insurance policy, 
STAX could only be purchased on 76-90% coverage rather than 70-90% (American Farm 
Bureau Federation, 2012). STAX would be designed to help bridge the gap between the deep 
revenue losses and the more shallow losses that can hinder a producer’s ability to repay any crop 
loan debt or build equity in the farming operation. 
57 
 
1.6 Problem Statement 
Since the FAIR Act of 1996, producers were free to respond to changing market conditions 
without losing federal farm program benefits as they weighted planting decisions across their 
farming operations. This signified a shift away from mono-cropped production systems that were 
common throughout the Mississippi River delta region. Over the past decade, changes in the 
production costs of major row crops affected the net returns of these farming operations. As 
producers in the region rely on crop rotations, federal commodity support programs, and crop 
insurance to manage price and income risk, significant variability in the fuel and fertilizer 
markets can significantly affect the return level of energy-intensive crops such as rice and cotton. 
This, coupled with constant changing market conditions, adds to the uncertainty of agricultural 
production from one year to the next. With the onset of newly crafted agricultural policy, further 
analysis is warranted as to the degree that new farm programs and insurance policies mitigate 
price and yield risk to producers of corn, cotton, rice, and soybeans in the Mississippi River delta 
region. As these new commodity and crop insurance programs/products become available to 
producers, economic analysis is needed to evaluate the degree that current federal programs have 
on risk mitigation and overall farm profitability. Also, further analysis is needed to estimate how 
each program will likely function for most commodities and farms under different risk scenarios. 
The 2014 farm bill requires producers and landowners to elect which program design they prefer 
based on what they think will be most effective for their operation, particularly in conjunction 






1.7 Objectives  
The purpose of this research is to provide analysis of farm bill commodity provisions and crop 
insurance policies in terms of the associated impact on corn, cotton, rice, and soybean net return 
variability in the Mississippi River delta region. The political component of agriculture income 
support policy coupled with crop production cost volatility can affect the economic vitality of 
farms in the region. This research intends to present economic analysis evaluating the risk level 
of commodity support programs and crop insurance selection across multi-crop farming 
operations in the Delta region. Specifically, the study area consists of representative farms that 
are modeled to reflect typical cropping patterns and practices of farms operating in Southeast 
Arkansas, Northeast Louisiana, and Northwest Mississippi.  
Specifically, the objectives of this research are: 1) simulate net returns per acre via a multivariate 
distribution of commodity prices, yields, and prices of selected energy-related farm inputs over 
the past ten-year historical period for each state in the region; 2) identify common crop rotations 
based on production systems on representative farms in the region as to develop a set of 
enterprise budgets; 3) specify new federal farm program mechanics that are applicable to the 
diversified agricultural production of the region; and 4) evaluate the risk preference of varying 
groups of producers in the region based on their participation in multiple commodity support 
programs and crop insurance policies relative to the crops being produced.    
The scope of the research will specifically focus on defining crop rotation alternatives on 
representative farms in the Mississippi River delta region of the Mid-south and comparing the 
level of net returns across the whole farm. The representative sample of farms will include 
commodity price and yield distributions over a ten-year historical time period from 2004 to 
2013. Production costs and farm size are additional parameters that will be addressed as 
production costs can vary from farm-to-farm within the region due to the requirements of 
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different crop production systems employed. Through the use of detailed enterprise budgets, 
production cost volatility can be identified between crop rotation alternatives as to denote 
regional variability. Farm size is a necessary parameter to include in this analysis as farm 
programs will be paid on base acres and not planted acres on a farm, should payments be 
triggered for a crop year. Data from the 2012 U.S. Census of Agriculture will assist in 
determining the acreage of the representative farms in each state. Secondly, this research will 
attempt to evaluate commodity farm program choice and insurance options per crop per farming 
operation for the economic analysis. Through the use of simulation modeling, the impacts of 
farm program selection on net return mean variability can be expressed. Third, the measure of 
risk in each state in the Mississippi River delta region can be evaluated for alternative farm 
program choice and underlying insurance policy options; given the specified utility function and 
risk aversion coefficients that measure profitability. 
For selected commodities, statistics on price, yield, input prices, and net return variability are 
presented using a risk return framework methodology. An applied procedure is used to simulate 
stochastic prices and yields in a farm simulation model that can assist farm managers and policy 
analysts in evaluating the impact that crop rotation choice and farm program election have on net 
returns. Key production unit prices for inputs such as nitrogen, phosphorous, and potash fertilizer 
and diesel fuel are simulated to generate a production cost per acre for each crop in the region. 
For each farm, commodity support program choice, and crop insurance policy, returns for each 
management prescription are compared using the risk-return framework of stochastic efficiency 
with respect to a function (SERF). The set of alternatives presented to agricultural producers in 
the SERF framework will include the net returns per acre for alternative crop rotations and 
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various farm program choices. This economic data is present over a range of risk aversion 
coefficients so that the risk behavior of producers can be approximated.  
In combination with production cost volatility, the elimination of DCP to cotton and rice 
producers is expected to have a larger impact on gross revenue when government program 
payments are added to market receipts since there are more acres eligible for a direct payment. 
Evaluations of alternative farm safety net proposals (e.g. ARC, PLC, SCO and STAX) are 
warranted in this research pertaining to rice farms located in the Mississippi River delta region. 
ARC, PLC, and marketing assistance loans will be calculated for covered commodities that 
include corn, long grain rice, and soybeans. Since cotton is no longer considered a covered 
commodity, it will transition out of traditional commodity support and move to insurance-based 
risk mitigation tools, such as SCO and STAX.  
The following research questions will be posed: (1) For the ARC and PLC programs, how do 
risk preferences affect program choice specifically for operations that contain a majority of corn 
and soybean acreage? (2) For those producers who produce cotton, how does their risk 
preference vary among STAX and SCO optional insurance endorsements? (3) Can SERF 
analysis be used as a risk measurement tool to answer these questions by assigning different 
utility functions and risk aversion coefficients? (4) Do different utility functions of producers 









CHAPTER 2: ECONOMIC LITERATURE REVIEW  
Multiple agricultural economic studies have used simulation approaches for the purposes of 
examining risk management in the farm management decision making process (Richardson, et 
al,. 2000; Flanders and Wailes, 2010; Flanders, 2008; Ray, et al., 1998). These studies use 
simulation as a methodology to estimate crop price and yield parameters (e.g. probability 
distribution of prices and yields), production cost variability, and crop returns from competing 
rotation systems. These studies also identify the level of returns to the farming operation for each 
scenario examined. In addition to measuring production risk, simulation analysis and modeling is 
used in by agricultural policy economists to evaluate the effect of farm-level policy decisions- 
chiefly the commodity price and income support programs as well as crop insurance products.  
 
2.1 Stochastic Simulation  
A simulation model is an organized collection of equations with relevant data to calculate output 
variables that represent realized outcomes in a real system as exogenous variables change values 
(Flanders and Wailes, 2010). Optimal selections for decision making can be determined by 
evaluating the simulated outcomes. Stochastic simulation models allow changes in variables that 
represent random occurrences that correspond to risks associated with decision making. 
Deterministic models lead to simulated outcomes that regard all variables as fixed with constant 
values. Stochastic models are preferred for analyzing government payments designed to provide 
levels of farm income support that vary with stochastic production and marketing conditions 
(Flanders and Wailes, 2010). 
Richardson, et al., (2000) uses simulation analysis as a method to evaluate multivariate non-
normally distributed random variables. Observations for input prices and quantities, market 
prices, and/or yields each carry their own probability distributions that must be parameterized. 
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This is often the case when using annual data to estimate each parameter. For instance, the 
number of observations can be considered too few when one wants to examine the past decade. 
A limited number of observations can rule out the use of standardized probability distributions 
due to the fact that too few observations exist to prove that the data fit a particular distribution. 
With the assumption that the data are distributed empirically, a specific distribution is not 
enforced on the variables and does not limit the ability of the model to deal with correlation of 
heteroskedasticity.  
Richardson, et al., (2000) outlines a seven step procedure for estimating the parameters for a 
multivariate empirical distribution (MVE). The first step outlined by the authors is to separate 
the random and the non-random components for each of the stochastic variables. The second step 
is to calculate the random component of each stochastic variable. The third step for estimating 
parameters for a multivariate empirical distribution is to convert the residuals (from step two) to 
relative deviates about their respective deterministic components. The fourth step is to sort the 
relative deviates (from step three) and to create pseudo-minimums and pseudo-maximums for 
each random variable. The fifth step is to assign probabilities to each of the sorted deviates (done 
in step four). The sixth step is to calculate the intra-temporal correlation matrix for the random 
variables. The seventh step is to calculate the inter-temporal correlation coefficients for the 
random variables.  
In the Richardson, et al., (2000) study, the multivariate empirical distribution is simulated for a 
ten year period using historical annual yields and national prices. For the simulation, it is 
assumed that the relative variability of yields would be the same in the future as it has been in the 
past. Richardson, et al., (2000) states that by separating the non-random component from the 
random component, the multivariate empirical distribution has the flexibility to impose the 
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historical variability on the mean value of the parametrized variable. The simulated coefficient of 
variation is the same as the historical coefficient of variation for all yields and prices. Using the 
percentage deviations as parameter estimates in the multivariate empirical distribution forces the 
coefficient of variation to remain stationary, even when the mean changes from year to year. A 
process that uses a constant standard deviation would generate a declining coefficient of 
variation. For example, if a researcher wanted to increase the relative variability of crop prices in 
the last year of the simulated period, the coefficient of variation would increase. Multivariate 
empirical distribution has the flexibility to impose the historical variability on any assumed mean 
value and accounts for the interrelationships occurring in the data (Richardson, Klose, and Gray, 
2000; Flanders, 2008). The resulting simulated random variables are bounded by historical 
minimums and maximums of the original data (Flanders, 2008). By using historical price and 
yield information specific to northeastern Louisiana, Deliberto, et al., (2013) obtains the 
distribution functions of each variable around a selected mean level representative of expected 
market and growing condition for the region. 
Stochastic simulations rely on the interactions of random variables within a model to analyze the 
uncertainty present in the model and how those variables behave under alternative conditions 
that are imposed. Each random variable’s subsistent distribution can be estimated and the 
distribution of each variable is then randomly sampled so that probabilistic outcomes can be 
modeled (Richardson, Schumann, and Feldman, 2008). Stochastic simulation models allow 
changes in variables that represent random occurrences that correspond to risks associated with 
production and policy aspect of decision making (Flanders and Wailes, 2010).  
Historical variability in agricultural prices, supplies, exports, and returns can be attributed to 
factors over which individual producers have neither control nor reliable predictive ability (Ray, 
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et al., 1998). Producers and policymakers are cognizant of the sources and magnitude of this 
variability surrounding crop yields, as well as prices and net returns. Ray, et al., (1998) poses this 
on the basis of the existence of price and net return variability being greater (or lesser) in the 
Southern region than for the U.S. as a whole. Producers, policymakers, agricultural lenders, 
agribusinesses, and others are increasingly interested in the range and relative frequency of 
prices given the variability associated with yields and exports.  
Stochastic simulation techniques allow estimation of probability distributions for endogenous 
variables such as prices and net returns, given probability distributions for uncertain variables in 
the system. With this technique, the disturbance terms for particular equations represent the form 
of uncertainty in the system (uncertainty of probability distributions of random variables, such as 
yield or the disturbance term). Stochastic simulation of such a model results in an estimate of the 
probability distributions on the endogenous variables, and thus provides an important dimension 
to the information base for decision makers (Ray, et al., 1998). This added dimension of 
variability around key indicators of agricultural performance (e.g. prices, yields, input prices, 
income levels, etc.) will be especially important in examining agricultural sector impacts of 
subsequent farm bills or other types of agricultural-based legislation. Using a ten-year stochastic 
baseline, Ray, et al., (1998) measures selected agricultural policies, domestic and global 
economic conditions, weather, technological change, and other influences that characterize the 
stochastic baseline simulation. Stochastic yield and export shock are introduced into their model. 
While a deterministic model could be used to perform multiple simulations that introduce 
randomness to desired variables, stochastic techniques provide a statistical framework to perform 
a series of simulations in an efficient and systematic manner (Ray, et al., 1998).  
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When attempting to model policy implication of federal agriculture-related legislation, the 
representative farm methodology can be employed. The representative farm approach treats a 
farm business unit as a unique system characterized by local features and resources with local 
conditions internalized in the creation and simulation of each farm (Richardson, et al., 2014b). In 
this research, information necessary to simulate the economic activity of these representative 
farms is developed from panels of producers using a consensus-building interview process. Panel 
members are tasked with providing the data needed to build a farm that is representative of their 
operations. Such data include: size of operation, land tenure, commodities produced, production 
practices, fixed costs, variable costs, equipment compliment, yields, and prices received for their 
commodities (Richardson, et al., 2014b). Similar approaches to modeling the financial 
performance of representative farms can be explored in Richardson, et al., (2014a) and 
Richardson, et al., (2014c).  Multiple years of historical data are included in the analysis so that 
the results are ensured to track the financial outcomes that were experienced in the recent past by 
the farming operation (Outlaw, et al., 2012). Key assumptions that pertain to modeling the farm 
level impact of policy provisions contained in Outlaw, et al., (2012) are such that actual price 
and yield data made available was obtained from the producers. Multiple policy scenarios were 
analyzed reading new commodity and crop insurance products of what is now the 2014 farm bill. 
Through the use of representative farms, a farm’s preference for one policy alternative over 
another was based on the alternative with the highest average net cash farm income over the 
duration of the simulated period (Outlaw, et al., 2012).  
 
2.2 Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function  
The most direct way to measure risk preferences is to derive the decision maker's utility function. 
Utility functions relate the outcomes of choices to single-valued indices of desirability. As such, 
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they are a representation of preferences (King and Robison, 1981). Expected utility theory states 
that a decision maker’s utility function for outcomes is needed to assess risky alternatives as the 
shape of the actual utility function reflects an individual’s attitude towards risk (Hardaker, et al., 
2004; Schumann, et al,. 2004). The utility of a risky alternative is the decision maker’s expected 
utility for that alternative, meaning the probability-weighted average of outcomes. Stochastic 
dominance criteria is useful in situations involving a single decision maker whose preferences 
are not known precisely and in situations where more than one decision maker might be 
involved, such as analyzing policy alternatives for a group of decision makers. An attractive 
feature of generalized stochastic dominance is that it does not require specific knowledge of an 
individual’s utility function (Williams, 1988; Maynard, et al., 1997).  
A stochastic dominance criterion provides a partial ordering of risky alternatives for decision 
makers whose preferences conform to specified conditions about their utility functions 
(Hardaker, et al., 2004). It is important to note the trade-offs made in conducting a stochastic 
dominance analysis. The fewer restrictions that are placed on the utility function, the more 
general applicability the results will have, but the less powerful will be the criterion in selecting 
between alternatives. The decision maker must then make the final choice from among the 
members of the efficient set. Criteria that identify small efficient sets usually require more 
specific information or assumptions about preferences (Hardaker, et al., 2004).  
Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) allows for tighter restrictions on risk 
aversion. Eliciting from the decision makers the bounds on their risk aversion coefficients may 
be simpler than eliciting a complete utility function. The name is chosen to distinguish it from 
conventional stochastic dominance with respect to a function (SDRF) and to indicate that the 
method works by identifying utility efficient alternatives for ranges of risk attitudes, not by 
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finding a subset of dominated alternatives. (Hardaker, et al., 2004). SDRF has been used because 
it is a generalized version of the commonly used first- and second-degree stochastic dominance 
criteria and, at the same time, is more flexible and discriminating and does not require the 
specification of the decision maker’s utility function (Williams, 1988). Imprecision in the 
measurement of decision maker preferences can be recognized explicitly be using an efficiency 
criterion rather than a single-valued utility function to order alternatives.  
SERF partitions alternatives in terms of certainty equivalents as a selected measure of risk 
aversion is varied over a defined range (Hardaker, et al., 2004; Schumann, et al. 2004). SERF 
can be applied for any utility function for which the inverse function can be computed based on 
ranges in the absolute, relative or partial risk aversion coefficient, as appropriate. Conventional 
SDRF picks only the pairwise dominated alternatives. By contrast SERF will potentially identify 
a smaller efficient set than SDRF because it picks only the utility efficient alternatives, 
comparing each with all the other alternatives simultaneously. SERF allows for estimation of the 
utility-weighted risk premiums between alternatives to provide a cardinal measure for comparing 
the payoffs between risky alternatives (Hardaker, et al., 2004).  
SERF provides an ordinal ranking of alternatives at each risk aversion level between the lower 
and upper risk aversion bounds customarily tested. SERF is a one step process that is similar to, 
but potentially more discriminating than, running an SDRF analysis at all risk aversion levels 
within the stated bounds. SERF provides a cardinal measure of the decision maker’s conviction 
for preferences among alternatives at each risk aversion level by interpreting the differences 
between certainty equivalent (CE) values as risk premiums. SERF evaluates CE values for 
alternatives over many values and then graphically displaying ordinal and cardinal rankings for 
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many different groups of agents across a spectrum of risk aversion levels. (Hardaker, et al., 2004; 
Schumann, et al. 2004).  
Primary assumptions involved in expected utility analyses are those relating to the distribution of 
the data and the utility function of the decision maker. Differing assumptions regarding these can 
greatly impact decision analysis and efficient sets under alternative risk aversion levels. The 
SERF procedure can be carried out for many specified parametric distributions. In many cases, 
the specific form of the utility function, let alone the parameterization, is relatively unknown 
apart from general characteristics (Schumann, et al., 2004). Apart from having to choose a 
specific utility function, a composite of several utility functions can be used in the ranking 
process for a SERF analysis. Choosing utility functions with the assumption of concavity in the 
range of risk aversion and weighting them to create a composite ranking can be useful to analyze 
decision maker’s choices under quasi-risk aversion conditions (Schumann, et al., 2004). In 
addition to the difference in discriminating power, whether pairwise SDRF and SERF applied 
using the same form of utility function will give comparable results will also depend on 
differences in data handling (Hardaker, et al. 2004).  
Strategies (outcomes) with higher CEs are preferred to those with lower CEs. The CE of a risky 
strategy is the amount of money at which the decision-maker is indifferent between the certain 
(generally lower) dollar value and the expected value of the risky strategy. For a risk-averse 
decision-maker, the estimated CE is typically less than the expected value of the risky strategy. 
The calculation of the CE depends on the utility function specified. Given a negative exponential 
utility function, a specific absolute risk aversion coefficient (ARAC), which represents the ratio 
of the second and first derivatives of the decision-maker’s utility function, is used to derive CEs. 
Values of the absolute risk-aversion function are simply local measures of the degree of 
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concavity or convexity of a utility function. As such, they also serve as indicators of the extent to 
which a decision maker is risk averse or less risk averse (King and Robison, 1981). To calculate 
the CEs using SERF various types of utility functions can be used, e.g. power; negative 
exponential, quadratic, log-log (Fathelrahman, et al., 2011). A negative exponential utility 
function used in the SERF analysis conforms to the hypothesis that farm managers prefer less 
risk to more given the same expected return. This functional form assumes managers have 
constant absolute risk aversion. Under this assumption, managers view a risky strategy for a 
specific level of risk aversion the same without regard for their level of wealth. A negative 
exponential function can be used as a reasonable approximation of risk averting behavior 
(Williams, et al. 2012).  
The degree of precision with which preferences are measured- i.e., the size of the interval 
between the lower and upper bound functions-can be specified directly in accordance with the 
characteristics of the problem under consideration. The procedure for constructing interval 
measurements of decision maker preferences is based on the premise that under certain 
conditions, a choice between two distributions defined over a relatively narrow range of outcome 
levels divides absolute risk aversion space over that range into two regions: one consistent with 
the choice and one inconsistent with it (Williams, et al., 2012). The decision maker's preferences, 
as revealed by the ordering of the two distributions, determines which of the two regions their 
level of absolute risk aversion lies. By confronting the decision maker with a series of choices 
between selected pairs of distributions, the region of absolute risk-aversion space consistent with 
the decision maker's preferences can repeatedly be divided. With each choice, a portion of that 
region is shown to be inconsistent with the decision maker's preferences, and the interval 
measurement for the level of absolute risk aversion is said to narrow. The procedure continues 
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until a desired level of accuracy is attained (Williams, 1988). Varian (1992) states that if a 
consumer is risk averse over some region, then the chord drawn between any two points of the 
graph of their utility function in this region must lie below the function. This is equivalent to the 
mathematical definition of a concave function. Hence, concavity of the expected utility function 
is equivalent to risk aversion. The more concave the expected utility function, the more risk 
averse the consumer. Normalizing the second derivate results in the Arrow-Pratt measure of 
absolute risk aversion (Varian, 1992).  
Interval preference measurements are used in combination with the evaluative criterion of 
stochastic dominance with respect to a function to order choices. Lower and upper bound 
absolute risk-aversion levels for each of the outcome levels where direct measurements have 
been made and the outcome distributions to be ordered serve as inputs to the computer program 
designed to accomplish this task (King and Robison, 1981). King and Robison, 1981, go onto 
suggest that most intervals for stochastic dominance with respect to a function be established 
between the ranges from -0.0001 to 0.0010. Elicited risk preferences suggest that similar farm 
managers would exhibit risk-neutral behavior within the range of -0.00001 and 0.00001. Those 
above this range would exhibit more risk-adverse behavior, whereas those below would exhibit 
more risk-seeking behavior (Williams, 1988). 
Under conditions of risk, mean-variance/mean-standard deviation analyses and stochastic 
dominance approaches have been used to provide for risk aversion behavior under general 
assumptions concerning farmer’s utility functions and cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) 
of returns (Fathelrahman, et al. 2011). For economic analyses, this normally involves comparison 
of cumulative income (e.g. gross margin or net return) probability distributions from a set of 
agricultural management alternatives (e.g. tillage or cropping systems). SERF analyses are 
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dependent on the range of risk aversion coefficients used. The decision rule for SERF is to rank 
the risky alternatives (within the decision makers specified risk aversion coefficient) from the 
most preferred (i.e. the highest CEs at specified levels of risk aversion) to the least preferred (i.e. 
the lowest CEs at specified levels of risk aversion).  Another advantage of the SERF method is 
its ability to produce ranking of alternatives for any utility function with risk attitudes defined by 
corresponding ranges of absolute, relative or partial risk aversion coefficients (Hardaker, et al. 
2004; Schumann, et al., 2004). The relative risk aversion coefficient is typically around 1.0. 
Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker, (1977) proposed a classification of degrees of risk aversion, 
based on the relative risk aversion with respect of wealth in the range 0.5 (hardly risk averse at 
all) to approximately 4.0 (very risk averse) as evaluated in the Hardaker, et al., (2004) study.  
Fathelrahman, et al., (2011) uses this range in their study for SERF analysis of the tillage system 
alternatives as well as including the situation where risk aversion with respect to wealth was 
equal to zero, i.e. a risk neutral condition. For a rational decision maker who is risk averse (as in 
the case of farm planning), the estimated CE is less than the expected monetary value of the risky 
strategy. The difference between the expected variance and the CE is called the risk premium 
(Hardaker, et al., 2004), indicating the effect of the decision maker’s risk aversion.  
Bryant, et al., (2008) uses SERF methodology to place upper and lower bounds on the value of 
the dominant cotton technology with respect to a set of dominated technologies. Multiple 
technologies are compared simultaneously and risk is appropriately considered. Bryant, et al. 
(2008) builds on the Johnson and Blackshear, (2004) work that uses stochastic simulations to 
evaluate the profitability of Roundup Ready® and conventional cotton varieties considering the 
variability of prices, yields, and production costs. Stochastic dominance with respect to a 
function was used to rank the varieties accounting for the inherent stochasticity and different 
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levels of producer risk aversion. A stochastic approach compared various levels of risk aversion 
and risk neutrality. The analyses were conducted for twenty different alternative levels of ARAC 
ranging from 0 to 0.05. Bryant, et al., (2008) employs a negative exponential utility function is 
chosen to calculate the ARAC for each study location by dividing two extreme ARAC values for 
relative risk aversion with respect to wealth measures of 0.5 and 4.0 by an average of wealth for 
alternative cotton seed technologies at each location. Subtracting CE for less preferred 
alternatives from the CE of the preferred alternative yielded a measurement of preference for the 
preferred alternative at a given risk aversion level.  
Stochastic dominance is a mathematically precise evaluative criterion to rank actions or choices 
for classes of decision makers defined by specified lower and upper bounds of their absolute risk 
aversion coefficient (King and Robison, 1981). The ARAC is defined as the –U”(x) divided by 
U’(x), where U represents a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function (King and Robison, 
1981). A positive absolute risk aversion coefficient (ARAC) implies a concave utility function 
for a risk averse decision maker. Conversely, a negative ARAC implies a convex utility function 
for a risk loving decision maker (King and Robison, 1981).  
Furthermore, the specification of lower and upper bounds places constraints on the range of risk 
attitudes entering the stochastic dominance analysis (Giesler, Paxton, and Millhollan, 1993). The 
advantage of this approach is that it utilizes all simulated observations and provides an indication 
of the confidence a decision maker has regarding the ranking of alternative variety selections 
(Richardson, 2002). Furthermore, the results are preferred to the simple “average” results, which 
do not internalize any considerations for risk preferences.  
Barham, et al., (2011), examines the risk efficiency of alternative combinations of risk 
management strategies over a range of risk aversion levels for a representative Texas Lower Rio 
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Grande Valley farming operation. Risk mitigating aspects of irrigation in combination with crop 
insurance, hedging, and farm programs are considered as part of the management strategy 
employed. A multivariate empirical distribution was used to avoid biasing the results and to 
adequately represent the data from a small sample (Richardson, et al., 2000). SERF is used to 
rank the expected benefits of 16 alternative management strategies using a power utility function 
with risk aversion coefficients ranging from 0.0 to 4.0.  The CE is calculated over a range of risk 
aversion coefficients (RACs), rather than selecting a single RAC, and ranks risky alternatives 
based on the CE values over the range of RACs. Barham, et al., (2011) conclude that a rational 
decision maker prefers a higher CE to a lower value at their particular RAC, so scenarios can be 
ranked by observing the highest CE at each relative risk aversion coefficient. 
Hignight, et al., (2010) evaluates production costs, crop yields, and economic risk of tillage 
systems in five rice-based cropping systems (continuous rice, rice-soybean, rice-corn, rice-wheat, 
and rice-wheat-soybean-wheat) of the Arkansas prairie region. Yields, crop prices, and key input 
prices are simulated to create a distribution of net returns to the farm. Stochastic efficiency with 
respect to a function (SERF) is used to evaluate profitability and risk efficiency. Crop prices 
received, fuel, fertilizer, a glyphosate herbicide, and yields are the stochastic variables contained 
in the model. Multivariate empirical distributions of the variables followed the estimation 
procedures identified in Richardson, et al., (2008). The MVE distribution creates a distribution of 
the deviations expressed as a fraction from the mean or trend and simulates the random value 
based upon the frequency distribution of the actual data. A MVE distribution has been shown to 
appropriately correlate random variables based upon their historical correlation (Richardson, et 
al., 2000). Hristovska, et al., (2011)  examined rice and soybean yield distributions under 
competing tillage systems that were simulated using historical yield data from a long term rice-
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based cropping systems study in Arkansas for the period 2000 to 2010. The historical crop yields 
represent yields obtained in a two-year rice-soybean rotation. Deviations from the mean yields 
were used to estimate the parameters for the MVE yield distributions. The SERF method of the 
SIMETAR feature of Microsoft® Excel uses a negative exponential utility function to estimate 
the CE values at each ARAC. The ARAC formula proposed by Hardaker, et al., (2004) is used to 
calculate a farm manager’s degree of risk aversion. Given the CE values, risk premiums can be 
calculated across alternative cropping systems and between tillage practices. Certainty 
equivalents and risk premiums are presented by cropping system for a range of ARACs in are 
used to predict preferences of tillage practice applied to each cropping system. Certainty 
equivalents are equal to the mean (risk neutral) when the ARAC is equal to 0. Positive ARACs 
represent risk aversion, and risk aversion increases as ARACs become more positive. 
Alternatively, negative ARACs represent risk seeking behavior, and risk seeking behavior grows 
as ARACs become more negative. ARACs values from -0.15 to 0.15 are used to give a range of 
how the cropping systems and tillage practice would be ranked across risk aversion levels. 
The economic feasibility of soybeans, grain sorghum, and corn in annual rotation with winter 
wheat using reduced tillage and no-tillage systems in the Central Great Plains region were 
evaluated in Williams, et al., 2012. Net returns were calculated using simulated yield and price 
distributions based on historical yields, two historical annual price series, and 2011 production 
costs. SERF was used to determine the preferred strategies under various risk preferences. The 
objective of this analysis was to determine which tillage systems and row crops rotated with 
winter wheat are preferred under varying degrees of risk preference for producers in the region. 
A simulated correlated multivariable empirical yield distribution derived from actual historical 
yields was multiplied by a simulated multivariate empirical price distribution derived from actual 
75 
 
historical prices to calculate gross returns for each cropping system. Empirical distributions were 
specified using the yield and price data following Richardson, Klose, and Gray, (2000) because 
too few observations existed to estimate parameters for another distribution (e.g., truncated 
normal distribution). The price and yield distributions were used to generate a CDF using the 
historical yield data with the probability ranging from 0.0 to 1.0, formed by ordering the data and 
assigning a cumulative probability for each observation. The same process was repeated using 
annual marketing year prices. The simulated net return data outcomes from each crop production 
system were sorted into CDFs, which were used in the SERF analysis. Once the strategies were 
ranked using the CE results, a utility-weighted risk premium was calculated.  
Williams, et al., 2012 applied the simulated net return data outcomes from each crop production 
system sorted into CDFs, which were used in the SERF analysis. Once the strategies were ranked 
using the CE results, a utility-weighted risk premium was calculated. The risk premium for a 
risk-averse decision maker reflects the minimum amount (dollars per acre) that a decision-maker 
has to be paid to justify a switch from the preferred strategy to a less-preferred strategy under a 
specific risk aversion coefficient. An alternative set of commodity prices was used to simulate 
net returns for the SERF analysis. Annual commodity price projections from the University of 
Missouri’s Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) for the marketing years 
compared with the SERF results from the marketing year commodity price series from 2006 
through 2010 in the observation period.  
Luitel, Knight, and Hudson, (2015) used simulation analysis to evaluate the relative benefit of 
different crop insurance policies at varying levels of underlying coverage. This application was 
specific to cotton production in Texas where farm production history was derived via surveys of 
representative panel participants. Initial wealth was measured, which represented the revenue 
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earned from the crop plus insurance indemnity (if warranted) less the premium cost. Premium 
rates for the surveyed production region were obtained from USDA RMA rates, county reference 
yields, and enterprise unit. Crop revenue produced was simulated using a yield distribution. 
Luitel, Knight, and Hudson, (2015) assumed that the producer would maximize the CE of 
stochastic ending wealth through analysis that is consistent with a constant relative risk aversion 
utility function. The CE are calculated in dollar values which represents the difference between 






















CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Production History and Farm Characteristics within the Region   
This research will utilize production data from the 2004 through 2013 historical period (with 
future production scenarios presented for 2014 through the 2018 years) for corn, cotton, rice, and 
soybean crops in the three state Mississippi River delta region via USDA NASS county-level 
yield data and national marketing year average price data. National marketing year prices for 
2014 through 2018 crop years are obtained from the University of Missouri’s Food and 
Agricultural Policy Research Institute.  
In an attempt to model farm-level production variability in each state, specific cost estimates are 
used to approximate the regional production cost estimates. Production cost data were obtained 
for selected row crops of the region using enterprise budgets developed by multiple University 
Extension Services.  The general procedures used by Salassi and Deliberto, (2014) are applied to 
estimate machinery and other input costs for common production practices for corn, cotton, rice, 
and soybeans in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. Input prices contained in the enterprise 
budgets were obtained from surveys of farm suppliers, machinery dealers, and aerial applicators 
to provide a basis for estimating budget item categories.  The budgets are categorized by the total 
direct expenditures and total fixed expenses (per acre) incurred in a typical production season. 
Within these two broad categories, the various inputs are itemized with their respected costs. 
Direct expenses include such cost items as seed, fertilizer, chemicals, fuel, labor, repairs, and 
irrigation. Fixed expenses include such items as depreciation and interest on investment which 
are generally incurred in the production period. Enterprise crop budgets itemize the direct or 
variable expenses per acre relative to net income gained from the crop, excluding government 
payments. This serves as a decision-making tool enabling both the producer and landlord to 
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examine the significance that rising input prices have on the gross economic returns of the 
crop(s) being produced.  
An application model of the multivariate empirical distribution method will be developed using 
ten years of historical price and yield data for a mixed crop farm specific to: (1) Acadia Parish 
located in the southwestern region of Louisiana; (2) Tensas Parish located in the northeastern 
region of Louisiana; (3) Morehouse Parish located in the northeastern region of Louisiana; (4) 
Arkansas County located in the southeastern region of Arkansas; (5) Phillips County located in 
the southeastern region of Arkansas; (6) Mississippi County located in the northeastern region of 
Arkansas; (7) Bolivar County located in the northwest region of Mississippi; (8) Coahoma 
County located in the northwestern region of Mississippi; and (9) Leflore County Mississippi 
located in the northwestern region of Mississippi. Figure 3.1.  
 
 




A representative farm approach is applied to model traditional cropping patterns of each region 
to include corn, cotton, rice and soybeans. Typical farm size (harvested acres) per locale is 
obtained from the 2012 U.S. Census of Agriculture data.  Historical data on commodity prices, 
output (yield) levels, as well as selected input parameters are obtained for the recent ten-year 
time period.  Commodity prices and yield level per acre are those that are published by USDA 
NASS. For each variable, the average yearly estimate was obtained for the elapsed period of 
2004 through 2013. The prices and yield levels of the major row crops in Arkansas, Louisiana, 
and Mississippi from 2004 to 2013 were entered into the SIMETAR software program of 
Microsoft® Excel, as developed by Richardson, Schumann, and Feldman, (2008). Random 
variables are simulated for the purposes of parameter estimation. A total of 1,000 iterations for 
each variables were generated within the model. Distributions of net returns to land and 
management were calculated using simulated yield and price distributions based on actual 
historical yields, annual marketing year price series, and current input cost estimates of the 
specified farming operation. Revenue variability, expressed as the grower’s share of net returns 
above variable costs, is indicated by the coefficient of variation for each farming operation. 
According to 2012 U.S. Census of Agriculture data, Arkansas has 7,316,469 acres harvested 
across 25,535 farms. Selected counties in the Prairie and Mississippi River delta regions were 
selected to determine the majority of farm sizes in the localized production area. Selected 
counties in Arkansas were grouped into two categories: farms between 1,000 to 1,999 acres and 
farms larger than 2,000 acres. Data from the Census shows that farms in both acreage categories 
comprise over 50% of the total number of farms in Arkansas, Chicot, Desha, Mississippi, and 
Monroe counties.  A similar approach was used for Louisiana and Mississippi. In Louisiana, 
farms greater than 1,000 acres in the parishes of East Carroll, Madison, and Tensas represented 
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approximately half of the farms in each parish, respectively. These parishes are located in the 
Mississippi River delta region of the state predominantly produce corn, cotton, and soybeans. For 
the southwest rice-producing region of the state, farms greater than 1,000 acres represented a 
22% to 26% share of the total farms in Acadia and Jeff Davis parishes. For counties in the state 
of Mississippi, farms greater than 1,000 acres represented over 43% of the total farms in 
Coahoma, Issaquena, Leflore, Sharkey, Sunflower, and Tunica. In Bolivar County, a leading 
rice-producing county, the percentage of larger farms (1,000 acres plus) comprises 
approximately 33% of total farms in that locale. Appendix B contains 2012 U.S. Census of 
Agriculture farm data on the basis of farm count and harvested cropland acres for selected 
counties in the Mississippi River delta region.  
The Texas A&M Agricultural and Food Policy Center (AFPC) compares farm level economic 
impacts of baseline price scenarios on representative crop farms that are typically conducted over 
a multi-year planning horizon using a whole farm simulation model (Richardson, et al., 2015). 
Data that are utilized in representative farm construction originate from producer panel 
cooperatives that are used to develop descriptive economic information. Characteristics for each 
of the farming operations in terms of location, size, crop mixes, assets, and average receipts are 
identified. The locations of these farms are primarily the results of discussions with staff member 
for the House and Senate Agriculture Committee of Congress (Richardson, et al. 2015). Key 
assumptions of representative farm analysis (presented in Richardson, et al., 2015) include the 
following: (a) All farms classified as moderate scale are considered to be representative of a 
majority of full-time commercial farming operations in the study area; (b) farm level stochastic 
simulation incorporates price and yield risk faced by farmers over the past ten-years; (c) farm 
program payments for participating corn, cotton, rice, and soybeans are included in the model; 
81 
 
and (d) farms are assumed to carry crop insurance policies at coverage levels common to the 
area.  
The AFPC uses a representative farm approach to model the economic outlook for different farm 
types using a series of current baseline market price projections.  The farm’s size, crop mix and 
location are also part of the categorical grouping that acts to simulate the economic activity on 
these representative farms throughout the country, with Table 3.1 presenting the characteristics 
of operations located in the Mid-south region.  
 
Table 3.1. Representative farms used by the AFPC denoting the acreage share of crop mixes of  
     each farm.  



































Rice (325), Soybeans (4,000), Cotton (325),  
Corn (1,500), Wheat (150) 
Rice (1,296), Soybeans (1,620), Corn (324),  
Wheat (324) 
Rice (700), Soybeans (700) 
Rice (1,800), Soybeans (1,050), Corn (150) 
 
Corn (1,056), Cotton (264), Soybeans (1,188) 
Rice (500), Soybeans (800), Cotton (250),  
Corn (950) 
Rice (800), Soybeans (530) 
Source: Texas A&M AFPC, 2015.  
 
In examining the five Arkansas counties employed by the AFPC, comparisons to Agriculture 
Census data can be made on the basis of farm size with respect to the referenced county. For 
farms located in Mississippi County, Arkansas, farms larger than 2,000 acres constitute 30% of 
the total number of farms in the county. In terms of acreage, this large farm class accounts for 
72% of cropland in the county. For the larger panel farm in Arkansas County, farms larger than 
2,000 acres constitute 21% of the total number of farms and represent 52% of cropland acres in 
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the county. Farms in Cross County ranging between 1,000 and 1,999 acres constituted 21% of 
total farms and 24% of cropland in the county. Lawrence County farms greater than 2,000 acres 
constitute 10% of the farms and 52% of the cropland in the county. In Louisiana, farms larger 
than 2,000 acres in Morehouse Parish constituted 16% of farms and 51% of the cropland acres. 
Farms in the 2,000 acre ‘plus’ category for Madison Parish accounted for 16% of the farm count 
and 43% of the cropland. Farms in the 1,000 to 1,999 acre category for Acadia Parish constituted 
13% of farms and 36% of cropland acres for the locale. There is no panel farm originating in the 
state of Mississippi, included in the AFPC representative farm analysis.  
Unique to this research endeavor, three representative farms were constructed in the states of 
Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi to reflect common production systems of the area and to 
measure farm financial performance under varying Federal farm program policy and crop 
insurance options. The production systems of the representative farms include (1) a rice and 
soybean operation, (2) a corn, cotton, and soybean farming operation that produces a significant 
amount of cotton relative to the feed grain crops, and (3) a corn, cotton, and soybean operations 
that is centered in the production of corn and soybeans but does retain significant cotton 
production.  County (parish) level production data are coupled with region enterprise production 
budgets in order to depict a realistic operation in each state, with particular attention devoted to 
agronomic soil conditions, irrigation delivery systems, disease pressure, and weed pressure at 
each locale selected to host a representative farm. The selection criteria used to evaluate, and 
ultimately determine the location for each farming operation per state, was based on the amount 
of planted acreage in the county, correspondence with Extension Service personnel from each 
state, and comparison to the Texas A&M AFPC representative farm outlook simulator. From this 
collection of data, representative counties (parishes) were selected and modeled.  
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A representative rice and soybean farming operation spanning 3,000 acres was modeled for 
Arkansas County, Arkansas. This county ranked second in planted rice acreage 13 times and 
ranked third and fourth twice, each respectively during the 1996 to 2013 observational period. In 
regards to planted soybean acreage, Arkansas County ranked first on three occasions, ranked 
second on five occasions, ranked third on three occasions, fourth on three occasions, and ranked 
fifth on four occasions. University of Arkansas Extension Service personnel have stated that a 
3,000 acre farm is consistent with the current agricultural landscape and validated since the 
Texas A&M AFPC models a representative farm in this County for rice and soybean production 
across 3,240 acres. An assumption imposed on the farm model suggests that rice is the 
predominate crop on the farm.  For the second representative farm modeled in the Mississippi 
River delta region of Arkansas, Phillips County was selected. Phillips County ranked first in 
planted corn acres on three occasions, ranked second once, ranked third once, ranked fourth on 
three occasions, and ranked fifth on four occasions. Phillips County ranked second in planted 
cotton acres on two occasions, ranked third on four occasions, and ranked fourth on four 
occasions. In terms of soybean acres, the county ranked first on one occasion, ranked second on 
six occasions, ranked third on three occasions, and ranked fourth on three occasions over the 
eighteen year observational period. Given the fact that a large portion of Arkansas planted cotton 
acreage is centered in Mississippi County, a third representative farm was modeled to reflect a 
predominant cotton, corn, and soybean operation. Mississippi County led the state in planted 
acres to cotton in each year of the 18 year period. In addition, this same county led the state in 
planted soybean acres ten times.  
In Louisiana, a representative rice and soybean farm was constructed for Acadia Parish. Acadia 
ranked first and second in rice planted acreage on nine occasions, respectively. Acadia Parish 
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ranked second in soybean acres only twice in the observation period. Rice farms in the 
southwestern region of the state typically employ either a soybean or crawfish rotational system 
to combat infestations of red rice and to supplement farm income through farm diversification. 
Therefore, soybean production in this parish is expected to be limited as soybeans are not the 
major crop of the region and do not receive the management intensity that a rice crop would. 
Similar to the assumption imposed on the Arkansas County farm, rice is said to be the 
predominant crop grown. The size of this farm is 2,000 acres. This acreage is based on 
communication with LSU Agricultural Center Extension Service personnel and is consistent with 
the Texas A&M AFPC model farm in the parish of 1,480 acres. The additional acres on this rice 
and soybean farm considers that the farm does contain fallow (idle) acres removed from crop 
production as a part of the farm’s rotation. The second representative farm constructed in 
Louisiana is located in the Mississippi River delta region of the state, specifically in Morehouse 
Parish. This 2,500 acre farm is diversified in its production of corn, cotton, and soybeans. 
Morehouse Parish ranked first in corn acreage once, ranked second on eight occasions, and third 
on three occasions. Morehouse Parish ranked first in cotton acreage once, ranked second on three 
occasions, ranked third on three occasions, and ranked fourth on four occasions. In terms of 
soybean acres, the parish ranked fourth on two occasions. In comparison, the Texas A&M AFPC 
models a similar 2,640 acre farm in this location. A majority of the cotton that is produced in 
Louisiana is grown in Tensas Parish, therefore a third representative farm (2,500 acres) was 
modeled in this locale for a corn, cotton, and soybean operation. Tensas parish ranked first in 




In Mississippi, a representative rice and soybean farm was constructed in Bolivar County 
encompassing 3,000 acres. Bolivar County ranked first in planted acres for both commodities in 
each of the 18 years of the observation period. The second representative farm depicts a 4,000 
acre corn, cotton, and soybean farming operation in Leflore County. Leflore County ranked first 
in planted corn acres once, ranked third on two occasions, ranked fourth on four occasions, and 
ranked fifth on two occasions. Leflore County ranked second in planted cotton acres on two 
occasions, ranked third on eight occasions, ranked fourth on four occasions, and ranked fifth on 
three occasions. This county ranked fifth in soybean acres on four occasions. Coahoma County 
was selected to represent a corn, cotton, and soybean farming operation (4,000 acres) since this 
county ranked first in planted cotton acres on 13 occasions and second on five occasions. 
Coahoma County ranked second in soybean acres on two occasions, ranked third on three 
occasions, ranked fourth on six occasions, and ranked fifth on four occasions. As previously 
mentioned, the Texas A&M AFPC does not model a rice and soybean or a mixed cotton and 
grain farm in the state of Mississippi. Therefore, farm size was estimated through personal 
correspondence with the Mississippi State University Extension Service at the Delta Research 
and Extension Center in Stoneville, Mississippi.  
To summarize the correspondence between extension service personnel, Table 3.2 contains a list 
of the representative farm and the crops produced (number of acres in production) on those farms 
for the purposes of this research. From communication from University of Arkansas, Division of 
Agriculture, Extension Service personnel, a typical farming operation in the Mississippi River 
delta region would consist of between 3,000 and 6,500 acres.  Louisiana State University 
Agricultural Center Extension Service personnel estimates that a typical or representative farm 
size in the Mississippi River delta region would be approximately 2,500 acres. For 
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predominately rice-producing farms located in the southwestern region of the state, farms are 
considerable smaller, at 1,500 acres. Mississippi State University personnel estimate that a 
typical rice and soybean farm in the Mississippi delta region resembles 2,300 to 3,000 acres 
while a corn, cotton, and soybean farm would consist of 3,000 to 6,000 acres.  
 
Table 3.2. Representative farms constructed in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi.  

































Rice (1,500) and Soybeans (1,500) 
Corn (1,500), Cotton (1,000) and Soybeans (1,500) 
Corn (1,500), Cotton (1,000), and Soybeans (1,500) 
 
Rice (1,175), Soybeans (375), and Fallow (500) 
Corn (750), Cotton (875), and Soybeans (875) 
Corn (750), Cotton (875), and Soybeans (875) 
 
Rice (1,500) and Soybeans (1,500) 
Corn (1,500), Cotton (1,000) and Soybeans (1,500) 
Corn (1,500), Cotton (1,000) and Soybeans (1,500) 
 
Starting from the 1996 crop year, production data were collected via USDA NASS in an attempt 
to record the number of planted acres for corn, cotton, rice, and soybeans at the county (parish) 
level for selected agricultural locales in the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. The 
FAIR Act of 1996 signaled a new market-oriented era of planting flexibility for U.S. agriculture 
by provided seven years of predetermined direct payments to producers and eliminated acreage 
use restrictions (Nelson and Schertz, 1996). Tables 3.3 through 3.14 denote the leading locales of 
production for corn, cotton, rice, and soybeans. Counties (parishes) were sorted by their rank 
relative to the total number of acres planted in the state for each major commodity. Only the top 
five counties (parishes) were included in this analysis for the 1996 through 2013 time period. For 
example, Table 3.3 can be interpreted as that for corn acreage in Clay County, Arkansas, this 
locale ranked first (highest number of planted corn acres) in eight of the 18 year historical 
observation period; ranked second three times; and ranked third and fourth twice, respectively.  
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Table 3.3. Frequency of state ranking on acres planted to corn in Arkansas, 1996 to 2013.  









































































































Table 3.4. Frequency of state ranking on acres planted to cotton in Arkansas, 1996 to 2013.  



































































Table 3.5. Frequency of state ranking on acres planted to rice in Arkansas, 1996 to 2013.  



















































Table 3.6. Frequency of state ranking on acres planted to soybeans in Arkansas, 1996 to 2013.  



















































Table 3.7. Frequency of state ranking on acres planted to corn in Louisiana, 1996 to 2013.  

































































Table 3.8. Frequency of state ranking on acres planted to cotton in Louisiana, 1996 to 2013.  



















































Table 3.9. Frequency of state ranking on acres planted to rice in Louisiana, 1996 to 2013.  








































Table 3.10. Frequency of state ranking on acres planted to soybeans in Louisiana, 1996 to 2013.  


































































Table 3.11. Frequency of state ranking on acres planted to corn in Mississippi, 1996 to 2013.  





































































Table 3.12. Frequency of state ranking on acres planted to cotton in Mississippi, 1996 to 2013.  





































































Table 3.13. Frequency of state ranking on acres planted to rice in Mississippi, 1996 to 2013.  





















































Table 3.14. Frequency of state ranking on acres planted to soybeans in Mississippi, 1996 to 2013.  













































Using this USDA NASS data set from 1996 to 2013, yield data were compiled for each corn, 
cotton, rice, and soybean producing county (parish) in the three state study region, relative to 
leading commodity-producing locales. Appendix C contains data to summarize the yield per acre 
for each representative farm location.   
 
3.2. Model Attributes and Development  
A farm-level simulation model is conducted on separate farming operations in different 
geographical locations within the Mississippi River delta region. Actual data for county (parish) 
yields are combined with national marketing year average prices to develop a multivariate 
empirical yield and price distribution for each farming operation employed in this analysis. The 
farming operation is simulated for each year of the 2014 to 2018 crop years using stochastic 
yields and prices to estimate the distribution of total crop receipts for the farm. The prices of 
selected farm-level production inputs (nitrogen fertilizer, phosphate fertilizer, potash fertilizer, 
and farm-grade diesel fuel) are also simulated stochastically, as the fertilizer and fuel categories 
of enterprise budgets account for a large share of the variable production costs. The flexibility of 
this multivariate empirical distribution procedure allows one to control the stochastic process in 
many dimensions. Properties of the residual values (deviations) associated with the imposed 
mean of each parameters are held consistent with their historical behavior (i.e. variations 
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throughout the ten-year observation period are considered likely to occur when a specified mean 
is imposed).  
A stochastic simulation model will be used to simulate the producer’s share of net returns above 
variable production cost for each crop farm in the region. Stochastic simulation based on the 
historical relationships of national market prices, regional crop yields, and selected farm 
production inputs with a multivariate empirical distribution includes a correlation matrix that 
generates correlated stochastic variables that are entered into a financial simulation model for 
each farming operation. Rental assumptions are made based on those arrangements common to 
agricultural producers of rice, soybeans, cotton, and corn based on personal communication with 
farm industry representatives. Rental charges for crop share leases are calculated as a function 
(percentage) of the simulated yield level and are factored into the producer’s and landlord’s share 
of gross income in the economic evaluation of each planted crop on the farming operation. The 
allocation of federal farm program payments (specific to the legislative guideline of Title I of the 
2014 farm bill) are assumed to be shared in the same equitable proportion. In an approach similar 
to Williams, (1988) the variability of net returns is examined by evaluating risk that is associated 
with each system, relative to the aforementioned production costs simulation, with and without 
crop insurances as a response to yield risk.  
For the purposes of the federal farm programs (e.g. ARC-CO and PLC), a ten-year trend of the 
county (parish) yield was used to estimate the county (parish) final reported yield for the 2014 to 
2018 outward crop years, identified in Tables 3.15 to 3.23, respectively.  These yield parameters 
will represent key factors in determining if the ARC-CO program triggers a payment in any of 
the 2014 future crop years. For the purposes of upland cotton, USDA RMA yield data were 
obtained and utilized on the purposes of enterprise unit separation (i.e. dryland and irrigated 
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cotton tracts). Irrigated cotton yields in each of the locales in Arkansas, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi were used in the ten-year trend yield estimation. Corn, rice, and soybean yields for 
each locale were obtained via USDA NASS. In order to determine a yield at the farm gate, it was 
assumed that each farm in the study historically produced at 5% over the county’s reported yield. 
In the unique production situation of rice in southwestern Louisiana (Acadia Parish), a second 
rice crop (ratoon) is assumed to be produced on the farm. Published 2013 Louisiana ratoon 
acreage estimates released by the Louisiana State University Agricultural Center state that 
Acadia parish had 32,924 acres of rice producing a second crop. This corresponds to 
approximately 40% of the parish’s first crop rice (82,310 acres) producing a ratoon crop in late 
August to early September. Statewide, 30% of the rice acreage produced a second rice crop in 
2013. Therefore, a conservative estimate for Acadia parish was imposed into the model 
suggesting that 30% of the rice acreage on the representative farm produces a second rice crop. 
This assumption was carried into each of the 2014 through 2018 crop years. Ratoon crop yield 
was set to equal 35% of the simulated first crop rice yield per model iteration. Production costs 
were weighted according to the percent of acreage devoted to producing a second crop.  
 
Table 3.15. Mean yield parameters simulated on the representative Arkansas County, Arkansas  
       farm.  















Table 3.16. Mean yield parameters simulated on the representative Mississippi County,  
       Arkansas farm.  





















Table 3.17. Mean yield parameters simulated on the representative Phillips County, Arkansas  
        farm.  





















Table 3.18. Mean yield parameters simulated on the representative Acadia Parish, Louisiana  
        farm.  
















Table 3.19. Mean yield parameters simulated on the representative Morehouse Parish, Louisiana  
       farm.  






















Table 3.20. Mean yield parameters simulated on the representative Tensas Parish, Louisiana  
       farm.  






















Table 3.21. Mean yield parameters simulated on the representative Bolivar County, Mississippi  
       farm. 

















Table 3.22. Mean yield parameters simulated on the representative Coahoma County, Mississippi  
       farm.  





















Table 3.23. Mean yield parameters simulated on the representative Leflore County, Mississippi  
       farm.  




















Information on marketing year pricing information was obtained from FAPRI’s April 2015 
baseline U.S. crop price report, denoted in Table 3.24. This baseline is used for the purposes of 
MYA price parameters for the marketing loan, ARC-CO, and PLC calculations for federal farm 
program benefits. In order to simulate the season average farm price per state, the final MYA 
price was compared to the final reported state average farm price over the past ten year period. 
The difference between the MYA price and the state price was then randomly applied to the 
simulated MYA price per model iteration, so that a state price could be determined for the farm’s 
revenue calculation. It is noted that this state farm price is not used in any farm program or crop 
insurance program payment calculation. The historic seasonal average farm prices for each state 
are presented in Tables 3.25 to 3.27.  
 
Table 3.24.  Mean values for simulated MYA price projections as obtained from University of 
Missouri’s Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute April 2015 baseline.  

























Source: University of Missouri FAPRI, 2015.  
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Source: USDA NASS, 2014.  
 
 



























































Source: USDA NASS, 2014.  
 
The input costs of selected farm-level production units  were set to vary based on the previous 
three-year rolling average of those reported unit prices appearing in each state’s enterprise 
production budgets, published annually by the University of Arkansas Extension Service, the 
































































Source: USDA NASS, 2014.  
 
Farm level inputs such as nitrogen fertilizer, phosphorus fertilizer, potash fertilizer, and farm-
grade diesel fuel appear in Tables 3.28 to 3.30.  
 
Table 3.28. Mean values for simulated fertilizer and diesel fuel input costs for Arkansas farms. 





























Note: Prices for fertilizers are presented as the unit cost per pound of active ingredient. 
 
Table 3.29.  Mean values for simulated fertilizer and diesel fuel input costs for Louisiana farms. 






































Table 3.30.  Mean values for simulated fertilizer and diesel fuel input costs for Mississippi farms. 





























Note: Prices for fertilizers are presented for UAN 32% nitrogen, DAP P, and a 60% K 
concentration per 100 pounds.  
 
Other production costs such as drying and hauling are a function of the farm’s yield per acre. 
Therefore, drying and hauling expenses for corn, soybeans, and rice were adjusted based on the 
simulated county level yield parameter per model iteration. The unit cost for drying corn (bushel) 
was $0.19 in Arkansas and Louisiana. Mississippi did not include a corn drying charge in their 
enterprise budget. Hauling charges applied to corn in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi were 
set at $0.22; $0.23; and $0.23 per bushel, respectively. A drying charge was assessed to rice in 
Arkansas ($0.35 per bushel); Louisiana ($0.90 per cwt); and Mississippi ($0.40 per bushel). 
Hauling charges for rice were set at $0.22 per bushel for Arkansas, $0.30 per cwt in Louisiana, 
and $0.35 per bushel in Mississippi. For soybeans, hauling charges of $0.22; $0.27; and $0.27 
per bushel were applied to the production cost function for Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. 
These unit rates were held constant for the five-year period between 20014 and 2018. For the 
cotton crop, hauling and ginning costs were removed for the cost equation as these items are 
typically shared between the gin and producer.  
Other non-energy related production categories such as custom farming operations (lime 
application and spraying), harvest aids, herbicides, insecticides, fungicides, seed, technology 
fees, labor, repair charges, and scouting amounts were set to increase at a rate of 2% per year 
during the 2014 to 2018 crop years. This increase was consistent with the average percentage 
increase in the MYA price baseline used in the analysis. The rationale for this 2% assessment 
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was that given the change in market prices received for commodities, input supplies would be 
likely to vary their rates based on market price increases so that economic gains could be 
captured by industry sectors of agricultural chemical suppliers relative to the change in overall 
pricing conditions. Fixed costs incurred in the production process are set to increase at a rate of 
1% per year from the associated per enterprise per locale. The 2014 fixed costs per acre, 
appearing in enterprise budgets per state are presented in Table 3.31. Fixed costs are presented 
for illustrative purposes and are not included in the results section of this study.  
 
Table 3.31. Fixed cost per acre for selected enterprises in the Mississippi River delta region,  
       2014. 









































Sources: University of Arkansas Extension, Service, Louisiana State University Agricultural 
Center, and Mississippi State University Extension Service, 2014.  
 
Through personal communication with extension service personnel, land rents were estimated so 
that a net return dollar amount could be calculated for the producer. Given the fact that there 
exists several land tenure arrangements within the Mid-south region, some of the more common 
arrangements were selected for each crop enterprise. For rice produced in Louisiana, the landlord 
is assumed to receive a 20% share of the crop in exchange for providing the land as well as 
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paying the irrigation pumping costs. Farm program payments are said to be allocated in an 
equitable portion, identical to the 20% contribution made to the enterprise by the landowner. 
(The common notation for this rental percentage can be referenced as an 80% producer share and 
a 20% landowner share, expressed by the notation 80/20.) A general practice in Arkansas rice 
production is for the landowner to contribute 25% of the cost of drying the rice crop in exchange 
for providing land privilege, expressed as a 75/25 agreement. Again, farm program payments are 
assumed split in the same proportion. For Mississippi rice production, share rental arrangements 
were less typical, with a cash rent being the preferred rental mechanism of the area. A downside 
to applying a cash rental rate is determining an ‘average’ amount from the available data, which 
was supplied by the Mississippi State University Extension Service. Cash rental rates ranged 
from $80 to $185 per acre. From the information, an 80/20 rental rate for rice was indicated as a 
‘common’ but less typical share rental arrangement, with the landowner sharing in no production 
category outside of granting land privileges. In a similar approach to Louisiana and Arkansas, 
farm program payments to this Mississippi rice farm were allocated 20% to the landowner, with 
the producer receiving the remaining 80% share.  
Since soybeans are also said to be produced on these predominant rice farms, the land rents for 
this enterprise did vary slightly in one instance. Soybeans produced in southwestern Louisiana 
were assumed to be under an 85/15 share rental rate where the landowner received 15% of the 
crop in exchange for providing the land.  In the case of the Arkansas farm, the landowner 
received a 25% share of the crop similar to the rice arrangement. On the Mississippi rice 
operation, the landowner received a 20% share of the crop.  
For the mixed crop farms located in the Mississippi River delta region, an 85/15 rental 
arrangement was applied to corn and soybean enterprises while a 90/10 share rental arrangement 
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was applied to cotton enterprises. This notation can be interpreted as the landowner receives 15% 
of the corn and soybean crops, respectively while receiving a 10% share on revenue generated 
from cotton production. Farm program payments for these crops are allocated in the same 
proportion. Two reasons for the alternative land charge on cotton were the decline in planted 
acres across each state and the management intensity of the crop which can make production cost 
sharing between each vested party expensive compared to cheaper alternative grain crops.  
The selection criteria used to determine the product pairing of crop policies to the applicable 
crops is in conjunction with the predominant type of policy that was purchased in the state over 
the past three years. The multiple type of product offerings, per enterprise unit, were vetted with 
extension service personnel in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi as to determine the 
applicable policies for the farm. Through this communication, a revenue policy (RP) was 
assumed to be purchased for corn, cotton, and soybean crops throughout the Mississippi River 
delta region study area. However, rice is not eligible to receive revenue protection in 2015 
according to the USDA RMA (USDA RMA, 2015). In February of 2015, USDA RMA informed 
producers that revenue plans will automatically function as yield plans for the 2015 crop year. 
The information regarding the calculation of a price volatility factor, which is used in the 
calculation of RMA’s premium rates for revenue coverage was not available due to limited 
liquidly of the rice contact as defined by the Commodity Exchange Price Provisions. The 
minimum requirements to establish the projected price for revenue coverage were not met 
according the USDA RMA on February 23, 2015. For crop insurance analysis in this study, it is 
assumed that revenue coverage is offered to rice producers. Information relating to type of crop 




Table 3.32. Crop insurance products applied to representative farms per locale. 







































































Where: RP is a revenue protection insurance policy, STAX is the stacked income protection plan 
insurance policy only eligible to cotton producers, and SCO is the supplemental coverage option 
insurance policy. R is rice, SY is soybeans, CT is cotton, and CR is corn.  
  
In order to simulate crop insurance indemnity payments per planted acre of enrolled crops, an 
insurance projected price and a harvest month price are required for calculation of insurance 
coverage per county (parish) per crop. Since this pricing information is based on volatility of 
certain futures month contract prices, a method was applied to approximate the insurance 
projected price and the harvest month price relative to the simulated MYA price value per model 
iteration. For example, the difference between the national monthly price at harvest (e.g. 
November) and the reported MYA price was calculated for each harvest month for the previous 
ten years. This difference was then randomly applied to the simulated MYA price for each 
iteration. Recall, this was a similar approach used to determine the season average farm price at 
the state level. For the insurance projected price, usually determined from the futures contract 
prices in January and February, the same methodology was applied. The monthly MYA price in 
February was obtained for the previous ten years and applied to the final reported MYA price 
during that time span, with the difference being randomly applied to the simulated MYA price 
per iteration.  
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The net returns to each crop can be determined by applying Equation 1 to each commodity 
produced in the crop rotation (where i = the covered commodity and j = state).  Market income to 
the producer (GRWINC) can be expressed as: 
(1) 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
where Pi is the MYA price for the commodity and Yij is the yield per planted acre for the 
commodity in the state. Net returns above variable cost (NRAVCij) can be expressed by the 
following equation considering the producer’s share of market income (GRWSHij) relative to 
land rental percentage. Key production input categories that will be estimated in Equation 2 
include: custom farming operations to include spraying and application charges (CUSTOMij), 
fertilizer (FERTij), herbicides (HERBij), fungicides (FUNGij), insecticides (INSECTij), seed 
(SEEDij), labor via operator and irrigation service (LABORij), diesel fuel (FUELij), repair and 
maintenance (RMij), and interest on operating capital (INTERESTij). Drying and hauling charges 
are a function of yield and therefore will vary with the amount of output produced on the farm.  
 (2) 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) − (𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) 
 
In order to model the contribution of farm program payments to the producer’s share of net 
return per acre, alternative agricultural policy and insurance parameters related to price and 
income support are evaluated as contained in the 2014 farm bill (GPINSij) estimated by Equation 
3. When considering farm program payment parameters of the ARCij and PLCij programs and 
selected crop insurance policies, the net returns above variable cost equation was modified to 
include the farm program benefits (if the applicable criteria is met in the crop year). The price for 
the SCOij, endorsement with the underlying insurance policy (INSij), and STAXj are then 
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subtracted from this equation as it is an expense incurred for by the producer. The annual 
producer premiums are represented by INSDEDSCOij, INSDEDpolicyij, and INSDEDSTAXij.  
(3) 𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ {(𝑦𝑦𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 1 − 𝑦𝑦𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 1 − 𝑦𝑦𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖)}
− (𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) 
 
Income from all federal government programs and crop insurance policies are listed in the 
equation above. In Equation 3, the variable y is a binary variable where (y = 0) for PLC 
participation and (y = 1) for ARC participation. Equation 4 calculates the PLC program (not 
adjusted for the grower’s share).  
(4) 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 (𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖, 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖) ∗  𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 0.85 
 
The RPi identifies the congressionally established reference price for the covered commodity 
multiplied by the higher of the MYA price or the loan rate (LRi) of the covered commodity. 
PLCYLDij represents the program yield for the covered commodity on record with the local 
USDA FSA office. Since PLC and ARC program payments are made to the base acres of 
enrolled covered commodities, the 85% payment rate is applied to the payment, so that this can 
be recorded by the individual base acre enrolled.  
County-level ARC program payments (ARC-CO) are estimated by a series of equations that are 
performed using a product of national MYA prices and USDA-reported county level yields 
(CTYYLDij). No individual farm data are used in the calculation and ultimately the 
determination of ARC-CO payments other than the applicable number of the base acres of the 
covered commodity that exists on the farm. The ARC-CO actual revenue equation is determined 
by applying Equation 5 to the model. 




In this equation, ARCCOACTREVij is the actual revenue for the crop year in the referenced 
county obtained by the product of the reported county yield and the higher of the MYA price or 
the loan rate (LRi) for the covered commodity.  The ARC-CO benchmark revenue 
(ARCCOBENCHij) is determined by applying Equation 6. This equation obtains the previous 
five year Olympic average yield for the county and the five year Olympic average of the higher 
of the MYA or the LR for the covered commodity.  
 (6) 𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
=  
∑ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖51  ��𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼1 + ⋯+ 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼5� − 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 �𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼1 + ⋯+ 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼� − 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 �𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼1 + ⋯+ 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼5�� ∗
 ∑ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖51  ((𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖1, 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖1) + ⋯+ (𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖5, 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖5) −𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 (𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖1,𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖1 + ⋯+ 𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖5, 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖5) −𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 (𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖1,𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖1 + ⋯+  𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖5, 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖5))
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The ARC-CO revenue guarantee (ARCCOREVGUARTij) is calculated by Equation 7, which is 
simply 86% of the benchmark revenue measure ARCCOBENCHij, obtained in Equation 6.  
(7) 𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 0.86 
 
In the likelihood that the ARCCOACTREVij is less than the ARCCOREVGUARTij, the 
difference is applied as a program payment on 85% of the base acres of the covered commodity 
present on the individual farm. However, there is a limit on the size of the ARC-CO payment. 
The congressionally-imposed limit is 10% of the benchmark revenue. 
Insurance policies have the potential to vary by coverage type and protection level for different 
commodities produced on the representative farms in the region. Equations 8 through 10 
represent an example of yield protection coverage where the insurance guarantee (INSGUARij) 
is equal to the insured acres INSACRESij times the yield protection level and projected insurance 
policy price, PPi. The value of this protection is denoted by the INSVPROTECTij formula which 
is the product of the protection level (PROTLEVELij) and the projected policy price (PPi). An 
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insurance indemnity payment is made when the guarantee exceeds the protection level afford to 
producers thorough this specific policy for the commodity, expressed by INSij.  
(8) 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 
(9) 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 
(10) 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
In Equation 11, the SCO protection is calculated (SCOij). The 2014 farm bill establishes the 
maximum amount of coverage when the county revenue from the commodity falls below 86%. 
The SCO endorsement pays out its full amount when county revenue falls to the coverage level 
percent of its expected level (always equal to the percent of the underlying policy), expressed as 
86 less the YPROTij level. The percent of the commodity covered by SCO is the difference 
between the two. 
(11) 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �86 − 𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� ∗ (𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
 
As an alternative to the yield protection aspect of the supplemental coverage option, Equations 
12 through 22 present the necessary calculations for the operational mechanics of the SCO 
endorsement that is paired with an underlying revenue protection policy to be presented. 
Equation 12 calculates the expected revenue for the area (SCOEXPCTYREVij), or county. This 
is not based on any individual characteristics of the farm. Where EXPCTYYLDij is the expected 
county level yield, released by USDA RMA and BASEPRICEi is the insurance projected price.  
(12) 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖� 
 
Equation 13 and 14 calculate the upper and lower bounds of the SCO policy, denoted by the 
SCOTRIGGERUPPERij and SCOTRIGGERLOWERij variables. Here it is assumed that 75% is 
the coverage level of the required underlying insurance policy.  
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(13) 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0.86 ∗ �𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� 
(14) 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0.75 ∗ �𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� 
 
SCO coverage range (SCORANGEij) is calculated by Equation 15. This is expressed as the 
difference between the coverage bands of the policy.  
(15) 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = (𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
 
SCO actual revenue equation (SCOACTREVij) is obtain throught the application of Equation 16. 
In this equation, the actual revenue is determined by the product of the actual county-level yield 
(ACTCTYYLDij) and the reported USDA RMA insurance harvest price, HARVTPRICEi. 
(16) 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = (𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖) 
 
Next, the SCO percent loss factor (SCOPERCENTLOSSij) is determined. Equation 17 applies 
the difference between the trigger level (Equations 13 and 14) and the actual revenue (Equation 
16) divided by the SCO coverage range as presented in Equation 15.  





Equation 18 represents the SCO expected farm revenue, EXPFARMREVij. This is a key 
determination of the potential indemnity as this equation ‘scales’ the area loss to the individual 
farm’s APH.  
(18) 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = (𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖) 
 
Equation 19 is the determination of the SCO threshold revenue (SCOTHRESHij). This equation 
relies on the expected farm revenue calculated in Equation 18.  Note that this is a factor of the 
maximum coverage range for the SCO endorsement of 86%.  




SCO revenue insured liability, considering the underlying revenue protection policy, 
(RPINSLIABij) is presented by Equation 20. Recall, in this example, the underlying policy was 
revenue-protected at a coverage level of 75%, therefore 75% is applied to the liability 
calculation. This is used to determine if the SCO and the underlying policy each produce an 
indemnity payment for the crop year.  
(20) 𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0.75 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
SCO insurance liability (SCOINSLIABij) is calculated by Equation 21, which takes the 
difference between the SCO threshold (Equation 19) and the revenue insurance liability 
(Equation 20). 
(21) 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� 
 
The SCO indemnity (SCOINDEMij) is obtained, by applying Equation 22 to the model. 
  
(22) 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = (𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
 
Another insurance product scheduled for released in 2015 is the STAX program. STAX 
protection for producers of upland cotton is applicable when revenue falls below 90% of its 
expected level. Payments reach the maximum when area revenue falls to 70%. The 
PROTFACTORj variable represent the protection factor that is selected by the producer that is a 
scalar of the expected revenue, ranging from 0.80 to 1.20. Where the subscript j is the state in 
which the representative farm is located. The STAX expected revenue is presented in Equation 
23. As previously stated, STAX borrows from the mechanics of the SCO program as both are 
designed to work as area-wide insurance policies that guard against shallow losses that a 
traditional underlying policy may not cover. The expected revenue (STAXEXPREVj) is the 
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product of the insurance projected price (PPi) and the expected county revenue as previously 
determined under the SCO calculation.   
(23) 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 =  (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖) 
 
The STAX actual county-level revenue (STAXACTCTYREVj) equation is denoted by Equation 
24. It can be explained as the product of the insurance projected price reported by USDA RMA 
and the yield for the area (ACTCTYYLDj).  
(24) 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 = (𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖)  
 
STAX indemnity (STAXINDEMj) is calculated by Equation 25. For this example, the indemnity 
is the minimum value of the upper coverage level (90%), multiplied by the difference between 
the expected revenue for the area and the actual revenue (STAXACTREVj) or 20% of the 
expected revenue.  
(25) 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 �(0.90 ∗  𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 − 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖�, (0.20 ∗  𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖)) 
 
The STAX premium (STAXPj) equation is calculated by applying Equation 26 to the model. The 
USDA RMA will publish the premium rates associated with irrigation practice, coverage level, 
and protector factor multiplier for each county. This factor is represented by the variable 
RMAPRATE.  
(26) 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = �0.90 ∗ �𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖�� ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 ∗ 0.20 
 
Specific to the producers of cotton, Title I of the Agricultural Act of 2014 grants cotton transition 
assistance payments (CTAPj) for the 2014 crop year. That payment is made regardless of MYA 
price or production levels of cotton that is produced on the farm. The payment amount of the 
CTAP is $0.09 per pound. Adjusting for the fact that this program payment is made on 85% of 
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the existing 2013 cotton base acres on the farm, the CTAPRATE becomes $0.054 per pound per 
base acre. In equation 27, the cotton transition assistance payment CTAPPYMTij is calculated. 
The DPYLDij is the direct payment program yield on file with the local USDA FSA office, as in 
effect for the previous farm bill. For CTAP, the mandatory 7.2% sequestration rate, authorized 
by the Budget Control act of 2011 is applied to the payment formula.  
 
(27) 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = {�𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � ∗ 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖} ∗ 0.923 
Total income to the producer (GRWINCij) is then expressed by Equation 28 for each commodity 
produced on the representative farm. Economic gains from farm program payments and crop 
insurance indemnities are considered in this financial indicator.  
(28) 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
Alternative risk preferences of different agricultural producers in each Mississippi River delta 
state can then be evaluated using a stochastic efficiency with respect to a function criteria 
(SERF). SERF operates by identifying utility efficient alternatives for ranges of risk attitudes, 
not by finding a subset of dominated alternatives (Hardaker, et al., 2004). SERF can be applied 
for any utility function for which the inverse function can be computed based on ranges in the 
absolute, relative, or partial risk coefficient and will pick only the utility efficient alternatives by 
comparing each with another simultaneously. The utility function (U) of a decision maker is as 
follows with the performance criterion (w) representing wealth. In this research, the wealth 
variable can be expressed as the producer’s share of net return per acre across each 
representative farming location, expressed by Equation 29.    





In this utility function the argument representing the net return above variable cost for the farm 
can be extrapolated to include components of Equation 28 into Equation 30.  
(30) 𝐶𝐶 �𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� =   𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
Following research by Hardaker, et al., (2004) this research will examine different levels of 
alternative farm program choices paired with and without crop insurance products that will 
compare uncertain outcomes, so values of w are stochastic. Utility functions are then converted 
into CE values be taking the inverse of the utility function stated above and resulting in Equation 
31. 
(31) 𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹 �𝑤𝑤, 𝑟𝑟(𝑤𝑤)� = 𝐶𝐶−1(𝑤𝑤, 𝑟𝑟(𝑤𝑤)) 
The calculation depends on the utility function specified. Similar to the negative exponential 
utility function employed in Bryant, et al., (2008) and Williams, et al., (2012), the risk aversion 
coefficient is defined below. This represents the ratio of the second and first derivatives of the 
producer’s utility function, U(w). In the equation that follows represents the Arrow-Pratt 
measure of relative risk aversion denoted by Equation 32.  




Following Meyer, (1977) representation of a decision marker’s preferences, can be interpreted as 
a measure of that decision maker’s absolute aversion to risk. Restrictions on r(w) can be viewed 
as specifying a lower r1(w) and upper bound r2(w) on the degree of risk aversion for the agents in 
the set being considered. A decision marker’s utility function can be expressed by Equations 33 
and 34.   
 




(34) 𝑟𝑟1 (𝑤𝑤) ≤
−𝑢𝑢′′(𝑤𝑤)
𝑢𝑢′(𝑤𝑤)
≤ 𝑟𝑟2 (𝑤𝑤) 
 
Schumann, et al., (2004) denotes classes of utility functions typically used in classical stochastic 
efficiency utility analysis that exhibit concavity in the range of risk aversion. The negative 
exponential utility function assumes constant absolute risk aversion while the power utility 
function considers relative risk aversion. Two functional forms of interest are the negative 
exponential and the power functions in equations 35 and 36. 
(35) 𝐶𝐶 (𝑤𝑤) =  − exp(−𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎 𝑤𝑤) 
(36) 𝐶𝐶 (𝑤𝑤) =  
1
1 − 𝑟𝑟 
 𝑤𝑤1−𝑟𝑟 
 
In similar to the research conducted by Schumann, et al., (2004), the two utility functions are 
characterized by their respective risk aversion coefficients, or more specifically, their relative 
risk aversion coefficients. The expected risk aversion coefficients are based on the same 
distributional assumptions regarding the CE. The CDFs of the simulated net return for 
commodity i in state j per rotational systems were sorted into SERF analysis. Crop rotations 
along with properties of policy program election were ranked by CE values. Risk premiums 
could then be calculated by subtracting the CE of the less preferred option and rotation from the 











CHAPTER 4: RESULTS  
“Current revenue-based crop insurance programs offer opportunities to cover deep losses but not 
those that occur when prices or crop yields fall below the long-term trend yields. With today’s 
high input costs, such shallow losses can put a producer out of business” (Laws, 2011). This 
statement by a popular press farm magazine summaries the interrelationship between farm 
programs and crop insurance products while suggesting that these ‘shallow losses’ may be 
shallow enough to substantially reduce farm revenue. Therefore, in mitigating shallow losses that 
may occur to the area (and to the farm), the question becomes one of how effective can 
combinations of farm programs and crop insurance products provide the safety net to agricultural 
producers for the next five years.  
Through simulation modeling of farm production inputs, market prices, and yield levels; net 
returns per acre to the producer can be measured given historical trends in the Mississippi River 
delta region. The current farm safety net afforded to agricultural producers via price and income 
support programs are a key farm income dimension to all major row crop farms. This research 
aims to evaluate the economic effect of key provisions of the 2014 farm bill which reauthorizes 
agricultural programs through the 2018 crop year. Those provisions are: (1) the economic 
consequences of repealing (eliminating) direct payment, counter-cyclical payment, and the 
ACRE program payments on producer profitability while evaluating the establishment of the 
ARC and PLC programs.  In addition, the SCO and STAX programs are analyzed to measure the 
area-wide revenue insurance effect on producer returns, and ultimately profitability, on different 
representative farming operations in the region. These policy programs represent significant 
change to domestic farm policy and, as such, warrant an economic evaluation presented in a 
policy context.  
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Simulation analysis allows the simultaneous evaluation of market price and production cost 
volatility coupled with yield variability on the farm. The simulated market price and yield level 
are utilized in evaluating the circumstance in which farm program payments are issued 
(assuming prevailing conditions exist). The historical trend component of this analysis enables 
the simulated production parameters to lie within the actual upper and lower bounds of reported 
bounds for the past ten-years. This historical reference period will serve as an accurate depiction 
of the range (or movement) of prices, yields, and production costs observed by agricultural 
producers in three diverse regions of each locale. The program and policy-driven simulated 
economic return data from each crop production system per locale were used in the SERF 
analysis. SERF was used to rank the various systems using utility-weighted certainty equivalents 
for various degrees of risk aversion. The certainty equivalents were used to calculate risk 
premiums at each risk aversion level. The producer’s share of net returns above variable costs 
were originated from common cost categories contained in enterprise budgets developed for each 
representative farm. The risk premium for a risk-averse decision maker reflects the minimum 
amount (dollars per acre) that a decision-maker has to be paid to justify a switch from the 
preferred strategy to a less-preferred strategy under a specific risk aversion coefficient.  
Net returns above variable costs for alternative crop rotations on representative farms are 
calculated as a function of market receipts, government payments, and crop insurance 
indemnities for multiple crop mixes produced on the farm over the five year duration of the farm 
bill. Return variability at the acre- and whole farm-level are presented for each state in the 
region. For example, the producer net returns are presented for a typical rice and soybean farm 
located in each state in the study area. Net return variability will be a function of the historic 
regional yield trend, national market prices, and farm program and crop insurance choice give 
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cropping pattern of the model farm. Acreage allocation on the representative farms were 
obtained through personal communication with extension service personnel. Given the suite of 
farm program and crop insurance choices afforded to producers in the region, results are 
classified by: crop rotation, farm program choice, and risk preferences estimated through a 
producer’s utility function. Competing crop choices, regional yield trends, and farm program and 
crop insurance options factor into the categorical grouping of producers with their risk 
preference measured through the utility function.  
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 contain descriptive statistics of the policy scenarios that are considered for 
each representative farm in the study, relative to the crop produced on each farm. It is also 
assumed that all crops are eligible to participate in the marketing assistance loan program. In the 
case of cotton, producers are assumed to have a direct payment yield of 750 pounds per acre, 
corresponding to the individual farm’s payment yield on record with their local USDA FSA 
office. This assumption on payment yield is necessary for the purposes of calculating a 2014 
CTAP payment calculation is applied uniformly to all farms in the study area that have existing 
cotton base. Since the STAX insurance product is available to all cotton-producing counties 
(parishes) for 2014 there is not expected to be a CTAP payment authorized for the 2015 crop 
year. Also, in accordance with federal farm law, SCO and STAX are offered through USDA 
RMA beginning with the 2015 crop year. Another policy-impose structural component of the 
model is that rice is assumed to have a RP insurance policy for the 2014 through 2018 crop 








Table 4.1. Description of farm program and insurance policy selection on representative rice and soybean  
































Table 4.2. Description of farm program and insurance policy selection on representative corn,  


















































Results in Table 4.3 to 4.11 are presented as the cumulative sum of the grower’s share of net 
returns above variable costs for the entire life of the farm bill. A net present value (NPV) 
calculation was preformed that imposed an arbitrary 3% interest rate. This economic measure of 
the farm’s performance represents the average return across 5,000 iterations per crop per 
representative farm over the past five years. The formula for the NPVij calculation is presented 
by Equation 37.   Where j represents the crop enterprise on each representative farm in each of 
the five years (n) of the farm bill and i is the interest rate.  







Values represent the CE (cumulative NPV returns above variable costs to the producer) at 
varying levels of risk aversion for each policy scenario examined per farm location. Appendix C 
presents a complete range of CE across varying levels pf risk per policy option.  
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4.1 Representative Rice and Soybean Farms  
Results in Table 4.3 for the 3,000 acres rice and soybean farm in Arkansas County, Arkansas, 
indicate that policy option number 2 generated the highest level of cumulative net returns to the 
grower over the duration of the farm bill. This policy option is described as enrolling rice in the 
PLC program while electing to enroll soybeans into the county-level ARC program (ARC-CO). 
Crop insurance was not purchased for either crop under this policy scenario. Since crop 
insurance was not selected and further assumed to not be purchased in the five-year horizon. 
Soybeans are not eligible to carry an SCO insurance endorsement, as stipulated by statute. 
Across all levels of risk, policy option number 2 dominated both policy option number 1 and 
option number 3 as indicated by the largest NPV value (cumulative per acre returns above 
variable costs to the producer).  Although, it can be observed from Figure 4.1 that at increasing 
levels of risk, policy option 3 appears to reduce the difference in return generation compared to 
policy option 2 in being the preferred policy option; even as the net return value is reduced. For 
example, a risk neutral producer (where RAC=0) under policy number 2 is estimated to net 
$1,361.55 per acre above variable costs. This policy option is $136.08 greater than policy option 
3 and $318.30 superior to policy option 1. However, as the risk aversion coefficient increases to 
0.0014913, the mean return for all policy options can be estimated as $868.35 for policy option 
1, $1,176.88 for policy option 2, and $1,079.36 for policy option 3. This equates to the difference 
in policy 2 domination to become reduced ($97.44 over policy option 3 and $308.53 over policy 
option number 1) as the RAC increases in value away from the neutrality position. For the 
producer who is extremely risk averse (RAC=0.0029826), policy option 2 is still the preferred 
option, however  the return difference from policy option 3 is now $64.98 and still a substantial 
$294.41 difference over policy option 1.  
118 
 
Table 4.3. Mean net returns above variable production costs to the producer, Arkansas County,  








































Figure 4.1. SERF results for a representative Arkansas County, AR farm.  
 
 
For the representative rice and soybean farm in Acadia Parish, Louisiana, unique production 
practices are considered to be typical of the southwestern rice-producing area of the state. As 
previously stated, approximately one-quarter of the farm’s total acreage is left out of production 







































the potential production of crawfish in the winter/spring season. Therefore, the production costs 
for fallow field activities consisting of multiple diskings and an herbicide application are 
weighted to reflect this cost to the farming operation. Also, a ratoon rice crop is produced on an 
apportionment of the rice acres, and is such considered in the economic performance of the farm. 
Results in Table 4.4 suggest that the mean net returns to the farm over the duration of the farm 
bill are greatest when policy option 2 is selected. Figure 4.2. This is also the case with the 
representative rice and soybeans farm in Arkansas County, Arkansas. Policy option 2 consists of 
rice enrolled in the PLC program and soybeans enrolled in the ARC-CO program dominate both 
policy alternatives that are presented. For the risk neutral producer (RAC=0), policy option 2 
dominates policy option 3 by $60.21 per acre and policy option 1 by a much larger amount, 
$187.03 per acre. These estimates represent the cumulative sum (adjusted by the NPV 
calculation) of returns to the producer over the five year life of the farm bill.  As the RAC 
increases to 0.0031006, policy option 2 dominates policy option 3 by a slightly smaller amount 
($55.47) and dominated policy option 1 by a larger $215.19 amount. For a risk averse producer 
at RAC of 0.0062012, policy option 2 is preferred to policy option 3 by an amount of $51.27 per 
acre and $244.64 over policy option 1. One conclusion that can be drawn from this 
representative farm is that policy option 2 consistently dominated policy option 3 by roughly $51 
to $60 per acre across all risk aversion coefficient levels. This was not seen on the representative 
rice and soybean farm in Arkansas County, Arkansas, whereas the RAC increased, the policy 









Table 4.4. Mean net returns above variable production costs to the producer, Acadia Parish,  







































Figure 4.2. SERF results for a representative Acadia Parish, LA farm.  
 
The final rice and soybean farm in the Mississippi River delta region is located in Bolivar 
County, Mississippi. Results in Table 4.5 again indicate that the preferred policy option for the 
risk neutral producer is policy option number 2. Policy option 2 dominates all other policy 







































cumulative five year returns per acre above variable costs of $50.57 over policy option 3 and 
$193.20 over policy option 1. As the RAC increases, similar results to those of the Acadia Parish 
farm can be observed. At a RAC of 0.0035963, policy option 2 exceeds policy option 3 by 
$48.81 and policy option 1 by $205.82 per acre, respectively. For the extreme risk averse 
producer (RAC=0.0071926) policy option 2 dominated policy option 3 by nearly an identical 
amount of $48.82 per acre and policy option 1 by a substantial $2014.75 per acre. A notable 
difference with this Bolivar County, Mississippi farm is that policy option 2 of rice enrolled in 
the PLC program and soybeans enrolled in the ARC-CO program consistently result in returns of 
approximately $50 per acre greater than the alternative policy choices presented. This behavior 
was observed with the Acadia Parish farm, although by a slightly larger return variation level.   
 
Table 4.5. Mean net returns above variable production costs to the producer, Bolivar County,  







































4.2 Representative Corn, Cotton, and Soybean Farms 
Results in Table 4.6 are associated with a corn, cotton, and soybean farm located in Mississippi 
County, Arkansas. For this mixed crop farm, five policy alternatives were analyzed. For the risk 
neutral producer (RAC=0), policy option 1 dominated the remaining policy considerations. 




Figure 4.3. SERF results for a representative Bolivar County, MS farm.  
 
 
while cotton was not selected to carry either the SCO or STAX insurance endorsement. This 
option dominated option 2 by $80.61; option 3 by $52.93; option 4 by $48.72; and option 5 by 
$35.22 per acre, respectively. Among policy options 2 through 5 that elected to carry either SCO 
or STAX insurance endorsement on the farm’s cotton acres, policy option 5 was the preferred 
choice to the risk neutral producer. This option enrolled corn in the PLC program and soybeans 
into the ARC-CO program. Cotton did receive a fixed CTAP payment only in the 2014 crop 
year. Interestingly, in terms of the insurance policies obtained for the farm, cotton enrolled in the 
STAX program (20% coverage with a 1.2 protection factor), corn carried the option SCO 
endorsement to supplement the underlying 75% RP policy, and soybeans carried a 75% RP 






































scenarios, policy option 5 dominated policy 2 by $45.39; option 3 by $17.71; and option 4 by 
$13.50 per acre, respectively over the life of the bill.  
As the RAC increased, the competing policy alternatives returns started to become reduced. At a 
RAC of 0.0094304, policy option 1 dominated all other options with a cumulative return of 
$136.57 per acre. However, this was a reduction of $119.01 from a risk neutral standpoint. Of 
the insurance-based policy alternatives, policy option 5 was still the preferred choice yielding 
$115.62 cumulative net returns to the grower over the duration of the farm bill. At this RAC 
level, policy option 5 dominated policy option 2 by $57.26; option 3 by $30.25; and option 4 by 
$22.71 per acre, respectively.  At a RAC of 0.0188608 (extreme risk aversion), policy option 1 is 
still preferred at $60.03 per acre. Policy option 2 results in the producer not generating a net 
return above variable costs (-$19.76 per acre). Policy option 3 results in the producer exceeding 
variable costs by $7.36 per acre. Policy options 4 and 5 result in the greatest cumulative returns 
of all the insurance-based policy alternatives, at $19.44 and $46.39 per acre, respectively.  
 
 
Table 4.6. Mean net returns above variable production costs to the producer, Mississippi County,  






























































Figure 4.4 SERF results for a representative Mississippi County, AR farm.  
 
 
In the final representative farm located in the state of Arkansas, a corn, cotton, and soybean farm 
was constructed to model production of Phillips County. For this mixed crop farm located in the 
Arkansas delta region, policy option 1 dominated all policy alternatives that were presented. 
However, results in Table 4.7 indicated that policy option 1 was preferred by only $0.86 per acre 
to policy option 5 at a RAC equal to 0. Of the previous farm models examined, these policy 
options are comparable in the amount of cumulative returns generated. Figure 4.5. Although this 
same outcome persisted for the Mississippi County, Arkansas farm, the difference between 









































Table 4.7. Mean net returns above variable production costs to the producer, Phillips County,  



























































Figure 4.5 SERF results for a representative Phillips County, AR farm. 
 
  
Policy option 1 is preferred to policy option 2 by $83.04; option 3 by $27.13; and option 4 by 
$35.95 per acre, respectively. Of the insurance-based policy alternatives, policy option 5 










































respectively. The same policy considerations for the STAX insurance endorsement were held 
consistent (20% coverage with a 1.2 protection factor). 
As the RAC is increased 0.0093253, policy option 1 remain the dominant choice for the farm 
manager at $106.38 per acre, as compared to the $101.50 return generated by policy option 5. As 
the level of risk aversion increases, the difference between these two policy alternative widens 
($0.86 at RAC of 0 to $4.88 per acre at an RAC of 0.0093253).  Another observable note is that 
with the increase of the RAC, the difference between policy options 3 and 4 seems to decrease. 
This would indicate that as the risk coefficient increases, policy option 4 can dominate policy 
option 3 ($0.13 per acre) in a pairwise comparison at levels greater than 0.0093253. Such is the 
case at a RAC value of 0.0121229, where policy option 4 is preferred to policy option 3. At this 
level of risk aversion, the cumulative return generated to the Phillips County farm are $75.67 by 
policy option 1, the dominant option; $69.16 by option 5; $22.45 for option 4; $22.32 for option 
3; and -$22.03 for policy option 2. At a high level of risk aversion (RAC=0.0186506) policy 
options1 ($16.01) and policy option 5 ($0.27) are the only option generating a positive 
cumulative return per acre to the producer.  
Results in Table 4.8 illustrate the policy effect of farm program and crop insurance products on a 
representative corn, cotton, and soybean farm located in the Louisiana delta, specifically 
Morehouse Parish. Results at levels of risk neutrality are similar to the Phillips County farm, 
with policy option 1 ($674.65 per acre) slightly dominating policy option 5 ($672.93 per acre). 
Policy option 1 is preferred by a risk neutral producer (RAC=0) by $61.01 over option 2; $34.42 





Table 4.8. Mean net returns above variable production costs to the producer, Morehouse Parish,  




























































Figure 4.6 SERF results for a representative Morehouse Parish, LA farm.  
 
When only comparing the insurance based options for cotton, policy option 5 is the preferred 
option, followed by option 3, 4 and finally 2. The corresponding differences between option 5 
and the remaining insurance based policy alternatives is $32.70 over option 3; $45.75 over 









































As the level of risk aversion is increased to a value of 0.0030973, policy option 1 is replaced by 
option 5 as the preferred policy election. At this RAC level, policy option 5 is estimated to 
generate a $508.31 net return above variable costs to the producer over the duration of the farm 
bill. This figure is in comparison to the net returns associated with policy option 1 of $486.29 per 
acre; $460.44 with option 3; $454.96 with option 4; and $431.54 with option 2, respectively. 
Policy option 5 is preferred to option 1 by $22.02 per acre. Policy option 5 consists of enrolling 
corn in the PLC program and soybeans in the ARC-CO program. Corn is said to carry the SCO 
election to supplement the underlying RP insurance policy. Soybeans are protected by RP 
insurance. The STAX (20% coverage with a 1.2 protection factor) endorsement is purchased for 
the cotton acres on the farm. This is in comparison to option 1 that carries no crop insurance on 
the farm and enrolls corn and soybeans in the ARC-CO program.  
At high levels of risk aversion (RAC=0.00619545), policy option 5 continues to dominate all 
alternatives. Policy option 1 is dominated by $45.98; option 2 by $94.92; option 3 by $62.59; and 
option 4 by $59.68 per acre, respectively.  
Results in Table 4.9 are presented for the second corn, cotton, and soybean farm located in the 
Louisiana delta, Tensas Parish, Louisiana. Drawing similarities from the companion Louisiana 
delta farm, policy option 1 dominated all scenarios at a RAC of 0.  
 
Table 4.9. Mean net returns above variable production costs to the producer, Tensas Parish,  



























































Policy option 1 dominates option 2 by $69.72; option 3 by $42.97; option 4 by $53.83; and 
option 5 by $9.04 per acre, respectively. Again, of the insurance-based policy alternatives, policy 
option 5 dominates options 2, 3, and 4. Amounts are equal to $60.68; $33.93; and $44.79 per 
acre, respectively.  
When the RAC is increased to 0.0047971, policy 5 is the dominant choice for the producer, 
generating a cumulative net return above variable costs at a level of $263.93 per acre. Figure 4.7.  
 
 
Figure 4.7 SERF results for a representative Tensas Parish, LA farm.  
 
Corresponding economic activity generated under policy options 1, 2, 3, and 4 equate to 
$243.89; $180.91; $209.02; and $210.50 per acre, respectively over the life of the farm bill. At 
this level of risk aversion, policy option 4 is preferred to option 3 in a pairwise comparison. A 











































(RAC=0.0095942), policy option 5 is the dominate option generating a net return estimated at 
$130.42 per acre. This policy option is followed by option 1 ($85.25); option 4 ($68.96); option 
3 ($50.48), and finally option 2 ($20.12), respectively. At very high levels of risk aversion, this 
Tensas Parish farm generates a positive return above variable costs across all policy options. 
These returns are smaller in comparison to the per acre benefit realized at the Morehouse Parish 
location.  
A mixed corn, cotton, and soybean farm was constructed in Coahoma County, Mississippi. 
Results appearing in Table 4.10 suggest that policy option 1 results in the highest net returns per 
acre to this farming operation at a measure of $770.94 for the risk neutral producer.  
 
Table 4.10. Mean net returns above variable production costs to the producer, Coahoma County,  



























































Policy option 5 ranked second at $704.31; option 3 was third at $688.42; option 4 was fourth at 
$685.94; and option 2 was fifth at $671.12 per acre, respectively. Policy option 1 exceeded 
policy option 5 by $66.63 per acre and exceeded options 3, 4, and 2 by $82.85; $85.00; and 
$99.82 per acre, respectively. Of the insurance-based policy scenarios, option 5 was again the 
highest producing alternative, followed by options 3, 4, and 2.   
As the level of risk aversion increases from 0 to 0.0028403, policy option 1 still remains the 
dominate alternative among the 5 options. Figure 4.8. This outcome is unlike the Louisiana delta 
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examples of Morehouse and Tenses parishes, where policy option 1 was replaced for option 5 
that considers insurance endorsements and the inclusion of the PLC program for corn in lieu of 
the ARC-CO program. At this RAC level, policy option 1 yields a cumulative net return above 
variable costs of $632.36 per acre compared to the $582.75 per acre produced by the policy 5 
option (a difference of $49.61).  
 
 
Figure 4.8 SERF results for a representative Coahoma County, MS farm.  
 
 
This would suggest that electing the ARC-CO for corn and soybeans and purchasing no crop 
insurance is the preferred policy option for a producer across the calculated risk aversion levels. 
Of the remaining policy options at this RAC, option 4 is preferred to option 3 by $1.57 and 
option 3 is preferred to option 2 by $19.45 per acre. At higher levels of risk aversion, 










































form this option are estimated at $522.24 per acre. Policy option 5 produces an estimated 
$488.50 per acre, followed by option 4 at $457.01, option 3 at $446.56, and by option 2 at 
$429.20, respectively.  
A second corn, cotton, and soybean farm was constructed in the Mississippi delta, this particular 
farm originating in Leflore County. Results from Table 4.11 suggest that policy option 1 is the 
dominate policy election for the risk neutral producer. This policy option produced economic 
returns estimated at $727.59 per acre over the five year duration of the farm bill. Policy option 1 
was followed by option 5 ($683.31), option 3 ($660.04), option 4 ($645.26) and finally option 2 
($636.46), respectively. Of the insurance-based policy scenarios, option 5 again resulted in the 
greatest net returns above variable costs per acre as compared to options 3, 4, and 2. This finding 
was consistent with the Coahoma County, Mississippi farm.  
 
Table 4.11. Mean net returns above variable production costs to the producer, Leflore County,  



























































For example, as the risk aversion level increased to 0.0029827, policy option 1 remained the 
dominate alternative ($573.62); again similar to the Coahoma County farm which suggest 
pairing corn and soybeans with the ARC-CO program and purchasing no crop insurance is the 
preferred policy election. Figure 4.9. At this RAC, policy option 1 was followed by option 5 
($544.93); option 3 ($509.62); option 4 ($501.16); and option 2 ($485.66), respectively. At even 
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higher levels of risk aversion, (0.0059654) policy option 4 ($390.93) begins to closely approach, 

































































CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS   
  
5.1 Summary of Selected Farm Program and Crop Insurance Policy 
 
A farm bill process that began almost four years concluded on February 7, 2014 when the 
President signed the Agricultural Act of 2014. This omnibus piece of legislation contains both 
repeals and reforms to the farm safety net that many producers rely on as a viable risk 
management tool while contributing $23 billion in deficit reduction. Policy changes to 
commodity support programs will require producers to evaluate the programs afforded to them 
under the bill to determine which program offers a better risk management safety net for the five 
year duration of the law. In other words, attention should be given as to how each program will 
function for commodities and farms under different risk scenarios.  
One major change in the farm bill is the repeal of the direct payment program. Direct payments 
became a vulnerable target politically during farm bill markup as these payments are made 
regardless of market price and are dispersed at a fixed rate. Along with the elimination of direct 
payments, the countercyclical and ACRE programs are also repealed. Producers, under the new 
law, have the option to retain or reallocate their base acres within their operation. The purpose of 
reallocating base acres is an important decision to the farm owner, as ARC-CO and PLC 
program payments are made to 85% of the base acres of the farm.  
ARC-CO and PLC can be elected by on a crop-specific basis. This implies that producers may 
choose ARC for some covered crops produced on their farm and PLC for other covered crops 
produced on that same farm. Producers should consider two points in weighing their program 
election. The first point is whether the expected national MYA price will be above/below the 
reference price. If a producer expects that the MYA price for a particular covered commodity 
will be above the reference price, the PLC program will not produce a payment that year as the 
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program only produces a payment when the MYA price is below the reference price. Under this 
scenario, the ARC-CO program may look attractive. The ARC-CO should also be considered 
relative to price and to the relationship between farm and county yield correlation. If the opposite 
anticipation is held by the producer and the MYA price is expected to be below the reference 
price, the PLC program may look attractive in providing downside price protection. A second 
point to consider is to ask the question of what does the forecasted MYA price look like over the 
upcoming crop years in deciding which program will provide long-term risk protection relative 
to the producer’s risk strategy. This decision should not be made in a vacuum, meaning it will 
rest upon more factors than expectations about projected price trends.  
There are advantages and disadvantages of using individual farm data opposed to relying on 
county averages when comparing the ARC versus PLC programs. Given the recent years of high 
prices that are used in the ARC payment calculations, it is likely that ARC payments will begin 
at higher price levels than the relatively low reference price (used in PLC payment calculations) 
for corn, soybeans, and wheat- which can be viewed as an advantage for the ARC program. 
Since the ARC program uses a five year Olympic average of prices and yields, high prices from 
the 2011and 2012 crop years are included in the benchmark revenue calculation. A disadvantage 
is that ARC payments are capped to 10% of the benchmark revenue. This means that if a 
significant and substantial price decline occurs, maximum payment is reached with the ARC 
program providing no additional protection with any further price declines. In contrast and 
keeping with the above policy scenario, PLC payments continue to grow until prices move down 
to the loan rate levels. These evaluations point to the fact that a program decision should be 
based on the individual producer’s five year price outlook. The more optimistic they are about 
the price of a crop, the more likely they are to favor ARC. If a producer believes low, or very 
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low prices could occur, they may look more favorably toward PLC. Producers will also need to 
consider how their government program choice integrates with their crop insurance program and 
how these programs combine to provide a financial safety net.  
Payment limitations can be described as both a technical and legal issue. The total amount of 
payments (for covered commodities) received by a person or legal entity for any crop under Title 
I commodity program and as marketing loan gains or loan deficiency payments may not exceed 
$125,000. In a general sense, the payment limit for a person and a spouse would total $250,000, 
provided both are actively engaged in the farming operation. A person or legal entity shall not be 
eligible to receive any program benefit during a crop, fiscal, or program (as appropriate) if the 
average AGI of the person or legal entity exceeds $900,000.  
A complex feature of the 2014 farm bill, is the interaction between Title I commodity programs 
and Title XI crop insurance products- most notably the SCO policy endorsement. ARC and PLC 
commodity programs are tied to historical base acres, while traditional crop insurance policies- 
to include the SCO-are tied to planted acres. Covered commodities that are enrolled in the  
ARC-CO are not eligible to receive coverage from the SCO insurance program. Whereas, 
covered commodities enrolled in the PLC program remain eligible to participate in the SCO 
insurance program. In the event that insurance indemnities are triggered, payments (SCO and 
STAX) are made on a planted acre basis. SCO and STAX programs are similar to the preexisting 
Area Risk Protection Insurance (ARPI) policy. Coverage under these programs is based on the 
experience of the county rather than an individual farm.  
SCO is a new insurance product for the 2015 crop year that provides county-level coverage from 
an 86% to the coverage level of the required underlying insurance policy. Indemnities are 
triggered based on county losses in excess of 14% (100% - 86%), which means the entire county 
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must suffer at least a 14% loss in order for any individual’s SCO policy to pay an indemnity. The 
size of the county level loss results in a payment factor which is applied to the individual 
producer’s insurance deductible to determine the actual indemnity payment. SCO has important 
implications for producers as they evaluate commodity program options (i.e. PLC versus ARC) 
and risk management decisions (i.e. individual insurance coverage levels). Because SCO is 
limited by the statute to the deductible range of the underlying policy, it will operate as 
individual-based coverage, but the indemnity is triggered and scaled by area-wide (county) 
losses.  
SCO is only available to commodities enrolled in the PLC program; although enrollment in the 
PLC program is not a prerequisite. Producers should consider the purchase of an SCO policy in 
future crop years when making the choice between the PLC and ARC commodity program 
decisions. Since SCO is an RMA-administered program it acts like other ‘traditional’ insurance 
products in that is can be purchased on a year-to-year basis. This annual insurance policy 
duration complicates alternative farm bill commodity program decision making in that 
commodity program selection is irrevocable for the five-year life of the farm bill. Linking the 
decision farm program and crop insurance suite of products can complicate crop insurance 
delivery, as commodity program choice (beginning with the 2014 crop year) will have to made 
prior to offering SCO (beginning in 2015).  
As an added component to pairing commodity program to crop insurance, there is potential 
overlap can exist between crop insurance and the PLC program option. An overlap can exist 
between target price payments and declines in crop insurance price between the pre-plant and the 
harvest price discovery periods. The exact degrees of the overlap expected between PLC and 
crop insurance is difficult to calculate because PLC pays on 85% of the farm’s base acres while 
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insurance pays on 100% of are planted on the insured unit. Producers should consider this 
insurance/PLC overlap when making their farm program election. Overlapping payments would 
provide additional assistance if prices decline and remains below the reference price established 
by statute.  
The farm program decision is a multi-year management decision. ARC and PLC can provide 
assistance with multiple year losses. ARC-CO is an integrated shallow multiple year loss 
program. PLC paired with the SCO is not integrated. In further detail to the above-mentioned 
point, there are two sets of calculations must be combined, one for shallow losses (SCO) and one 
for multiple year price losses (PLC).  
A key consideration with the SCO is a loss at the county level may or may not align with loss 
experienced on the individual farm. ARC-CO and PLC can influence the crop insurance choices 
for certain covered commodity that are produced on a farm. Therefore, the farm program/crop 
insurance selection decision question can be separated such that the crop insurance components 
(to include SCO) of the decision are examined. Figure 5.1 presents the multiple series of 
decisions, come of which being interrelated, that are to be made by the farm manager concerning 
program election and insurance selection. If a commodity’s price is expected to be below the 
reference price, producers may elect the PLC program to provide downside price protection and 
possibly reduce their yield insurance protection to cover yield risk. A strength of the  
ARC-CO is the assistance for shallow multiple year losses. However, ARC-CO also provides 
some disaster price assistance since it has a minimum price built into its policy design as the 
inclusion of the PLC reference price. Strength of the PLC program is its assistance for multiple 
years of declining and stagnant prices, coupled with SCO (or high individual farm insurance 












In conclusion, the 2014 farm bill allows producers to tailor the coverage options for the next five 
years to their individual farming operations and the commodities that are produced on their 
farms. To briefly summarize the farm program options, PLC is intended to cover against the risk 
of lower commodity prices. It is a traditional income support policy utilizing price floors for 
commodities to help with market uncertainties such as sustained low prices. ARC is intended to 
cover against lower revenues caused by either lower prices or by lower yields relative to recent 
averages. ARC provides benefit to producers when price declines relative to recent averages. 
ARC provides assistance in the deductible range of crop insurance utilizing indications of actual 
losses and an emphasis on multi-year price risk. There may be times in the future when one 
program produces a payment and the other program does not.  
 
5.2 Selected Elements of Cotton Farm Policy  
 
For producers of upland cotton, the 2014 farm bill embodies major substantive change to 
elements of the crop’s safety net. Cotton is no longer a covered commodity and is considered a 
market loan-only program under the guidelines set forth by the commodity title of the farm bill. 
One of cotton’s risk management tools, the direct payment which were made on an annual basis, 
were replaced with two new insurance policies aimed at mitigating revenue risk. These products 
will be administered by USDA RMA and are subsequently contained in the crop insurance title 
of the farm bill.  CTAP is identified as a temporary program that provides payments to producers 
on a farm for which cotton base acres in existence for 2013. This program is designed to be a 
‘transition’ for cotton producers between the previous direct and countercyclical payment 
programs and the new STAX program, which is authorized to begin in the 2015 crop year. CTAP 
is decoupled from ARC or PLC program participation. It is possible for cotton base acres eligible 
for CTAP to also qualify for eligible generic base acres for ARC and PLC. 
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CTAP payments are subject to a separate $40,000 per person (or legal entity) payment limitation 
and not applied toward the $125,000 Title I payment limitation of the farm law.  
Perhaps, the most significant ‘change’ to cotton policy aside from the insurance programs of 
2015, is that the crop is no longer a program or covered commodity in terms of eligibility to 
participate in commodity revenue and price support programs. Since direct and counter-cyclical 
program payments were made on 85% of the base acres of an enrolled commodity, policymakers 
were faced with a decision on how to treat the existing cotton base on farms as of September 30, 
2013. Cotton base acres in effect for the farm are automatically retained as generic base acres 
through the 2018 crop year, regardless of whether the decision is made to retain or reallocate 
base acres.  The uniqueness of these generic acres is that, when planted to a covered commodity, 
they function as additional base acres for the crop planted and are in addition to established base 
acres on the farm in that particular crop year. In the event that a farm program is triggered, 
program payment (ARC or PLC) will be made on 85% of the total base acres on that farm for the 
respective crop- to include both traditional and generic base acre. Farm bill language states that 
generic acres must be planted to a covered commodity to be eligible for program benefits and are 
allocated annually to the covered commodities planted. This couples program payments to 
planted generic acres as a prerequisite to receive payments.  
The treatment of payment acres pertaining to generic base acres reads as follows from the 2014 
farm bill. “If a single covered commodity is planted and the total acreage planted exceeds the 
generic base acres on the farm, the generic base acres are attributed to that covered commodity in 
the amount equal to the total number of generic base acres. If multiple covered commodities are 
planted and the total number of acres planted to all covered commodities exceeds the generic 
base acres, the generic base acres are attributed to each of the covered commodities on the farm 
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on a pro rata basis to reflect the ratio of the acreage planted to a covered commodity on the farm 
to the total acreage planted to all covered commodities on the farm. If the total number of acres 
planted to all covered commodities on the farm does not exceed the generic base acres, the 
number of acres planted to a covered commodity is attributed to that covered commodity.”  
At farm program election, producers on a farm must indicate their preferred farm program choice 
for all covered commodities that may or may not be planted to generic acres through the 2018 
crop year. Given the flexible nature of generic acres, alternative crops not traditionally produced 
on a farm may now be eligible to participate in commodity support programs if planted. 
Therefore, evaluating which program choice is best for a particular farm and production area are 
a critical component of any risk management strategy.  
The majority of cotton support will be contained in Title XI of the new farm bill, as cotton 
transitions away from traditional commodity price and income support programs. STAX is 
another new insurance product for the 2015 crop year administered by the RMA. The major 
feature of this product that sets it apart from other insurance products is that STAX is only 
available to producers of upland cotton. The new income safety net for cotton will be the USDA 
RMA-administered STAX product. STAX will be a county area-based revenue insurance plan 
that will cover losses between 10% (100% - 90% coverage) and 30% (100% - 70% coverage) of 
expected county revenue. STAX is designed to cover shallow losses and supplement the farms 
existing yield or revenue policy. STAX may be purchased as a supplement to an existing crop 
insurance policy or may be purchased as a stand-alone policy. The premium cost of the STAX 
policy will be subsidized by 80%. Cotton producers can select STAX or SCO but cannot have 
STAX and SCO on the same cotton acres (prohibiting duplication in coverage of the same acres). 
STAX and SCO are very similar in terms of operational mechanics and the way in which 
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indemnities are calculated. Ultimately, both are revenue products like the ARC program for 
covered commodities, in that they are shallow loss programs. While STAX coverage is based on 
revenue experience, SCO indemnities can be triggered by either county yield or revenue 
experiences in tandem with the underlying policy.  
 
5.3 Conclusions from the Representative Farm Analysis 
 
Tables that are contained in Appendix D present the economic returns to each representative 
farm location separated by crop enterprise produced. Net returns above variable costs to the 
producer are not adjusted for interest, instead they are summed over the five year life of the bill 
relative to farm program and/or crop insurance policy imposed. These indicators of a farm’s 
financial performance do not consider varying levels of risk, and are to be interpreted as a risk 
neutral measure. Information contained in this appendix provides an alternative perspective for 
measuring total economic returns (e.g. crop receipts, farm program payments, and crop insurance 
indemnities) to each farming operation on the basis of enterprise contribution.  
For the three representative rice and soybean farms in the study, the farm program selection of 
PLC for rice and ARC-CO for soybeans was the dominant option that, in conjunction with the 
price, yield, and production cost variability imposed across all models, outperformed the 
remaining policy scenarios that involved purchasing optional revenue-based insurance policies 
(including the SCO endorsement). This observation holds true when the risk aversion coefficient 
is increased. Tables 4.3 to 4.5. The inference drawn from this analysis is that for rice and 
soybean producers located in the study area, the determination of farm program choice and 
insurance option may be straightforward. One partial explanation of the consistency of rice 
program selection is that with the relationship between the reference price and the forecasted 
MYA long grain prices, the PLC program appears to generate a greater program payment in 
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every year of the farm bill as compared to the ARC-CO option. The result is that the producer’s 
net returns above variable costs for the Arkansas County, Acadia Parish, and Bolivar County 
farms all witness higher returns to the rice enterprise when the PLC option is selected over the 
ARC-CO program. Tables D.1 to D.3 provide a descriptive summary of the returns per enterprise 
over the five year observational period. An added benefit not readily observed from this analysis 
is the residual effect that the updated payment yield of the individual farm has in supplementing 
the PLC payment. (It was assumed that the farm’s yield for the covered commodity mirrored the 
county average for the 2008 through 2012 crop years).  
In the case of soybeans that are produced on these rice farms, the ARC-CO option was the 
preferred option over the life of the farm bill. Since the operational mechanics of this program 
consider revenue losses sustained at the county level, individual farm performance is not 
considered in program payment determination. Overall, the short-term increase in soybean yields 
across Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi is becoming realized in setting ARC-CO program 
benchmark and revenue guarantee levels at a substantial threshold level for payment calculation. 
What can be observed is that as the frequency of higher county yields are included in the revenue 
calculation, the ARC-CO revenue guarantee will increase. The results is that the actual soybean 
revenue for the county would increase also, but be dependent upon the current year’s production 
conditions in the area and the MYA and its relation to the previous five year average. A similar 
inference can be drawn when the price aspect of this revenue support program is evaluated.  
A common result to these rice and soybean farms was that policy option 2, which did not include 
an insurance policy, generated the largest economic grain to each operations over the study 
period. Since individual crop insurance policies carry adjusted premium rates for a particular 
area, which are likely to vary from one crop year to the next, causing policy premium cost to 
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affect the economic returns to the farm when measuring farm financial performance. From an 
actuarial basis, variability in futures prices and USDA RMA reported yield data can influence 
the volatility of a policy’s soundness and ultimately, its premium price that is paid by the 
producer. Therefore, increases in the policy premium costs incurred by the producer in the 
absence of an indemnity can reduced the total returns to the farm. This would be the case in 
years of increased crop yields that act to partially offset stable to declining market prices.  
Through the construction of mixed grain and cotton farms in the Mississippi River delta region, 
economic returns to cotton in the absence of Title I program support is surprising. By examining 
the mean net return above variable costs to the producer, cotton returns significantly decrease 
from the 2014 to the 2015 crop year across all farms in the three-state region. Nearly one-half of 
the base acreage on farms in Mississippi, Phillips, Morehouse, Tensas, Coahoma, and Leflore 
locations consists of cotton. The reason for the decline in total economic returns is that CTAP 
payments for the 2014 crop year function as a quasi-direct payment, and cease to exist in any 
out-year of the farm bill in exchange for the optional SCO and STAX insurance products. In 
analysis of the ARC-CO and PLC programs for corn and soybean enterprises, cotton being 
produced on these farms was assumed to maintain STAX insurance coverage. Results from 
Table 4.6 to 4.11 indicated that total returns to the farming operations are greatest when cotton is 
endorsed by STAX in lieu of SCO. The purpose, suggested by industry representatives, was to 
examine each farm’s five year financial performance when comparing the feed grain program 
options.  
In order to clarify the economic activity generated from PLC enrollment for mixed cropped 
farms in the Mississippi River delta region, the imposed MYA price parameter is simulated over 
several thousand iteration in the analysis as to obtain a single cumulative measure of farm 
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profitability. For each of the 1,000 iterations of the model, the MYA price is said to vary within 
the empirical distribution of the previous ten-year period, which can result in a generated price 
variable that falls under the reference price. This aspect of simulation analysis is important to 
note. For example, a mean soybean price set at $9.17 per bushel is above the $8.40 reference 
price for soybeans. However, through simulation analysis, a MYA price parameter may be 
generated, subject to the distribution of the variable, to fall below the $8.40 reference price; thus 
resulting in a PLC payment being triggered. For corn and soybean prices that are at or near the 
reference price level and act to serve as the mean for the simulated parameter, several iterations 
can be below the reference level, while some fall above the reference price.  
As a basis for comparison, total returns to the farm to include ARC-CO and PLC programs is set 
as that corn and soybeans both are enrolled in the ARC-CO program coupled with the RP 
insurance complement, with cotton receiving insurance-based protection from the STAX product 
(policy option 3). When examining policy options 3, 4, and 5, the Arkansas corn, cotton, and 
soybean farms displayed alternative preferences for farm program choice. For the Mississippi 
County farm, if soybeans were selected to be enrolled in the PLC program (option 4), the returns 
to the soybean enterprise would be increase. The same observation is made when corn is elected 
to enroll in the PLC program (option 5), although the return increase to the enterprise is much 
larger. Table D.4. As the risk aversion level (coefficient value) of the producer increases, farm 
program and insurance policy options may not be as straightforward as with the rice farms of the 
region. For the Mississippi County farm, as the risk aversion level increases, policy option 1 
remains the preferred choice, followed by 5, 4, 3, and option 2. Over the series of the RAC 
coefficients that were examined, the results (measured as the five year total of net returns above 
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variable costs to the producer) did not intersect when plotted graphically, indicating the 
economic preference for one option over another has changed. 
In Phillips County, a similar income effect is observed when comparing corn enrolled in the PLC 
(option 5) in lieu of the ARC-CO (option 4). The decision for this farm on program selection for 
soybeans proves to be different. Soybean returns are greater under the ARC-CO than the PLC 
program, resulting the policy option of PLC for corn and ARC-CO for soybeans. Table D.5. As 
the level of risk aversion increased in Phillips County, policy option 1 dominated option 5 across 
all levels. However, as risk aversion was increased, option three and four replaced one another in 
a pairwise comparison. Option 2 resulted in the lowest return level across all levels of risk 
aversion for the farm.  
In the Louisiana delta region, both the Morehouse and Tensas Parish farms generated higher 
economic returns from corn enroll in the PLC program with the insurance coverage of the SCO 
option (option 5). Economic returns resulting from soybeans enrolled in the PLC program 
carrying the SCO option decreased (option 4) when compared to the crop’s performance under 
policy options 3 and 5 where an underlying insurance policy was paired with ARC-CO. When 
the risk aversion level is increased, results from the Phillips representative farm hold true for the 
Morehouse Parish location. A notable difference did occur with the Tensas Parish farm. When 
the risk aversion coefficient is increased, policy option 1 no longer remains the option generating 
the highest returns to the farm. It is replaced with option 5. However in a similar accordance with 
the Morehouse location, policy option 3 is replaced by policy option 4.  
The same result was observed for the Coahoma and Leflore County Mississippi mixed grain 
farms. Economic returns generated from the production of corn increased when the PLC program 
was selected with the SCO insurance option. The opposite held true for soybeans that benefited 
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from participating in the ARC-CO program carrying an underlying revenue protection policy. In 
Coahoma County when risk aversion is increased, policy option 1 is preferred to options 5, 4, 3, 
and 2. When the total returns to the farm are presented in the context of SERF analysis, the line 
on the graph do not intersect over the imposed RAC. This indicates that across all levels of risk 
aversion, the policies remain ranked in terms of profitability as previously stated. In Leflore 
County, policy option 1 no longer remains the option generating the highest returns to the farm 
as it is replaced by option 5 as higher levels of risk aversion. Policy option 3 is replaced by 
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APPENDIX A: ENTERPRISE BUDGETS FOR THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER 
DELTA REGION, 2014 
 
Enterprise budgets published for selected crops in the Mississippi River delta region, 2014. 
State Corn   Cotton Rice Soybean 
Arkansas Stacked gene 
 Furrow irrg. 
Stacked gene, 




































































































































































where: BtRR= Bt stacked gene Roundup Ready corn seed; irrg= irrigation practice; non-irrg= dryland production; furrow irrg= furrow irrigation system; flood irrg= flood irrigation system; 
B2RF= Bollgard II Roundup Ready Flex cotton seed; B2LL, LLB2= Bollgard II Liberty Link production system cotton seed; con-till= conservation tillage practice; no-till= no tillage in field; 
reduce till= reduced tillage in field; conv. seed= conventional seed technology; CL= CLEARFIELD® technology rice seed; plant= planting method for rice; multi-inlet= multiple inlet field 
irrigation practice; zero grade= precision graded field; contour/straight levee= levee system in field; RR= Roundup Ready seed technology; LL= Liberty Link seed technology. 
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APPENDIX B: FARM SIZES FOR SELECTED COUNTIES IN THE 
MISSISSIPPI RIVER DELTA REGION 
 
Arkansas farm size for selected counties, 2012 Census of Agriculture data. 





















































































































Source: USDA ERS, 2014. 
 
 
Louisiana farm size for selected parishes, 2012 Census of Agriculture data. 
County Number of 
Farms 





























































































































Mississippi farm size for selected counties, 2012 Census of Agriculture data. 
County Number of 
Farms 




















































































































































APPENDIX C: YIELD HISTORY FOR SELECTED COUNTIES IN THE 
MISSISSIPPI RIVER DELTA REGION 
 
Historical production data for rice and soybeans produced in Arkansas County, Arkansas.  
















































































Historical production data for corn, cotton, and soybeans produced in Phillips County, Arkansas.  
Year  Corn Yield 
bu/ac) 





































































































Historical production data for cotton and soybeans produced in Mississippi County, Arkansas.  



















































































Historical production data for rice and soybeans produced in Acadia Parish, Louisiana.  



















































































Historical production data for corn, cotton, and soybeans produced in Morehouse Parish, 
Louisiana.  
Year  Corn Yield 
bu/ac) 




































































































Historical production data for cotton and soybeans produced in Tensas Parish,  Louisiana.  


















































































Historical production data for rice and soybeans produced in Bolivar County, Mississippi.  



















































































Historical production data for corn, cotton, and soybeans produced in Leflore County, 
Mississippi.  
Year  Corn Yield 
bu/ac) 




































































































Historical production data for cotton and soybeans produced in Coahoma County, Mississippi.  















































































APPENDIX D: UNITED STATES CODE ON AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY 
POLICY AND PROGRAMS   
 
7 USC 9011. The term “covered commodity” means wheat, oats, barley, corn, grain sorghum, 
long grain rice, medium grain rice, pulse crops, soybeans, other oilseeds, and peanuts.  
The term “generic base acres” means the number of base acres for cotton in effect under the 
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, as in effect on September 30, 2013, subject to any 
adjustment or reduction under the Agricultural Act of 2014.  
The “reference price” with respect to a covered commodity for a crop year, means the following: 
for wheat, $5.50 per bushel; for corn, $3.70 per bushel; for grain sorghum, $3.95 per bushel; for 
barley, $4.95 per bushel; for oats, $2.40 per bushel; for long grain rice, $14.00 per 
hundredweight; for medium grain rice, $14.00 per hundredweight; for soybeans, $8.40 per 
bushel; for other oilseeds, $20.15 per hundredweight; for peanuts, $535.00 per ton; for dry peas, 
$11.00 per hundredweight; for lentils, $19.97 per hundredweight; and for small chickpeas, 
$19.04 per hundredweight.  
7 USC 9012. The USDA the Farm Service Agency provided notice to farm owners regarding 
their opportunity to make an election to retain base acres, including generic base acres; or in lieu 
retaining base acres, to reallocate base acres, other than any generic base acres. Generic base 
acres are automatically retained.  
For the purpose of applying reallocation of all base acres of covered commodities on the farm, as 
in effect on September 30, 2013, among those covered commodities planted on the farm at any 
time during the 2009 through 2012 crop years. The reallocation of base acres among covered 
commodities on a farm is in proportion to the ratio of the four year average of the acreage 
planted on a farm to each covered commodity for the 2009 through 2012 crop years; and any 
acreage on the farm that the producers were prevented from planting during the 2009 through 
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2012 crop years to that covered commodity; to the four year average of the acreage planted on 
the farm to all covered commodities and any acreage on the farm that the producers were 
prevented from planting. Generic base acres are retained and may not be reallocated under the 
reallocation process. For the purpose of determining a four year acreage average for a farm, any 
crop year in which a covered commodity was not planted is not excluded.  
If the acreage that was devoted to another covered commodity in the same crop year (other than 
a covered commodity produced under an established practice of double cropping), the farm 
owner may elect the commodity to be used for that crop year in determining the four year 
average, but may not include both the initial commodity and the subsequent commodity.  
The reallocation of base acres among covered commodities on a farm cannot result in a total 
number of base acres (including generic acres) for the farm in excess of the number of base acres 
in effect for the farm on September 30, 2013.  
7 USC 9013. At the sole discretion of the farm owner, the owner has a one-time opportunity to 
update, on a covered commodity-by-covered commodity basis, the payment yield that would 
otherwise be used in calculating any price loss coverage (PLC) payment for each covered 
commodity on the farm for which the election is made. If the farm owner elects to update yields, 
the payment yield for a covered commodity on the farm, for the purpose of calculating PLC 
payments only, is equal to 90 percent of the average of the yield per planted acre for the crop of 
the covered commodity on the farm for the 2008 through 2012 crop years, excluding any crop 
year in which the acreage planted to the crop of the covered commodity was zero. If the yield per 
planted acre for a crop of a covered commodity for a farm for any of the 2008 through 2012 crop 
years is less than 75 percent of the average of the 2008 through 2012 county yield for that 
commodity, a yield for that crop equal to 75 percent of the average of the 2008 through 2012 
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county yield is assigned by USDA FSA for the purpose s of determining the average yield for the 
PLC program.  
7 USC 9014. For the purpose of PLC and agriculture risk coverage when county coverage (ARC-
CO) has been selection, the payment acres for each covered commodity on a farm shall equal 85 
percent of the base acres for the covered commodity on the farm. In the case of agriculture risk 
coverage when individual coverage (ARC-IC) has been selected, the payment acres for a farm 
shall be equal to 65 percent of the base acres for all covered commodities on the farm.  
In the case of generic base acres, PLC payments and ARC payments are made only with respect 
to generic base acre planted to a covered commodity for the crop year. With respect to a farm 
containing generic base acres, generic base acres on the farm are attributed to a covered 
commodity in the following manner. If a single covered commodity is planted and the total 
acreage planted exceeds the generic base acre on the farm, the generic base acres are attributed to 
that covered commodity in the amount equal to the total number of generic base acres. If 
multiple covered commodities are planted and the total number of acres planted to all covered 
commodities on the farm exceeds the generic base acres on the farm, the generic base acre are 
attributed to each of the covered commodities on a pro rata basis to reflect the ratio of the 
acreage planted to a covered commodity on the farm to the total acreage planted to al 
commodities on the farm. If the total number of acre planted to all covered commodities on the 
farm does not exceed the generic base acres of the farm, the number of acres planted to a covered 
commodity is attributed to that covered commodity. When generic acres are planted to a covered 
commodity or acreage planted to a covered commodity is attributed to generic base acres, the 
generic base acres are in addition to other base acres on the farm.  
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7 USC 9015. For the 2014 through 2018 crop years, all of the producers on a farm will make a 
one-time, irrevocable election to obtain PLC on a covered commodity-by-covered commodity 
basis; or ARC.  The producers on a farm that elect to obtain ARC will unanimously select 
whether to receive agriculture risk coverage payments based on county coverage (CO) applicable 
on a covered commodity-by-covered commodity basis; or individual coverage (IC) applicable to 
all covered commodities on the farm.  
7 USC 9016. PLC payments are made to producers on the farm on a covered commodity-by-
covered commodity basis if, that for any of the 2014 through 2018 crop years the effective price 
for the covered commodity for the crop is less than the reference price for the covered 
commodity for the crop year. The effective price for a covered commodity is the higher of the 
national average market price received by producers during the 12-month marketing year for the 
covered commodity; or the national average loan rate for a marketing assistance loan for the 
covered commodity in effect for such crop year. The payment rate equals the difference between 
the reference price for the covered commodity; and the effective price for the covered 
commodity. If price loss coverage payments are provided for any of the 2014 through 2018 crop 
years for a covered commodity, the amount of the PLC payment paid to producers on a farm for 
the crop year equals the product obtained by multiplying the payment rate for the covered 
commodity; the payment yield for the covered commodity; and the payment acres for the 
covered commodity. If PLC payments are required to be provided, the payment shall be made 
beginning October 1, or as soon as practicable thereafter, after the end of the applicable 
marketing year for the covered commodity.  
7 USC 9017. If all of the producers on a farm make the election to obtain ARC, payments shall 
be made to producers on a farm for any of the 2014 through 2018 crop years the actual crop 
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revenue for the crop year is less than the agriculture risk coverage guarantee for the crop year. In 
the case of county coverage, the amount of the actual crop revenue for a county for a crop year of 
a covered commodity equals the product obtained by multiplying the actual average county yield 
per planted acre for the covered commodity and the higher of- the national average marketing 
year price received by producers during the 12-month marketing year for the covered 
commodity; or the national average loan rate for a marketing assistance loan for the covered 
commodity in effect for such crop year.  
In the case of individual coverage, the amount of the actual crop revenue for a producer on a 
farm for a crop year shall be based on the producer’s share of all covered commodities planted 
on all farms for which individual coverage has been selected and in which the producer has an 
interest as follows. For each covered commodity, the product obtained by multiplying the total 
production of the covered commodity on such farms; and the higher of the national average 
market price received by producers during the 12-month marketing year; or the national average 
loan rate for a marketing assistance loan for the covered commodity in effect for such crop year. 
The sum of the aforementioned amounts is determined for all covered commodities on such 
farms. The quotient obtained by dividing the summed amount by the total planted acres of all 
covered commodities on such farms.  
The agriculture risk coverage guarantee for a crop year for a covered commodity equals 86 
percent of the benchmark revenue. In the case of county coverage, the benchmark revenue shall 
be the product obtained by multiplying the average historical county yield for the most recent 
five crop years, excluding each of the crop years with the highest and lowest yields; and the 
national average market price received by producers during the 12-month marketing year for the 
most recent five crop years, excluding each of the crop years with the highest and lowest prices. 
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In the case of individual coverage, the benchmark revenue for a producer on a farm for a crop 
year shall be based on the producer’s share of all covered commodities planted on all farms for 
which individual coverage has been selected and in which the producer as an interest to be 
determined as follows. For each covered commodity, for each of the most recent five crop years, 
the product obtained by multiplying the yield per planted acre for the covered commodity on 
such farms; by the national average market price received by producers during the 12-month 
marketing year. For each covered commodity, the average of the revenues for the most recent 
five crop years, exclude each of the crop years with the highest and lowest revenues. For each of 
the 2014 through 2018 crop years, the sum of the amounts is determined for all covered 
commodities on such farms, but adjusted to reflect the ration between the total number of acres 
planted on such farms to a covered commodity and the total acres of all covered commodities 
planted on such farms.  
If the yield per planted acre for the covered commodity or historical county yield per planted 
acre for the covered commodity for any of the five most recent crop years is less than 70 percent 
of the transitional yield, the amounts used for any of those years shall be 70 percent of the 
transitional yield. If the national average market price received by producers during the 12-
month marketing year for any of the five most recent crop years is lower than the reference price 
for the covered commodity, the reference price for any of those years.  
The payment rate for a covered commodity, in the case of county coverage, or a farm, in the case 
of individual coverage, shall be equal to the lesser of the amount that the agriculture risk 
coverage guarantee for the crop year exceeds the actual crop revenue for the crop year; or 10 
percent of the benchmark revenue for the crop year. If agriculture risk coverage payments are 
required to be paid for any of the 2014 through 2018 crop years, the amount of the agriculture 
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risk coverage payment for the crop year shall be determined by multiplying the payment rate and 
the payment acres. If agriculture risk coverage payments are required to be provided for the 
covered commodity, payments shall be made beginning October 1, or as soon as practicable 
thereafter, after the end of the applicable marketing year for the covered commodity.  
To the maximum extent practicable, the USDA Secretary shall provide calculation for a separate 
actual crop revenue and agriculture risk coverage guarantee for irrigated and non-irrigated 
covered commodities.   
7 USC 9019. Transition assistance is provided to producers of upland cotton in light of the repeal 
of section 1103 of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (7 USC 8713), the 
inapplicability of sections 116 and 117 of the Agricultural Act of 2014 to upland cotton, and the 
delayed implementation of the stacked income protection (STAX) plan required by section 508B 
of the Federal Crop Insurance Act (7 USC 1508b), as added by section 11017 of the Agricultural 
Act of 2014. Appendix B contains U.S. Code on selected Federal crop insurance provisions.  
For the 2014 crop of upland cotton, transition assistance, pursuant to the terms and conditions of 
section 119 of the Agricultural Act of 2014, shall be provided to producers on a farm for which 
cotton base acres were in existence for the 2013 crop year. For the 2015 crop of upland cotton, 
transition assistance payment will be provided to producers on a farm for which cotton base acre 
were in existence for the 2013 crop year; and that is located in a county in which the SATX plan 
required by section 508B of the Federal Crop Insurance Act (7 USC 1508b) is not available to 
producers of upland cotton for the 2015 crop year.  
The transition assistance rate is equal to the product obtained by multiplying: the June 12, 2013, 
midpoint estimate for the marketing year average price of upland cotton received by producers 
for the marketing year beginning August 1, 2013, minus the December 10, 2013, midpoint 
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estimate for the marketing year average price of upland cotton received by producers for the 
marketing year beginning August 1, 2013, as contained in the applicable USDA World 
Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE) report; and the national program yield for 
upland cotton of 597 pounds per acre. The amount of transition assistance to be provided to 
producers on a farm for a crop year shall be equal to the product obtained by multiplying- for the 
2014 crop year, 60 percent, and for the 2015 crop year, 36.5 percent, of the cotton base acres for 
the farm; the transition assistance rate in effect for the crop year; and the payment yield for 
upland cotton for the farm established for purposes of section 1103(c)(3) of the Food, 
Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (7 USC 817(c)(3)), divided by the national program yield 
for upland cotton of 597 pounds per acre.  
Transition assistance payment for a crop year will not be made before October 1 of the calendar 
year in which the crop of upland cotton is harvested. Sections 1001 through 1001C of the Food 
Security Act of 1985 (7 USC 1308 through 1308C), as in effect on September 30, 2013, shall 
apply to the receipt of transition assistance under section 1119 of the Agricultural Act of 2014 in 
the same manner as such sections applied to section 1103 of the Food, Conservation, and Energy 
Act of 2008 (7 USC 8713).  
7 USC 9031. For each of the 2014 through 2018 crops of each loan commodity on a farm, 
nonrecourse marketing assistance loans shall be made available for loan commodities produced 
on the farm.  
7 USC 9032. For purposes of each of the 2014 through 2018 crop years, the loan rate for a 
marketing assistance loan under section 1201 of the Agricultural Act of 2014 for a loan 
commodity shall be equal to the following: in the case of wheat, $2.94 per bushel; in the case of 
corn, $1.95 per bushel; in the case of grain sorghum, $1.95 per bushel; in the case of barley, 
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$1.95 per bushel; in the case of oats, $1.39 per bushel; in the case of base quality upland cotton, 
for each of the 2014 through 2018 crop years, the simple average of the adjusted prevailing 
world price of the two immediately preceding marketing years, but in no case less than $0.45 per 
pound or more than $0.52 per pound; in the case of extra-long staple cotton, $0.7977 per pound; 
in the case of long grain rice, $6.50 per hundredweight;  in the case of medium grain rice, $6.50 
per hundredweight; in the case of soybeans, $5.00 per bushel; in the case of oilseeds, $10.09 per 
hundredweight; in the case dry peas, $5.40 per hundredweight; in the case of lentils, $11.28 per 
hundredweight; in the case of small chickpeas, $7.43 per hundredweight; in the case of large 
chickpeas, $11.28 per hundredweight; in the case of graded wool, $1.15 per pound; in the case of 
non-graded wool, $0.40 per pound; in the case of mohair, $4.20 per pound; in the case of honey, 
$0.69 per pound; in the case of peanuts, $355 per ton.  
7 USC 9033. In the case of each loan commodity, a marketing assistance loan shall have a term 
of nine months beginning the first day of the first month after the month in which the loan is 
made.  
7 USC 9034. Producers on a farm are permitted to repay a marketing assistance loan for a loan 
commodity (other than upland cotton, long grain rice, medium grain rice, extra-long staple 
cotton, peanuts, and confectionery sugar, and each other kind of sunflower seed) at a rate that is 
the lesser of- the loan rate established for the commodity plus interest (determined by the Federal 
Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, 7 USC 7283; a rate that is- calculated based 
on the average market prices for the loan commodity during the preceding 30-day period; and 
will minimize discrepancies in marketing loan benefits across State boundaries and across county 
boundaries; or a rate that the Secretary may develop. The repayment rates for upland cotton, long 
grain rice, and medium grain rice shall be at a rate that is the lesser of- the loan rate, plus interest; 
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or the prevailing world market price for the commodity. The prevailing world market price for 
upland cotton, long grain rice, and medium grain rice shall be adjusted to U.S. quality and 
location.  
7 USC 9035. Loan deficiency payments are available to producers on a farm that, although 
eligible to obtain a marketing assistance loan under section 1201 with respect to a loan 
commodity, agree to forgo obtaining the loan for the commodity in return for loan deficiency 
payments. A loan deficiency payment equals the product obtained by multiplying- the payment 
rate determined for the commodity; by the quantity of the commodity produced by eligible 
producers, excluding any quantity for which the producers obtain a marketing assistance loan. In 
the case of a loan commodity, the payment rate shall be the amount by which the loan rate 
exceeds the rate at which a marketing assistance loan for the loan commodity may be repaid 
under section 1204 of the Agricultural Act of 2014.  
7 USC 9092. The total amount of payments received, directly or indirectly, by a person or legal 
entity for any crop year under sections 1116 and 1117 and as marketing loan gains or loan 












APPENDIX E: UNITED STATES CODE ON THE FEDERAL CROP 
INSURANCE  
Section 508(c) of the Federal Crop Insurance Act, 7 USC 1508(c), is amended by inserting the 
following. A producer shall have the option of purchasing additional coverage based on an 
individual yield and loss basis; or an area yield and loss basis; or an individual yield and loss 
basis, supplemented with coverage based on an area yield and loss basis to cover part of the 
deductible under the individual yield and loss policy. The level of coverage shall be dollar 
denominated; and may be purchased at any level not to exceed 85 percent of the individual yield 
or 95 percent of the area yield. In the case of the supplemental coverage option (SCO), the 
Corporation shall offer producers the opportunity to purchase coverage in combination with a 
policy or plan of insurance that would allow indemnities to be paid to a producer equal to a part 
of the deductible under the policy or plan of insurance- at a county-wide level to the fullest 
extent possible; or in counties that lack sufficient data, on the basis of larger geographical area as 
the Corporation determines to provide sufficient data for purposes of providing the coverage. 
Coverage is triggered only if the losses in the area exceed 14 percent of normal levels (as 
determined by the Corporation). Coverage offered shall not exceed the difference between 86 
percent; and the coverage level selected by the producer for the underlying policy or plan of 
insurance.  
Crops for which the producer has elected under section 1116 of the Agricultural Act of 2014 to 
receive agriculture risk coverage and acres that are enrolled in the stacked income protection 
plan under section 508B shall not be eligible for supplemental coverage.  
The premium for coverage offered shall be sufficient to cover anticipated losses and a reasonable 
reserve; and include an amount for operating and administrative expenses. Section 508(e) (2) of 
the Federal Crop Insurance Act, 7 USC 1508(e) (2), is amended by adding the following. In the 
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case of the supplemental coverage option, the amount shall be equal to the sum of 65 percent of 
the additional premium associated with coverage; and for the coverage of operating and 
administrative expenses.  
7 USC 1508 note. The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) shall begin to provide 
additional coverage based on an individual yield and loss basis, supplemented with coverage 
based on area yield and loss basis, not later for the 2015 crop year.  
Section 508(e) (5) of the Federal Crop Insurance Act, 7 USC 1508(e) (5), is amended by adding 
the following. Beginning with the 2015 crop year, the Corporation shall make available separate 
enterprise units for irrigated and non-irrigated acreage of crops in counties.  
7 USC 1508b. Beginning not later than the 2015 crop of upland cotton, the Corporation shall 
make available to producers of upland cotton an additional policy (to be known as the ‘Stacked 
Income Protection Plan’), which shall provide coverage consistent with the Group Risk Income 
Protection Plan (and the associated Harvest Revenue Option Endorsement) offered by the 
Corporation for the 2011 crop year.  
STAX shall comply with the following requirements. Provide coverage for revenue loss of not 
less than 10 percent and not more than 30 percent of expected county revenue, specified in 
increments of 5 percent. The deductible shall be the minimum percent of revenue loss at which 
indemnities are triggered under the plan, not to be less than 10 percent of the expected county 
revenue. The plan is offered to producers of upland cotton in all counties with upland cotton 
production- at a county-wide level to the fullest extent practicable; or in counties that lack 
sufficient data, on the basis of such larger geographical area as the Corporation determines to 
provide sufficient data for purposes of providing the coverage. The plan can be purchased in 
addition to any other individual or area coverage in effect on the producer’s acreage or as a 
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stand-alone policy, except that if a producer has an individual or area coverage for the same 
acreage, the maximum coverage available under the STAX plan shall not exceed the deductible 
for the individual coverage. 
Coverage is established based on the expected price established under existing Group Risk 
Income Protection (GRIP) or area wide policy offered by the Corporation for the applicable 
county (or area) and crop year; and an expected county yield established for the existing area-
wide plans offered by the Corporation for the applicable county (or area) and crop year (or, in 
geographic area where area-wide plans are not offered, an expected yield determined in a manner 
consistent with those of area-wide plans); or the average of the applicable yield data for the 
county (or area) for the most recent five years, excluding the highest and lowest observations, 
from the USDA RMA or the USDA NASS (or both) or, if sufficient county data is not available, 
such other data considered appropriate by the Secretary.  
The use of a multiplier factor to establish maximum protection per acre (protection factor) of not 
less than the higher of the level established on a program wide basis or 120 percent.  
An indemnity is paid based on the amount that the expected county revenue exceeds the actual 
county revenue, as applied to the individual coverage of the producer. Indemnities under the 
STAX plan shall not overlap the amount of the deductible selected. In all counties for which data 
is available, establish separate coverage for irrigated and non-irrigated practices.  
The premium shall be sufficient to cover anticipated losses and a reasonable reserve; and include 
an amount for operating and administrative expenses. The amount of premium paid by the 
Corporation for all qualifying coverage levels of the STAX plan shall be 80 percent of the 
amount of the premium established for the coverage level selected; and an amount to cover 
administrative and operating expenses.  
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APPENDIX F: SERF RESULTS FOR REPRESENTATIVE FARMS  
Certainty equivalents of cumulative net returns above variable costs to the producer for a 












0 0 $1,043.25 $1,361.55 $1,225.47 
1 0.0001491 $1,025.03 $1,342.48 $1,210.45 
2 0.0002983 $1,006.96 $1,323.52 $1,195.52 
3 0.0004474 $989.02 $1,304.70 $1,180.67 
4 0.0005965 $971.25 $1,286.02 $1,165.92 
5 0.0007457 $953.64 $1,267.47 $1,151.26 
6 0.0008948 $936.21 $1,249.06 $1,136.69 
7 0.0010439 $918.95 $1,230.79 $1,122.21 
8 0.0011931 $901.89 $1,212.67 $1,107.83 
9 0.0013422 $885.02 $1,194.70 $1,093.55 
10 0.0014913 $868.35 $1,176.88 $1,079.36 
11 0.0016405 $851.90 $1,159.23 $1,065.28 
12 0.0017896 $835.65 $1,141.74 $1,051.30 
13 0.0019387 $819.63 $1,124.42 $1,037.42 
14 0.0020879 $803.84 $1,107.28 $1,023.65 
15 0.002237 $788.28 $1,090.32 $1,010.00 
16 0.0023861 $772.95 $1,073.55 $996.45 
17 0.0025353 $757.86 $1,056.97 $983.02 
18 0.0026844 $743.01 $1,040.59 $969.72 
19 0.0028335 $728.40 $1,024.41 $956.53 














Certainty equivalents of cumulative net returns above variable costs to the producer for a 












0 0 $540.42 $727.45 $667.24 
1 0.0003101 $530.75 $720.59 $660.89 
2 0.0006201 $521.16 $713.82 $654.61 
3 0.0009302 $511.66 $707.13 $648.40 
4 0.0012402 $502.23 $700.51 $642.26 
5 0.0015503 $492.87 $693.97 $636.19 
6 0.0018603 $483.58 $687.49 $630.18 
7 0.0021704 $474.35 $681.07 $624.23 
8 0.0024805 $465.18 $674.71 $618.33 
9 0.0027905 $456.05 $668.40 $612.48 
10 0.0031006 $446.96 $662.15 $606.68 
11 0.0034106 $437.91 $655.94 $600.91 
12 0.0037207 $428.88 $649.77 $595.19 
13 0.0040308 $419.88 $643.64 $589.50 
14 0.0043408 $410.89 $637.55 $583.83 
15 0.0046509 $401.90 $631.48 $578.20 
16 0.0049609 $392.92 $625.45 $572.58 
17 0.005271 $383.93 $619.44 $566.98 
18 0.005581 $374.94 $613.45 $561.40 
19 0.0058911 $365.92 $607.49 $555.83 



















Certainty equivalents of cumulative net returns above variable costs to the producer for a 












0 0 $444.19 $637.39 $586.82 
1 0.0003596 $435.79 $630.44 $580.14 
2 0.0007193 $427.55 $623.61 $573.56 
3 0.0010789 $419.49 $616.92 $567.09 
4 0.0014385 $411.60 $610.35 $560.72 
5 0.0017981 $403.87 $603.91 $554.46 
6 0.0021578 $396.31 $597.59 $548.31 
7 0.0025174 $388.91 $591.39 $542.25 
8 0.002877 $381.67 $585.30 $536.29 
9 0.0032367 $374.58 $579.33 $530.43 
10 0.0035963 $367.64 $573.46 $524.65 
11 0.0039559 $360.83 $567.70 $518.97 
12 0.0043155 $354.17 $562.04 $513.37 
13 0.0046752 $347.64 $556.48 $507.85 
14 0.0050348 $341.24 $551.02 $502.41 
15 0.0053944 $334.97 $545.65 $497.04 
16 0.0057541 $328.82 $540.37 $491.75 
17 0.0061137 $322.78 $535.17 $486.53 
18 0.0064733 $316.86 $530.07 $481.38 
19 0.0068329 $311.05 $525.04 $476.30 



















Certainty equivalents of cumulative net returns above variable costs to the producer for a 

















0 0 $255.58 $174.97 $202.65 $206.86 $220.36 
1 0.000943 $240.89 $160.73 $188.33 $192.78 $207.58 
2 0.0018861 $226.88 $147.14 $174.66 $179.38 $195.38 
3 0.0028291 $213.54 $134.17 $161.62 $166.65 $183.73 
4 0.0037722 $200.85 $121.80 $149.18 $154.53 $172.63 
5 0.0047152 $188.78 $110.01 $137.32 $143.00 $162.03 
6 0.0056582 $177.30 $98.75 $125.99 $132.02 $151.91 
7 0.0066013 $166.37 $87.98 $115.16 $121.56 $142.24 
8 0.0075443 $155.97 $77.69 $104.80 $111.57 $132.99 
9 0.0084874 $146.04 $67.82 $94.88 $102.03 $124.12 
10 0.0094304 $136.57 $58.36 $85.37 $92.91 $115.62 
11 0.0103734 $127.51 $49.27 $76.23 $84.18 $107.46 
12 0.0113165 $118.83 $40.53 $67.45 $75.81 $99.62 
13 0.0122595 $110.51 $32.10 $58.99 $67.79 $92.08 
14 0.0132026 $102.51 $23.98 $50.84 $60.08 $84.82 
15 0.0141456 $94.81 $16.12 $42.98 $52.68 $77.83 
16 0.0150886 $87.39 $8.52 $35.39 $45.55 $71.09 
17 0.0160317 $80.22 $1.15 $28.04 $38.67 $64.59 
18 0.0169747 $73.28 -$5.99 $20.93 $32.04 $58.31 
19 0.0179178 $66.55 -$12.93 $14.04 $25.64 $52.25 


















Certainty equivalents of cumulative net returns above variable costs to the producer for a 

















0 0 $243.85 $160.81 $216.72 $207.99 $242.99 
1 0.0009325 $226.98 $142.32 $197.16 $188.77 $225.03 
2 0.0018651 $210.90 $124.84 $178.69 $170.71 $208.19 
3 0.0027976 $195.60 $108.29 $161.22 $153.69 $192.35 
4 0.0037301 $181.01 $92.59 $144.65 $137.62 $177.41 
5 0.0046627 $167.12 $77.65 $128.87 $122.39 $163.26 
6 0.0055952 $153.85 $63.40 $113.80 $107.91 $149.82 
7 0.0065277 $141.19 $49.77 $99.36 $94.11 $137.00 
8 0.0074603 $129.08 $36.68 $85.46 $80.92 $124.72 
9 0.0083928 $117.49 $24.10 $72.05 $68.28 $112.91 
10 0.0093253 $106.38 $11.98 $59.08 $56.15 $101.50 
11 0.0102578 $95.73 $0.27 $46.49 $44.49 $90.44 
12 0.0111904 $85.50 -$11.06 $34.25 $33.27 $79.68 
13 0.0121229 $75.67 -$22.03 $22.32 $22.45 $69.16 
14 0.0130554 $66.21 -$32.66 $10.70 $12.03 $58.86 
15 0.013988 $57.09 -$42.98 -$0.65 $1.98 $48.73 
16 0.0149205 $48.30 -$53.00 -$11.72 -$7.71 $38.76 
17 0.015853 $39.82 -$62.73 -$22.52 -$17.06 $28.93 
18 0.0167856 $31.62 -$72.18 -$33.05 -$26.07 $19.23 
19 0.0177181 $23.69 -$81.35 -$43.31 -$34.76 $9.68 


















Certainty equivalents of cumulative net returns above variable costs to the producer for a 

















0 0 $674.65 $613.64 $640.23 $627.18 $672.93 
1 0.0003097 $653.68 $593.33 $620.11 $607.79 $654.34 
2 0.0006195 $633.18 $573.48 $600.46 $588.89 $636.24 
3 0.0009292 $613.16 $554.11 $581.29 $570.47 $618.61 
4 0.0012389 $593.64 $535.22 $562.62 $552.55 $601.47 
5 0.0015486 $574.61 $516.82 $544.43 $535.12 $584.81 
6 0.0018584 $556.05 $498.88 $526.73 $518.17 $568.62 
7 0.0021681 $537.96 $481.40 $509.49 $501.70 $552.89 
8 0.0024778 $520.32 $464.36 $492.71 $485.68 $537.60 
9 0.0027875 $503.10 $447.75 $476.37 $470.11 $522.75 
10 0.0030973 $486.29 $431.54 $460.44 $454.96 $508.31 
11 0.003407 $469.88 $415.73 $444.93 $440.23 $494.27 
12 0.0037167 $453.85 $400.29 $429.80 $425.90 $480.61 
13 0.0040265 $438.17 $385.21 $415.03 $411.94 $467.33 
14 0.0043362 $422.84 $370.47 $400.63 $398.36 $454.40 
15 0.0046459 $407.85 $356.07 $386.57 $385.13 $441.81 
16 0.0049556 $393.18 $341.99 $372.84 $372.24 $429.55 
17 0.0052654 $378.83 $328.22 $359.42 $359.69 $417.61 
18 0.0055751 $364.79 $314.75 $346.32 $347.45 $405.98 
19 0.0058848 $351.06 $301.57 $333.52 $335.54 $394.65 


















Certainty equivalents of cumulative net returns above variable costs to the producer for a 

















0 0 $452.03 $382.31 $409.06 $398.20 $442.99 
1 0.0004797 $428.13 $359.39 $386.31 $376.49 $422.24 
2 0.0009594 $404.98 $337.16 $364.25 $355.49 $402.18 
3 0.0014391 $382.56 $315.61 $342.85 $335.20 $382.81 
4 0.0019188 $360.88 $294.73 $322.11 $315.60 $364.11 
5 0.0023985 $339.89 $274.48 $301.98 $296.66 $346.04 
6 0.0028783 $319.56 $254.81 $282.43 $278.34 $328.57 
7 0.003358 $299.84 $235.66 $263.40 $260.61 $311.66 
8 0.0038377 $280.68 $216.99 $244.84 $243.42 $295.28 
9 0.0043174 $262.04 $198.76 $226.73 $226.73 $279.38 
10 0.0047971 $243.89 $180.91 $209.02 $210.50 $263.93 
11 0.0052768 $226.19 $163.41 $191.67 $194.71 $248.91 
12 0.0057565 $208.91 $146.24 $174.67 $179.33 $234.30 
13 0.0062362 $192.05 $129.39 $158.01 $164.32 $220.07 
14 0.0067159 $175.59 $112.84 $141.66 $149.68 $206.20 
15 0.0071956 $159.53 $96.59 $125.64 $135.40 $192.70 
16 0.0076753 $143.87 $80.64 $109.93 $121.45 $179.56 
17 0.008155 $128.61 $65.01 $94.56 $107.84 $166.76 
18 0.0086348 $113.75 $49.70 $79.52 $94.55 $154.30 
19 0.0091145 $99.29 $34.74 $64.82 $81.59 $142.19 


















Certainty equivalents of cumulative net returns above variable costs to the producer for a 

















0 0 $770.94 $671.12 $688.42 $685.94 $704.31 
1 0.000284 $755.27 $655.85 $673.18 $671.29 $690.47 
2 0.0005681 $740.05 $641.02 $658.37 $657.07 $677.05 
3 0.0008521 $725.26 $626.61 $643.98 $643.28 $664.03 
4 0.0011361 $710.89 $612.61 $630.00 $629.89 $651.39 
5 0.0014202 $696.92 $598.99 $616.40 $616.89 $639.13 
6 0.0017042 $683.33 $585.75 $603.17 $604.27 $627.22 
7 0.0019882 $670.10 $572.85 $590.28 $591.99 $615.64 
8 0.0022722 $657.21 $560.29 $577.73 $580.05 $604.38 
9 0.0025563 $644.63 $548.04 $565.48 $568.42 $593.42 
10 0.0028403 $632.36 $536.08 $553.53 $557.10 $582.75 
11 0.0031243 $620.36 $524.40 $541.85 $546.05 $572.34 
12 0.0034084 $608.63 $512.98 $530.42 $535.27 $562.19 
13 0.0036924 $597.13 $501.80 $519.24 $524.75 $552.27 
14 0.0039764 $585.87 $490.85 $508.28 $514.46 $542.58 
15 0.0042605 $574.81 $480.11 $497.54 $504.39 $533.11 
16 0.0045445 $563.95 $469.57 $486.99 $494.53 $523.83 
17 0.0048285 $553.28 $459.22 $476.63 $484.88 $514.74 
18 0.0051125 $542.78 $449.05 $466.44 $475.41 $505.83 
19 0.0053966 $532.43 $439.05 $456.42 $466.12 $497.09 


















Certainty equivalents of cumulative net returns above variable costs to the producer for a 

















0 0 $727.59 $636.46 $660.04 $645.26 $683.31 
1 0.0002983 $710.15 $619.40 $643.02 $628.91 $667.58 
2 0.0005965 $693.18 $602.80 $626.46 $613.01 $652.30 
3 0.0008948 $676.69 $586.65 $610.37 $597.57 $637.46 
4 0.0011931 $660.65 $570.97 $594.72 $582.58 $623.05 
5 0.0014914 $645.08 $555.72 $579.52 $568.01 $609.07 
6 0.0017896 $629.95 $540.91 $564.74 $553.87 $595.49 
7 0.0020879 $615.26 $526.51 $550.38 $540.12 $582.30 
8 0.0023862 $600.98 $512.52 $536.42 $526.77 $569.49 
9 0.0026844 $587.11 $498.91 $522.84 $513.79 $557.04 
10 0.0029827 $573.62 $485.66 $509.62 $501.16 $544.93 
11 0.003281 $560.51 $472.77 $496.76 $488.87 $533.16 
12 0.0035793 $547.75 $460.21 $484.22 $476.90 $521.69 
13 0.0038775 $535.33 $447.97 $472.00 $465.23 $510.53 
14 0.0041758 $523.24 $436.03 $460.08 $453.85 $499.65 
15 0.0044741 $511.45 $424.38 $448.45 $442.75 $489.04 
16 0.0047723 $499.97 $413.00 $437.09 $431.91 $478.69 
17 0.0050706 $488.76 $401.89 $425.99 $421.31 $468.59 
18 0.0053689 $477.84 $391.02 $415.14 $410.96 $458.73 
19 0.0056672 $467.17 $380.40 $404.53 $400.84 $449.09 












APPENDIX G: ECONOMIC RETURNS TO REPRESENTATIVE FARMS PER 
CROP ENTERPRISE  
 
Whole farm mean net returns above variable costs per enterprise and policy alternative for a 
representative Arkansas County, Arkansas farm.  






















































































































Whole farm mean net returns above variable costs per enterprise and policy alternative for a 
representative Acadia Parish, Louisiana farm. 



























































































































Whole farm mean net returns above variable costs per enterprise and policy alternative for a 
representative Bolivar County, Mississippi farm. 

























































































































Whole farm mean net returns above variable costs per enterprise and policy  alternative for a 
representative Mississippi County, Arkansas farm. 




























































































































































































































Whole farm mean net returns above variable costs per enterprise and policy alternative for a 
representative Phillips County, Arkansas farm. 






























































































































































































































Whole farm mean net returns above variable costs per enterprise and policy alternative for a 
representative Morehouse Parish, Louisiana farm. 



























































































































































































































Whole farm mean net returns above variable costs per enterprise and policy alternative for a 
representative Tensas Parish, Louisiana farm. 




























































































































































































































Whole farm mean net returns above variable costs per enterprise and policy alternative for a 
representative Coahoma County, Mississippi farm. 



























































































































































































































Whole farm mean net returns above variable costs per enterprise and policy alternative for a 
representative Leflore County, Mississippi farm. 
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